Performance Measurement and Managerial Time Orientation by Rinsum, M. (Marcel) van
Performance Measurement and 
Managerial Time Orientation
Scandals involving managers that have quickly cashed in, leaving
their company in distress, regularly come to light. These managers
have undertaken actions oriented towards short-term gains, such as
lowering service or quality and decreasing long-term investments.
These actions are taken to boost current financial performance,
which commonly forms the basis for managers’ evaluation and rewards.
Although such actions are often dysfunctional, a short-term orien-
tation is not always bad. For example, in case of liquidity problems, a
fast increase in current financial results is required. Clearly, the
adoption of a managerial time orientation that is appropriate for the
circumstances is essential to a company’s success.
This dissertation demonstrates how the design of the performance
measurement system affects the time orientation of managers. It also
shows that managerial time orientation depends on individual
characteristics. The results can be used as guidelines for the use of
performance measures in companies, as well as for the selection of
managers, dependent on the desired managerial time orientation.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research
School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are RSM
Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics. ERIM was
founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-121-2
MARCEL VAN RINSUM
Performance
Measurement 
and Managerial
Time Orientation
D
esig
n
: B
&
T O
n
tw
erp
 en
 ad
vies w
w
w
.b
-en
-t.n
l
Prin
t:H
aveka w
w
w
.h
aveka.n
l
88
M
A
R
C
E
L
 V
A
N
 R
IN
S
U
M
 
P
e
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
 M
e
a
su
re
m
e
n
t a
n
d
 M
a
n
a
g
e
ria
l T
im
e
 O
rie
n
ta
tio
n
B&T26360 omslag rinsum
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance Measurement and 
Managerial Time Orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARCEL VAN RINSUM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Performance Measurement and 
Managerial Time Orientation 
 
 
Prestatiemeting en de tijdsoriëntatie van managers 
 
 
 
 
PROEFSCHRIFT 
 
 
 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
op gezag van de rector magnificus 
 
Prof.dr. S.W.J. Lamberts 
 
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties. 
 
 
 
 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op 
 
vrijdag 20 oktober 2006 om 11.00 uur 
 
door 
 
MARCEL VAN RINSUM 
geboren te Amersfoort 
  
Promotiecommissie 
 
 
Promotor: 
Prof.dr. F.G.H. Hartmann RC 
 
Overige leden: 
Prof.dr. G.M.H. Mertens 
Prof.dr. A.N.A.M. Boons 
Prof.dr. J.M.F.G. Bouwens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
RSM Erasmus University / Erasmus School of Economics 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
Internet: http://www.erim.eur.nl 
 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal:  http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
 
ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management, 88  
 
ISBN-10: 90-5892-121-2 
ISBN-13: 978-90-5892-121-5 
 
Design: B&T Ontwerp en advies, www.b-en-t.nl / Print: Haveka, www.haveka.nl 
 
© 2006, Marcel van Rinsum 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any 
form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by 
any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the 
author. 
 
  
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Conducting this research project and writing this dissertation is something I would never 
have been able to complete on my own. I am grateful for the help along the way of many 
people. Unfortunately I cannot thank them all by name here. 
 
First and foremost, I owe a debt of gratitude to my promoter, Frank Hartmann. I am very 
grateful to him for accepting me as his Ph.D. student, and for guiding me through the 
process with encouraging, insightful, critical and inspiring comments. But most of all I 
would like to thank him for his friendship and his support, trust, and patience, in a 
sometimes difficult period. 
 
Thanks also go to my two companions in the Ph.D. process, Victor Maas and Paolo 
Perego. From Victor, I obtained many insightful comments, including many on my 
research, during our work discussions and lunches. Paolo has also helped me a great deal 
in a similar way, not in the least by pointing out literature related to my topic. I wish to 
thank both of them for being such supportive colleagues and friends.  
 
I would also like to express my appreciation to my (former) colleagues at the University 
of Amsterdam (UvA) and Nijmegen University. I enjoyed working with them very much 
and I am grateful for their support. Maarten Schulp deserves mention in particular, for his 
help with my teaching activities and for being a fine colleague. I am also grateful to Jim 
Hunton and especially Mike Shields, for providing me with insightful and helpful 
comments on my research and my experimental design, during their time as visiting 
professors at the UvA, and after. 
 
Furthermore, I wish to thank the Controllers Institute (CI) for its logistical and financial 
support for the survey study, and the respondents to the survey and the participants in the 
experiment for their cooperation. 
 
During the completion of my manuscript, I received many helpful comments by two of 
my colleagues at RSM Erasmus University, Anna Nöteberg and Frank Verbeeten. I am 
grateful to Anna for providing insights for the write-up of my experiment, and I owe 
many thanks to Frank for his thorough reviews of my chapters. I also thank my other 
colleagues at RSM for their support. 
 
I am also grateful to the inner committee members for their consideration and approval of 
my manuscript, and to Jan Bouwens in particular also for his many insightful comments 
and helpful suggestions.  
 
Finally, I wish to thank my family and friends for their love and support. Their 
companionship has proven invaluable. 
v

  
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1    Introduction             1 
1.2    Research question            2 
1.3    Position in the literature            3 
1.4    Dissertation overview            5 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1    Introduction             7 
2.2    Accounting literature            8 
 2.2.1  Performance measure type          9 
 2.2.2  Performance measure use: subjectivity      16 
 2.2.3  Performance measure use: evaluation period      18 
2.3    Economic literature          22 
 2.3.1  Myopic loss aversion         23 
 2.3.2  Employment horizon         24 
2.4    Psychological literature          27 
2.5    Research opportunities          29 
 
 
Chapter 3: Hypotheses 
3.1    Introduction           33 
3.2   Properties of the performance measurement system      33 
3.2.1  Effects of leading and accounting performance measures    34 
3.2.2  Effect of subjectivity         39 
3.2.3  Effects of ease-of-manipulation       40 
3.3    Individual level variables          42 
vii
  
 
Chapter 4: Survey study 
4.1   Introduction           45 
4.2   Sample selection          45 
4.3   Preparation, pre-testing, and design        47 
4.4   Procedure           48 
4.5   Response rate           49 
4.6   Sample descriptives          50 
4.7   Measurement instruments         51 
4.7.1  Managerial time orientation        51 
4.7.2  Data manipulation         52 
4.7.3  Propensity to leave         52 
4.7.4  Individual time orientation (CFC)       53 
4.7.5  Performance measure properties       54 
4.7.6  Other PMS properties         54 
4.8   Descriptive statistics          55 
4.9   Non-response analysis          56 
4.10  Results            57 
 4.10.1  Correlations          57 
4.10.2 Partial Least Squares analysis of the model      58 
4.10.3 Tests for interaction H3        62 
4.11  Conclusion and discussion         63 
 
 
Chapter 5: Experimental study 
5.1 Introduction           67 
5.2 Experimental design          68  
5.2.1  General outline          68 
5.2.2  Operationalization of variables       70 
5.2.3  Detailed experimental design        72 
5.3 Results            75 
5.3.1  Sample           75 
5.3.2  Assumption testing         76 
5.3.3  Hypothesis testing         77 
5.4 Conclusions           83 
 
 
Chapter 6: Summary & Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction           87 
6.2 Summary overview          87 
6.3 Discussion of findings          88 
6.4 Implications and contributions         90 
6.5 Limitations and directions for further research       92 
viii
  
 
Appendix A: Survey study 
Appendix A1            96 
Appendix A2            97 
Appendix A3          105 
Appendix A4          106 
Appendix A5          111 
Appendix A6          112 
 
 
Appendix B: Experimental study 
Appendix B1          114 
Appendix B2          119 
Appendix B3          121 
Appendix B4          131 
Appendix B5          133 
Appendix B6          135 
Appendix B7          138 
Appendix B8          141 
 
  
References          145 
 
 
Summary in Dutch – Nederlandse samenvatting    155 
 
 
Curriculum Vitae         161 
ix
  
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1-1: Research framework           5 
Figure 2-1: Business process causal chain        10 
Figure 2-2: Conceptual framework for effects of PMS properties on MTO    12 
Figure 2-3: Typical reward scheme         19 
Figure 2-4: Myopic loss aversion         23 
Figure 3-1: Business process causal chain        34 
Figure 3-2: Combined effects of degree of lead and evaluation period    38 
Figure 3-3: Interactive effect of degree of lead and evaluation period    39 
Figure 3-4: Indirect effects of ease-of-manipulation       42 
Figure 3-5: Hypothesized theoretical model        44 
Figure 4-1: PLS results          59 
Figure 5-1: Physically separated working places in experimental room    68  
Figure 5-2: Schematic overhead view of experimental room      69 
Figure 5-3: Interactive effect of degree of lead and evaluation period    72 
Figure 5-4: Partial time-line for the experiment       73 
Figure 5-5: Histogram of two alternative dependent variables     76 
Figure 5-6: Graph of results          81 
 
x
  
TABLES 
 
Table 2-1: Definitions of performance measure categories        9 
Table 2-2: Overview of empirical evidence regarding effects on MTO    30 
Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics for survey measurement instruments    55 
Table 4-2: Correlations          57 
Table 4-3: Regression analysis for interactive effect       62 
Table 4-4: Correlations between degree of lead and MTO      62 
Table 4-5: Mean analysis MTO         63 
Table 4-6: Results of hypothesis testing        64 
Table 5-1: Experimental conditions         72 
Table 5-2: ANOVA analysis MTO #1        78 
Table 5-3: ANOVA analysis MTO #2        79 
Table 5-4: Results per experimental condition       79 
Table 5-5: Condition comparison of means MTO        80 
Table 5-6: ANOVA analysis subjects’ search strategy      82 
Table 5-7: Condition comparison of means subjects’ search strategy    83 
Table 6-1: Summary overview of findings        89 
 
 
 
 
 
xi
  
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
This dissertation analyzes the effects of properties of the performance measurement 
system and individual level variables on managerial time orientation, both theoretically 
and empirically.  
 
Managerial time orientation (MTO) is defined in this dissertation as the time-span within 
which managers seek to optimize the returns from their investments. Managers with a 
long MTO are more focused on long-term results, while short-term oriented managers are 
more inclined to maximize short-term results. 
The concept MTO has been defined in different terms in different streams of 
literature with no explicit generally accepted definition (National Academy of 
Engineering 1992; Bushman et al. 1996). Nevertheless, many studies consider a related 
concept which addresses a dysfunctional managerial short-term orientation, which is 
labeled myopia (short-sightedness) in the accounting literature (e.g., Merchant 1989; 
Merchant 1990; Chow et al. 1996; Bhojraj and Libby 2005):   
"Myopia exists when managers' orientations to the short-term become 
excessive, when the managers are more concerned with short-term 
profits than entity value." (Merchant 1998, p.460) 
Other studies that have also investigated managerial short-term orientation refer to short-
termism, or the unwillingness or impossibility of sacrificing short-run profit for long-term 
investments (e.g., Coates et al. 1995; Laverty 1996; Palley 1997; Demirag 1998b; 
Grinyer et al. 1998). Despite persisting attention to managerial short-term orientation, 
there is no consistent neutral definition of MTO, without an a-priori assumption about the 
possible dysfunctionality of a short-term managerial orientation, in the previous 
1
  
literature. This study addresses the whole spectrum of MTO, from short to long, in 
accordance with the definition provided at the start of this paragraph. 
 
Studying MTO and its determinants is of significant practical and theoretical relevance. 
The adoption by managers of a time orientation suitable for the circumstances, is 
considered crucial for the competitive position and long-term survival of firms (National 
Academy of Engineering 1992). Nevertheless, theoretical and empirical evidence on the 
effects of the performance measurement system (PMS) and of individual level variables 
on MTO is limited and relatively underdeveloped compared to research examining the 
effects of other (external) factors on MTO, such as pressure from the stock market 
(Laverty 1996, p.837). The scarcely available studies focus mainly on the effects of the 
use of accounting measures on myopia (e.g., Merchant 1990; Bhojraj and Libby 2005). 
Given the potential important influences of the PMS on MTO,  more extensive study of 
this topic is valuable (National Academy of Engineering 1992). This dissertation provides 
such a study. 
 
 
1.2  Research question 
Most of the attention to myopia in the accounting literature has been devoted to the 
effects of the use of only one particular type of performance measure: accounting 
performance measures. Many researchers have voiced claims about the negative effects 
of these measures on long-term investments (e.g., Fisher 1992; McKenzie and Shilling 
1998; Hope and Fraser 2003), and supporting empirical evidence exists (e.g., Merchant 
1990; Van der Stede 2000; Moers 2001). Recently, the attention of both academics and 
practitioners in accounting has also been directed at the use of non-financial performance 
measures as a means of providing a more balanced set of incentives and preventing 
managers from making short-term decisions (Balanced Scorecard, Kaplan and Norton 
1996), with only scarce empirical evidence available thus far (Moers 2001). But although 
non-financial measures can prevent myopia and gaming by measuring underlying 
dimensions of economic performance such as quality and customer satisfaction, whether 
and how non-financial measures work beyond the prevention of dysfunctional self-
interested behavior to cognitively affect management and actually lengthen MTO, is 
unclear. Moreover, by using distinctions for performance measures in broad categories, 
such as financial versus non-financial, without specifying the process through which this 
categorization influences managerial behavior, the accounting literature to date suffers 
from a lack of theory about which characteristics or dimensions of performance measures 
affect MTO and how (cf. Ittner and Larcker 1998; Ittner and Larcker 2002, p. s60). The 
generalization of effects on MTO of broadly specified categories of performance 
measures and the accompanying lack of clear theoretical arguments illustrate a first major 
2
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shortcoming in the current literature, and this constitutes the first main issue which this 
dissertation addresses. 
 
The second main issue addressed in this dissertation concerns the effect of variables at 
the individual level on MTO. First, the psychological literature has shown that 
individuals differ with respect to the consideration given to the future consequences of 
current actions (Strathman et al. 1994b). The question rises whether personal 
characteristics such as this affect MTO, and whether the use of performance measures 
could differentially affect MTO dependent on managerial personality characteristics. 
Second, the economic literature describes effects on MTO of the length of the 
employment horizon (length of employment contract), which is a personal situational 
variable. Taking into account the effects of individual characteristics and situational 
factors on MTO could provide valuable information on the relative effectiveness of 
personnel versus result controls (Merchant and Van der Stede 2003), with possible 
implications for the employee selection process and the design of the performance 
measurement system.  
 
This dissertation aims at filling significant gaps in the literature, as identified above, by 
building on the existing accounting literature, using both psychological and economic 
literatures, to examine the following research question as mentioned at the beginning of 
§1.1: 
What are the effects of properties of the managerial performance measurement system 
and individual level variables on managerial time orientation? 
 
 
1.3  Position in the literature 
The research question this dissertation investigates lies at the heart of the function of 
management control systems. These systems are described by Lowe (1971, p.5) as: 
"a system of organisational information seeking and gathering, 
accountability and feedback designed to ensure that the enterprise adapts 
to changes in its substantive environment and that the work behavior of its 
employees is measured by reference to a set of operational sub-goals 
(which conform with the overall objectives) so that the discrepancy 
between the two can be reconciled and corrected for."  
One of the main functions of the management control system is motivating managers to 
act in the organization’s interest (Merchant and Van der Stede 2003). When used for 
managerial performance evaluation, the PMS can be used as an instrument to provide 
motivation, for instance by setting difficult, specific, proximal goals (Bandura 1986; 
Locke and Latham 1990). However, the inherently specific and proximal nature of 
3
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION
  
performance measures used for evaluation can cause the maximization of the measured 
dimensions only, as well as invoke an undesirable MTO, leading to sub optimal 
organizational performance (e.g., Kerr 1975; Merchant 1990). This illustrates the 
importance of the correct direction of managerial effort, which includes an appropriate 
MTO. 
Correspondingly, the length of the time orientation exhibited by management 
should be appropriate for the circumstances under which the company operates to ensure 
high levels of organizational performance (National Academy of Engineering 1992). 
While a relatively long-term perspective may be optimal for most companies, there is 
evidence that companies have a spectrum of time horizons which ranges from quite long 
to short; some well-managed companies may want to adopt a short-term horizon. In terms 
of the contingency approach (Donaldson 2001; Chenhall 2003; Gerdin and Greve 2004), 
organizations that have achieved a fit between contingency factors and MTO will 
outperform those companies that have failed to achieve that fit and are in misfit. Many 
contingency factors have been mentioned in previous studies, such as strategy, which is 
used here for illustrative purposes. A strategic focus on short-term profit, which is likely 
the case when a harvest or divest strategy is employed (Govindarajan and Gupta 1985), 
would require a short-term orientation (Merchant and Manzoni 1989). A build strategy, 
aimed at improving market share in the long-run, can be expected to lead to optimal 
organizational performance only when coupled with a managerial long-term orientation. 
It is important to note that, although strategy influences the MTO required to achieve 
optimal organizational results, there is no theory that predicts a direct effect of strategy on 
MTO (Van der Stede 2000; Chenhall and Moers 2006). Instead, strategy affects the 
design of the management control system (e.g., Abernethy and Brownell 1999; Bouwens 
and Abernethy 2000), which is a choice variable and can in turn be used as an instrument 
to influence MTO (Chenhall and Moers 2006). The same reasoning applies to other 
contingency factors: they affect the fit with MTO, but have no direct effect – see the 
lower three ovals in figure 1-1. Other factors besides strategy that can affect the required 
or desired MTO are [1] industry or product and business activity (National Academy of 
Engineering 1992); [2] situations with an immediate desire for profit to signal stability to 
external stakeholders (Merchant and Manzoni 1989), for instance in case of liquidity 
considerations or avoidance of bankruptcy (Said et al. 2003); [3] firm growth 
opportunities (Bushman et al. 1996); [4] the costs associated with eliminating a 
dysfunctional (short) time orientation (Thevaranjan et al. 2000). 
 
In order to achieve the necessary focus, this study seeks to explain only the effects of 
several choice variables (properties) that are part of the design of the PMS and of 
individual level variables on MTO (indicated by the three gray ovals in figure 1-1). It 
refrains from predicting the effectiveness of the management control system design or the 
4
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MTO achieved, but only analyzes the effects of PMS properties, as well as individual 
level variables, on MTO. In doing so, it contributes to the research stream on MTO in 
managerial accounting (Merchant 1990; Chow et al. 1996; Van der Stede 2000) in map B 
as identified by Luft and Shields (2003). In contrast, much of the available evidence 
stems from studies that investigate the effects of contingency factors on the design of the 
PMS, assuming that this affects MTO. Although evidence from these studies will be used 
to derive the theoretical predictions, the goal of this dissertation is to provide empirical 
evidence on the direct relations between PMS properties and individual level variables, 
and MTO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4  Dissertation overview 
This paragraph provides an outline for the remainder of this dissertation, as well as a list 
of contributions to the literature. 
The next chapter provides a review of the literature regarding MTO, which is 
aimed at providing an overview of available theory and empirical evidence in the 
accounting literature, as well as in the fields of economics and psychology that it draws 
upon. In service of the research question, its particular purpose is to distill properties of 
the PMS and individual level variables affecting MTO from the literature. 
The third chapter develops hypotheses, based on combinations of existing and 
development of new theoretical arguments, about how properties of the managerial PMS 
and individual level variables influence MTO, without an a-priori assumption about the 
(dys)functionality of a managerial short-term orientation. This as opposed to the literature 
Figure 1-1: Research framework - the gray ovals indicate the 
focus of this dissertation. 
Contingency 
factors 
PMS 
properties 
MTO 
Organizational 
performance 
Individual 
factors 
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on MTO to date, that has primarily focused on managerial short-term orientation 
(Merchant 1990; Van der Stede 2000). Second, in building these theoretical arguments, it 
attempts to integrate behavioral and economic literatures, thus using an interdisciplinary 
approach which will provide a more complete picture of a complex practical problem (cf. 
Merchant et al. 2003). 
The fourth chapter describes the survey study that was conducted among a 
representative sample of Dutch financial managers to test the derived hypotheses. This 
chapter provides direct empirical evidence on how PMS properties and individual level 
variables influence MTO, thus providing a generalizable initial test of the theoretical 
model developed in chapter three.  
The fifth chapter gives a description of the experimental investigation, using 
student subjects, into three selected hypotheses from the theoretical model. Further 
investigation of these three hypotheses, concerning the effects of the evaluation period 
and the use of leading performance measures on MTO, was warranted based on the 
survey results. In addition, added value of the experiment lies in [1] isolating the effects 
of separate properties of the PMS on MTO that are confounded with other variables in the 
cross-sectional survey study; [2] demonstrating causality (Shadish et al. 2002); [3] 
enhancing reliability by employing a multi-method empirical test (McGrath et al. 1982; 
Birnberg et al. 1990) - by triangulating the findings of both methods, both external 
validity (by using a survey) and internal validity (by conducting the experiment) are 
optimized (McGrath et al. 1982); and [4] providing evidence on an underlying process of 
organizational performance, thus contributing to the scarce experimental literature 
considering dependent variables other than performance (Sprinkle 2003). 
Finally, the sixth and last chapter provides a summary and conclusion.
 
6
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides a literature review on research regarding (managerial) time 
orientation. Its structure and content are guided by the following considerations. 
First, the main goal of this chapter is to identify properties of the PMS and 
individual level variables affecting MTO, in accordance with the research question. As 
pointed out by Laverty (1996) in an overview of MTO research, influences on MTO 
originate from within the economy at large, from within the organization and from 
individual level variables, and these should ideally be considered simultaneously. 
However, the scope of this chapter is limited by the research question, which nevertheless 
addresses a complex practical issue that requires an interdisciplinary approach (Merchant 
et al. 2003). Studies regarding effects of the PMS and individual level variables on time 
orientation can be found in the accounting, economic and psychological literatures, and 
these are subsequently reviewed in this chapter. This structure enables an overview of 
factors that have been considered in different streams of literature, which is helpful for 
identifying opportunities for cross-fertilization and clarifying theoretical arguments.
Second, this dissertation aims to contribute to the existing management 
accounting studies on MTO in map B (Merchant 1990; Chow et al. 1996; Van der Stede 
2000) as identified by Luft and Shields (2003). The level of analysis of these studies and 
of this dissertation is the sub-unit level. This implies that the focal point of attention is 
formed by properties of the PMS that play a role at middle-management levels, and not 
by (external) variables that affect the MTO of CEOs, such as stock market influences.  
7
  
Third, the focus on PMS properties entails a choice in directing primary attention 
to performance measures and the way they are used for evaluation purposes1. Given the 
focus of the research question, this dissertation does not explicitly consider the type of 
incentives attached to performance measures2. It also does not analyze the specific form 
of the compensation formula (target setting).   
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, it describes the accounting, economic and 
psychological literatures that discuss properties of the PMS and individual level variables 
affecting time orientation in paragraphs two, three and four, respectively. This 
classification should not be seen as a strict separation between these streams of literature, 
which is both difficult and undesirable due to some degree of overlap. Rather, the 
purpose of these paragraphs is to provide a (not necessarily exhaustive) broad 
representative summary overview of the literature. Paragraph five concludes the chapter 
by pointing out avenues for further research. 
 
 
2.2  Accounting literature 
This paragraph discusses accounting studies regarding the effects of the PMS on MTO. 
The primary criterion for assigning a study to the accounting literature are its contents. 
Studies considering the effects of properties of the PMS and/or evaluations based on the 
PMS are classified as accounting studies, because they address issues of performance 
measurement which are at the core of accounting. This also applies to such studies that 
are based on economic theory. 
In the accounting literature, several different sources of influences on MTO from 
the PMS are discussed. Subparagraph 2.2.1 describes a subgroup of studies that 
investigate the effects of different types of performance measures on MTO. The next two 
subparagraphs focus on the way the PMS is used in evaluations. Subparagraph 2.2.2 
                                                 
1 This dissertation addresses the effects of the use of the PMS for decision control. 
2 It should be recognized that the effects of performance measures on MTO are influenced by incentive 
type (Coates et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 1999, p.140). For instance, it has been argued that a longer MTO is 
likely when career concerns are relatively more important (Coates et al. 1995; Day et al. 2002). Basing 
bonuses on managerial accomplishments from multiple periods – called “bonus banking” – alledgedly 
lengthens MTO (National Academy of Engineering 1992; Stern et al. 1995, p.43-44). More heavy 
weighting of rewards in later periods has also been claimed and shown to increase the length of MTO 
(Merchant 1989, p.75; Schotter and Weigelt 1992; Palley 1997, p.556), which is consistent with tournament 
theory (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986; Lambert et al. 1993). Finally, stock-based rewards are 
generally seen as inducive of a managerial long-term orientation (Palley 1997; Nagy et al. 1999). 
Consistently, these rewards have generally been shown to be more prevalent in firms with higher growth 
rates, longer product development and product life cycles, and higher R&D expenditures, all of which are 
contingency factors which require a long MTO (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Lewellen et al. 1987; Clinch 
1991; Bizjak et al. 1993; Gaver and Gaver 1993; Pavlik et al. 1993; Bushman et al. 1996). 
8
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considers studies that analyze the degree of subjectivity. The length of the evaluation 
period is the subject of a group of studies listed in subparagraph 2.2.3. 
 
2.2.1  Performance measure type 
For the most part, the literature has divided performance measures into two broad 
categories: financial and non-financial. The first category is often equated with 
accounting (transaction based measures, such as profit) or lagging measures, while the 
latter term is often used interchangeably with the term leading performance measures. 
This interchangeable use is not always appropriate. Table 2-1 contains definitions for 
each type of measure3. 
 
Table 2-1: Definitions of performance measure categories 
Type of measure Definition 
Financial Measure expressed in monetary terms 
 
Non-financial Measure not expressed in monetary terms 
 
Accounting Transaction-based financial measure (profit-based) 
 
Leading Measure at the beginning or middle of the causal chain of 
the business process (indicator of actions or processes) 
 
Lagging Measure at the end of the causal chain of the business 
process (indicator of outcomes / end-results) 
 
 
 
The leading/lagging classification requires further clarification. Leading performance 
measures are performance measures that are causally linked to eventual end-results in 
terms of accounting performance. Figure 2-1 provides an illustration of the concept of 
leading performance measures. A change in a leading indicator affects accounting results 
with a time lag. The length of this time lag determines the degree to which the 
performance measure is leading (degree of lead). In the figure, customer satisfaction is a 
performance measure with a higher degree of lead than customer retention, because it has 
a longer time lag until accounting performance is affected. Although figure 2-1 shows 
only non-financial leading performance measures, leading indicators can be stated either 
in non-financial or financial terms (for example, quality costs). 
                                                 
3 In order to achieve focus, the following categories of performance measures are not explicitly considered: 
group measures and measures at a higher organizational level, “new” value-based measures (e.g., Stern et 
al. 1995), market measures. 
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These performance measure classifications are relevant when studying effects of the PMS 
on MTO, and the following effects have been identified in the literature. 
Financial measures, and especially accounting measures, are generally seen as 
inducing short-term behavior. These measures are used to provide managers with 
incentives to strive for the overall organizational goal, but this implies that they are 
aggregated and summarized, and provide little indication of actions taken (Fisher 1992; 
Singleton-Green 1993). Managers can use the possibility for manipulation provided by 
the latitude in accounting principles to maximize compensation (Nagy et al. 1999; Libby 
et al. 2002). Subsequently, any myopic actions taken to enhance current accounting 
performance are not easily detected. At the same time, the cautious nature of accounting 
rules which do not recognize uncertain gains and, in the U.S., require R&D investments 
to be fully expensed immediately, is also argued to cause myopia (see Merchant 1989; 
Bushee 1998, p. 306).  
Non-financial leading performance measures, if chosen and monitored correctly 
and not prone to manipulation (Baker 2002; Smith 2002), have been claimed to promote 
long-term behavior because they provide indications of the causal factors of business 
success (Fisher 1992; Singleton-Green 1993). Given the relative benefits of financial and 
non-financial measures, Kaplan and Norton call for a balanced use of both types of 
measures in a Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1996). 
 
The next two sections describe analytical and empirical evidence on the effects of the 
different types of performance measures listed above on MTO, respectively. In the study 
citings, the original terminology regarding the type of performance measure is used in 
order to illustrate its use in the literature. The appropriateness of the interchangeable use 
of performance measure classifications is further explored at the end of this 
subparagraph. 
  High degree of lead
Figure 2-1: Business process causal chain, with performance measures that exhibit different 
degrees of lead. 
Time 
Action Increase in 
customer 
satisfaction 
Increase in 
profits 
Increase in 
customer 
retention 
  Low degree of lead 
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Analytical evidence 
A first subgroup of studies provide analytical evidence on the effects of different types of 
performance measures on MTO. The theoretical models developed in these studies are 
based on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In short, this theory posits that 
managers (the agents) are self-interested and effort- and risk-averse, which makes their 
goals incongruent with the goals of the company or shareholders (the principal). 
Combined with the assumed presence of information-asymmetry between principal and 
agent, this results in an incentive problem. Different types of performance measures are 
predicted to be used in evaluations to affect managerial effort and MTO. 
Narayanan (1985) developed a model which provides evidence on the effects of 
accounting measures. It shows that managers may be inclined to undertake short-term 
projects, when increasing earnings enhances their reputation and positively affects their 
value on the labor market.  
Dikolli (2001) shows that the optimal incentive weights on different types of 
measures depend on the agent's employment horizon; the shorter the horizon, the greater 
the weight on the forward-looking performance measure. Forward-looking measures are 
shown to prevent an agent from being too focused on short-term performance, and 
leaving the firm before the long-term adverse effects of that myopia become apparent.  
Sliwka (2002) provides an agency model demonstrating that if managers are 
mostly interested in current results, either inherently or to signal their value to other 
potential employers before quitting, it may not be possible to use an incentive plan based 
only on financial measures to provide incentives for increasing long-term performance. 
This observation is consistent with Narayanan (1985). The inclusion of non-financial 
measures in the compensation contract, however, can solve this problem by providing 
long-term incentives (Sliwka 2002).  
Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) developed a model which shows that the need for 
leading performance indicators depends on both the agent’s and the principal’s planning 
horizon and their ability to make long-term contractual commitments. The model 
demonstrates that especially in case of short-term contracts, leading performance 
measures are essential to induce managers to make investments, because the manager 
could otherwise be deprived of the benefits in the future (Dutta and Reichelstein 2003).  
In sum, analytical evidence demonstrates that non-financial leading performance 
measures can be used to induce a positive effect on MTO, while accounting measures can 
shorten MTO, especially though not exclusively in case of a short employment horizon.  
 
Empirical evidence 
Several distinct categories of studies provide empirical evidence on the effects on MTO 
of different types of performance measures. First, attention is focused on studies that are 
indirectly related to this relationship. 
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A first strand of research studies addresses the predictive ability of the different types of 
measures for future financial results. Many studies have investigated the time lag 
between current non-financial or financial performance and future financial performance 
– see Shields and Shields (2005) for an overview. For MTO, not this time lag itself but its 
effects on individual decision-making are of importance. Luft and Shields (2002) provide 
evidence on this issue by conducting an experimental study into the judgment 
performance of individuals predicting future financial performance. They provide 
subjects with financial and/or non-financial information, and find that judgment 
performance is better when financial measures are replaced with or supplemented by non-
financial measures. This evidence is consistent with the inclination of individuals to look 
for causes in the near past and the capability of non-financial measures to reduce myopia 
by providing a temporal bridge and to create a focus on the future, as opposed to the 
historical focus of financial measures (Luft and Shields 2002, p.31).  
 
A second subgroup of studies investigates the effects of contingency variables that affect 
the required MTO on the choice of performance measures. Figure 2-2 reproduces part of 
figure 1-1, that has been adapted to serve as a framework for the evidence that is 
considered here.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following studies do not directly address the effects of type of performance measure 
on MTO (link 2 in figure 2-2), but (implicitly) assume these effects. Empirically, they 
demonstrate only effects of contingency factors on the measures included in the PMS 
Figure 2-2: Conceptual framework for the effects 
of PMS properties on MTO. 
MTO 
  (1)    (2) 
(3) 
Organizational 
performance 
Contingency 
factors 
PMS 
properties 
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(link 1) and sometimes on performance (part of link 3), although the expectations are 
based on a line of reasoning that assumes an effect on MTO. 
Lambert and Larcker (1987) use both survey and archival data to examine the 
relative weight on accounting and market measures in CEO remuneration contracts. They 
find that high growth firms put relatively less weight on accounting measures, consistent 
with the conclusion that accounting measures are less useful when the consequences of 
current actions occur further in the future.  
Said et al. (2003) argue that the use of non-financial measures in a Balanced 
Scorecard leads to a long-term perspective. Consequently, longer product life or 
development cycles are expected to make non-financial measures more informative and 
financial measures less informative. Additionally, distressed firms are expected to rely 
more on short-term financial measures to avoid bankruptcy. Furthermore, organizations 
are likely to make more or less use of short-term financial or forward-looking measures 
dependent on whether their strategy is that of a prospector or defender (see Miles and 
Snow 1978), respectively. A fit between the use of non-financial measures and the factors 
strategy, length of the product life cycle and financial distress is found to affect firm 
performance positively (Said et al. 2003).  
Ittner et al. (1997) also argue that CEO compensation contracts will make 
relatively more use of non-financial indicators in case of a long-term innovative strategy 
(prospector), and relatively more use of financial indicators in case of financial distress. 
Their data confirms the hypothesis with regard to strategy, though not regarding financial 
distress.  
HassabElnaby et al. (2005) study the decision by firms to retain or discard the use 
of non-financial performance measures using longitudinal archival data. They find that 
firms with an innovation-oriented strategy or a longer product life cycle are more likely 
to retain non-financial measures in their compensation contracts, while firms that are in 
financial distress tend to abandon the use of non-financial measures. Moreover, firms 
with a fit between these circumstantial variables and the use of non-financial measures 
exhibit higher levels of performance. 
In sum, the representative studies listed above indicate that accounting measures 
are less useful and non-financial measures more useful when decisions affect results 
further in the future (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Luft and Shields 2002). Additionally, 
contingency factors such as the length of the product life and development cycle, 
financial distress, and whether the organization pursues an innovator or prospector 
strategy have been shown to influence the relative use of financial and non-financial 
performance measures consistent with the MTO that is theoretically required for optimal 
results (Ittner et al. 1997; AAA Financial Accounting Standards Committee 2002; Said et 
al. 2003; HassabElnaby et al. 2005). Theoretically, MTO should have been affected by 
the differential use of performance measures to achieve a fit with these variables resulting 
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in optimal performance (see figure 2-2), but an effect on MTO is only assumed and not 
empirically verified in these studies. Nevertheless, consistent with analytical evidence, 
these studies suggest that financial measures influence MTO negatively, while non-
financial measures exert a positive effect on MTO length.  
 
Empirical evidence on the direct link between type of measure and managerial time 
orientation, which is of primary interest here, can be found in the following studies. 
Merchant (1989) conducted an empirical study among managers from twelve 
companies. He presents both questionnaire data obtained from corporate financial 
officers and interview data from profit center managers. He concludes from his 
observations that the failure to timely recognize good long-term decisions is the severest 
problem with accounting earnings measures. He judges that investment myopia, or 
inefficient amounts of long-term investments, occurs because gains are not recognized 
when they are uncertain (accounting conservatism). Based on the responses by managers, 
his view is that leading indicators (such as customer satisfaction measures) direct 
attention to the long-term (Merchant 1989, p.67). 
In a later study, Merchant (1990) uses both interview and questionnaire data 
obtained from profit center managers to empirically test the effects of financial measures 
on managerial behavior. He finds that financial short term targets lead to a short-term 
managerial orientation and to manipulation of reported profit figures.  
The results of Hoskisson et al. (1993), who study the effects of incentives based 
on short-term (annual) financial performance of the division by means of a questionnaire 
among CEOs, indicate that incentives based on these measures are negatively related to 
firm-level R&D. This is consistent with the proposition that these measures cause a short-
term orientation and Merchant’s (1990) results. 
Van der Stede (2000) documented more empirical evidence on the effects of 
financial measures, based on a questionnaire of business-unit general managers. He finds 
a negative relation between budgetary slack and short-term orientation, consistent with 
the notion that accounting performance measures, when emphasized and difficult to 
achieve, cause a short-term orientation.  
Chow et al. (1996) study the differences between Japan and the U.S. in 
dysfunctional effects due to control system tightness. Their results indicate that, given a 
level of control tightness, US managers engaged in dysfunctional behavior to a greater 
extent than their Japanese counterparts. The former manipulated performance measures 
more frequently and were more short-term oriented, as they felt discouraged by the 
control system to develop ideas about new long-term investments (Chow et al. 1996).  
The study by Moers (2001) is the first to provide empirical evidence on the effects 
of non-financial measures on MTO. He hypothesized that evaluations based on financial 
measures shorten MTO while evaluations based on non-financial measures affect the 
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length of MTO positively, but these hypotheses were not supported by his questionnaire 
data. However, his data confirmed that when targets were used based on these measures, 
financial performance measures had a negative while non-financial measures had a 
positive effect on MTO length as expected. This suggests a certain level of tightness of 
controls based on performance measures is necessary to induce effects of those measures 
on MTO.  
Farell et al. (2005) conduct an experiment to study the effects of contracting on a 
leading indicator on the type of effort exerted. They find that the use of leading indicators 
mitigates the self-interested behavior by subjects and reduces short-term orientations in 
case of a short employment contract. In case of a long employment contract, leading 
indicators increase effort directed at the long-term, though for a different reason: they 
help subjects to identify the optimal long-term task strategy.  
Again, consistent with both analytical models and evidence regarding contingency 
factors, the empirical evidence listed above generally supports the propositions that the 
use of financial measures has a negative effect on MTO, while using non-financial 
measures positively affects MTO. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, both analytical and empirical evidence is consistent with claims voiced by 
academics and practitioners that the use of financial measures leads to short-term 
behavior (e.g., Merchant 1990; Hoskisson et al. 1993), at least in Western cultures (Chow 
et al. 1996), while the use of non-financial measures prevents a managerial short-term 
orientation (Moers 2001; Farrell et al. 2005). It is important to note, however, that these 
effects can be dependent on the managerial employment horizon (Dikolli 2001; Dutta and 
Reichelstein 2003; Sliwka 2002) and on the extent to which the performance measure is 
manipulable (Eccles and Mavrinac 1995; Baker 2002; Smith 2002). 
Theoretical arguments refer to the level of aggregation (Fisher 1992; Singleton-
Green 1993) and the conservatism in accounting, not just financial, measures as a cause 
for myopia (Merchant 1989; Bushee 1998; Nagy et al. 1999; Libby et al. 2002), 
Nevertheless, financial measures have often been equated with accounting measures in 
empirical research (e.g., Merchant 1990; Hoskisson et al. 1993). With regard to non-
financial measures, theoretical arguments indicate the importance of the extent to which 
performance measures are leading indicators of future (accounting) performance (Kaplan 
and Norton 1996). But leading indicators have often been equated with non-financial 
measures in empirical testing and occasionally also in theoretical arguments, while [1] 
financial indicators can also be leading indicators of long term results (for example, 
quality costs); and [2] not all non-financial indicators lead to the same extent because 
they do not occupy the same position in the causal chain of the business process (see 
figure 2-1). A more stringent use of terminology is called for. Moreover, the use of broad 
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categories has oversimplified studies on the determinants and effects of performance 
measures (Ittner and Larcker 1998; Said et al. 2003; Malina and Selto 2004). The 
literature on MTO seems to have under emphasized the process through which different 
types of performance measures affect MTO. To study this in more detail, a taxonomy of 
performance measures (cf. Pavlik et al. 1993, p.179) and an evaluation of the underlying 
characteristics of performance measures (cf. Ittner and Larcker 1998) is required.    
 
2.2.2  Performance measure use: subjectivity  
While the previous set of studies considered different types of performance measures, 
this paragraph and the next deal with the way in which performance measures are used in 
evaluations. Subjectivity refers to a judgment by the supervisor of the subordinates 
performance, including a judgment of the actions taken to achieve that performance. 
Subjective evaluations can take different forms, such as [1] flexible weighting of 
objective performance measures ex-post (at the end of the evaluation period); [2] the use 
of subjective (qualitative) measures; [3] discretion in using additional performance 
criteria (Ittner et al. 2003; Moers 2005). In contrast, in completely objective evaluations 
the weights attached to quantitative performance measures are specified precisely ex-
ante. Although analytical models have been developed which show that the use of 
subjective evaluations in addition to objective criteria can improve incentive contracts 
(Baker et al. 1994; Baiman and Rajan 1995), strong theory on the effect of subjectivity on 
MTO is lacking. Nevertheless, it is often argued that subjectivity allows the supervisor to 
correct for dysfunctional behavior, such as myopia, induced by incomplete performance 
measures (e.g., Gibbons 1998; Ittner and Larcker 1998, p.227; Baker 2002, p.750). In the 
next section the extent of the empirical evidence regarding the effect of subjectivity in 
performance evaluations on MTO is examined. 
 
Anecdotal evidence on the effect of subjectivity is provided by Merchant (1989). In one 
of his interviews, a CEO indicated that he did not want the terms in the performance 
evaluation contract to be defined very specifically up-front. The reason was that he was 
worried that if managers figured out the rules of objective bonus formulas, they would 
find out how to play games to increase short-term performance only (Merchant 1989, 
p.135). 
 
Stronger empirical evidence that indirectly supports a relation between subjectivity and 
MTO can be found in the following studies. These studies consider the effects of 
contingency variables that theoretically affect the required MTO – see figure 2-2 and the 
text elaborating on the figure in the previous paragraph.  
First, Bushman et al. (1996) use a proprietary compensation database to study the 
role of individual performance evaluation in CEO-compensation. Individual performance 
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evaluation refers to evaluations that are not based on corporate measures of performance 
(either accounting or stock based), but are more individually geared, which is similar in 
meaning to the term subjective evaluation. A third of all firms are found to use individual 
performance evaluation. Bushman et al. (1996) further find that both this form of 
subjective performance evaluation as well as the use of long-term option grants are 
positively related to firm growth opportunities and to longer product development and 
life cycles, circumstances in which objective corporate measures of performance are less 
likely to capture value-enhancing actions fully. Because these are circumstances which 
require a longer MTO, this evidence is consistent with a positive effect of subjectivity on 
MTO. 
Subjective evaluations are also predicted by Murphy and Oyer (2003) to be used 
to a greater extent in case of, among other factors, higher substantial growth and more 
investment opportunities, which are circumstances that require a long MTO. The authors 
are, however, unable to verify these hypotheses using a proprietary compensation data 
set.  
Hayes and Schaefer (2000) analyze data obtained from surveys of executive 
compensation. They show that when subjective evaluation is used to a higher degree, 
CEO compensation is more positively related to future earnings. This can be seen as 
support for the assertion that subjective evaluations are used to provide incentives for 
investments that benefit the long-term and are not adequately reflected in objective 
performance measures (Hayes and Schaefer 2000). 
Gibbs et al. (2004) study both causes and effects of subjectivity in incentive 
systems for middle-management in a sample of 250 car dealerships. They find that for 
those managers receiving a subjectively determined reward, that reward averages 20% of 
their total pay. They hypothesize that subjectivity in determining incentives will be 
higher [1] in case of less complete performance measurement, so that subjectivity can 
correct for the unmeasured dimensions of performance; [2] in case of a higher risk of a 
distorting short-term focus of accounting performance measures used and in case of a 
high level of long-term investments in intangibles, which are cases where subjectivity can 
correct for myopic behavior; [3] in case of performance measures that are more 
susceptible to manipulation, so that subjective evaluations can correct for any 
dysfunctional behavior. These hypotheses are (partly) supported – the study thus provides 
indirect evidence for the role of subjectivity in preventing dysfunctional behavior in 
general and myopia in particular.  
  
In sum, the majority of the theoretical conjectures and empirical evidence to date 
suggests that subjective evaluation methods correct for or prevent myopic behavior. More 
subjectivity was found in cases of more growth opportunities, longer product 
development and life cycles (Bushman et al. 1996), and more risk of dysfunctional 
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effects like myopia (Gibbs et al. 2004). This evidence provides indirect support for a 
positive effect of subjectivity on MTO. Nevertheless, while subjective evaluations have 
been found to be used frequently (Bushman et al. 1996) and rewards determined by this 
method can form a substantial proportion of compensation at middle-management level  
(Murphy and Oyer 2003; Gibbs et al. 2004), the amount of empirical evidence is limited. 
The available evidence is mixed, and mostly causes, not effects, of subjectivity are 
examined (Moers 2005, p.69). Moreover, until now there is no direct empirical evidence 
on the relationship between subjectivity and MTO (link 2 in figure 2-2). 
 
2.2.3  Performance measure use: evaluation period 
This paragraph focuses on the effect of the length of the evaluation period, which 
determines the frequency with which managerial performance in terms of accounting 
results is evaluated, on MTO. Measuring performance over a period shorter than the pay-
off period of long-run investments, for example quarterly or annually may induce a short-
term managerial orientation because long-term consequences are not apparent in current 
results (Laverty 1996).  
Although the focus of this study is on the internal managerial evaluation period, 
valuable insight can be gained by briefly directing attention to the effect of the stock 
market measurement period first. The stock market’s emphasis on quarterly earnings, 
combined with management's short tenure, has been found to lead to short-term thinking 
and little incentives to invest in R&D because of an over-emphasis on periodic results 
(Eccles 1991; Eccles and Mavrinac 1995; Demirag and Tylecote 1996; Demirag 1998a). 
Even when the market is not primarily interested in short-term returns, the mere 
perception by management that periodic external reports influence their performance 
rating in any way is enough to invoke short-term behavior (Demirag 1996; Demirag 
1998a). The remainder of this subparagraph discusses the internal evaluation period.  
The internal evaluation period or “accounting period” (Ridgway 1956) has been 
argued to affect the accomplishment of the organizational goal by affecting MTO. For 
instance, rigid adherence to annual financial targets is viewed by Hope and Fraser (2003) 
as leading to pressure for short-term actions, thus hindering innovation. These proponents 
of beyond budgeting therefore advise to set rolling forecasts or to set goals for a longer 
term than annually to prevent this. The next two sections describe empirical evidence 
regarding the effect of the length of the evaluation period. 
 
Earnings management 
Studies studying the phenomena of earnings management provide empirical evidence that 
the evaluation period affects managerial behavior, by documenting the manipulation of 
earnings due to annual bonus schemes (Healy 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 
1999). The reason is described by Jensen (2003), who criticizes the frequent use of non-
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linear bonus schemes, which results in dysfunctional behavior when performance is at a 
level near the lower or upper bound. Figure 2-3 displays the form of a typical incentive 
scheme. When performance is between the lower and upper bound, or just below the 
lower bound, an incentive exists to manage earnings upward in order to collect a higher 
reward. When performance is far below the lower bound, so that a bonus is unlikely, or 
above the upper bound, earnings will likely be shifted from the current period into the 
next, making it easier to present favorable results and obtain a bonus in the next period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Healy (1985) obtained access to the bonus contracts of executives in 94 companies and  
tested these earnings management hypotheses. Results indicate that executives manage 
earnings downward when their maximum periodic bonus has been reached. When 
performance is far below the lower bound, and an increase cannot be expected to increase 
earnings to a level eligible for a bonus, earnings are also managed downward. Earnings 
are managed upward when an increase in earnings is anticipated to increase 
compensation (between the lower and upper bound or just below the lower bound of the 
incentive scheme) (Healy 1985). Guidry et al. (1999) corroborate Healy’s (1985) 
empirical results.  
Using confidential data of executive short-term bonus plans, Holthausen et al. 
(1995) extend Healy’s work in this area by using a different data-analysis method. They 
also find evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are 
at their maximum. However, unlike in Healy (1985), no evidence is found that managers 
Figure 2-3: Typical reward scheme (based on Merchant and Van 
der Stede 2003, p.343). 
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manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to 
receive any bonus. Holthausen et al. (1995) also perform an empirical analysis into the 
effects of the bonus scheme on R&D expenditures, which can be seen as a way of 
detecting effects on MTO. However, they find no significant results indicating earnings 
management by adapting the level of real investment decisions. 
Dechow et al. (1996) examine big cases of earnings management that are 
investigated by the SEC; they find no evidence of earnings management for the purpose 
of obtaining a larger bonus (but positive evidence for purpose of raising low-cost external 
financing).  
A study by Degeorge et al. (1999) shows that there are three thresholds at which 
earnings management occurs. In order of importance, earnings are managed to produce 
positive earnings figures (>0), to sustain recent performance, and to live up to analysts’ 
expectations. Only when the first threshold is surpassed, does the next one enter the 
manager’s mindset and does it affect reporting behavior. 
Leone and Rock (2002) argue that budget ratcheting coupled with earnings-based 
bonus schemes provides managers with incentives to manage earnings only when this 
leads to long-term performance increases. Accounting choices that only lead to a short-
term gain are avoided, however, because targets in subsequent periods will be increased 
and cannot be continually achieved. Their statistical analyses of business unit data from a 
large multinational company confirm these expectations. Fundamental assumptions of the 
analysis are [1] asymmetrical ratcheting (losses lead to smaller target adjustments than 
gains); and [2] at least a five-year managerial horizon; if managers are planning to quit 
before then, they will be less concerned about future targets (Leone and Rock 2002, 
p.59). 
 
The previous section contains references to influential and illustrative papers in this 
stream of literature. Reviews of the earnings management literature are provided by 
Guidry et al. (1999) and Healy and Wahlen (1999). Overall, this stream of research 
shows that accounting based bonus contracts are one of the main causes of earnings 
management (Healy and Wahlen 1999), unless there is a long managerial contract 
horizon and budgets ratchet (Leone and Rock 2002). While the evidence is quite strong 
with respect to reporting behavior (e.g., timing of recording transactions), resource 
allocation and MTO can also be affected. Annual formula-based bonus plans tend to 
over-emphasize short-term accounting returns and can therefore be expected to 
discourage long-term investments (Hope and Fraser 2003). Delaying or permanently 
cutting R&D expenses, for example, is another way to manage earnings (Bushee 1998). 
Evidence on the effects on investments is weak at best. Holthausen et al. (1995) 
considered these effects, but could not demonstrate any significant effect of annual bonus 
schemes on real R&D investment decisions. Overall, the amount of research on the 
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effects of annual accounting based bonus schemes on resource allocation is limited and 
there is much room for further study (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Leone and Rock 2002, 
p.66). Studies outside the earnings management literature provide some additional 
evidence on the effects of the evaluation period on MTO, though, and these are listed 
below.   
 
Other accounting studies 
Several studies that investigate the effects of accounting performance measures, as 
described in paragraph 2.2.1, also (implicitly) consider the effect of the evaluation period. 
For example, Merchant (1989, p.84) notes that myopia is not inevitable if managers are 
evaluated based on long-term performance, and finds that this is more likely for managers 
with significant decision authority over long-term investments, where myopic decisions 
would be very costly. Merchant (1990) reported that financial short term targets lead to 
manipulation of reported profit figures and to a short-term managerial orientation. It is 
not entirely clear whether it is primarily the type of measure or the length of the 
evaluation period that drives his results.  
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of the evaluation period length, type of 
performance measure, and target difficulty from these correlational studies in the 
accounting literature in general and in the earnings management literature in particular. 
Only one study that attempts to isolate the effects of evaluation period length exists thus 
far (Bhojraj and Libby 2005). Bhojraj and Libby (2005) designed an experiment, in 
which they manipulated reporting frequency, the pattern of earnings and the likelihood of 
issuing stock. They hypothesized that if managers perceive disclosure of earnings to the 
market as an evaluation point, greater disclosure frequency will lead them to focus more 
on near-term results and will reduce planning for the long-term. Results indicate that 
myopia is either increased or reduced by an increased reporting frequency, depending on 
the pattern of earnings and the likelihood of issuing stock. Even when managers are 
acting in interests of existing shareholders, they can be inclined to focus on short-term 
earnings. Of main concern in the experiment is the signal that performance reports 
provide to external parties; internal reporting is held constant. Conclusive (experimental) 
evidence on the effect of the internal evaluation period on MTO is still absent in the 
accounting literature. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, although many authors have concluded that the evaluation period affects 
managerial time orientation, empirical evidence is mostly limited to external reporting or 
indirect and confounded by other variables. In many earnings management and other 
accounting studies, it is unclear whether it is the type of performance measure 
(earnings/financial), properties of that measure, target difficulty, the length of the 
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evaluation period, or a combination of these variables that can explain the findings (e.g., 
Merchant 1990; Hoskisson et al. 1993). The scarce experimental evidence in the 
accounting literature has focused on the influence of external reporting only (Bhojraj and 
Libby 2005). Although the available evidence strongly suggests that a longer evaluation 
period increases MTO length, further empirical evidence on the relationship between the 
internal evaluation period and MTO is clearly called for. This topic particularly requires  
experimental research, that can easily isolate the effects of evaluation period. Related 
evidence exists in the economic literature, however, and is discussed in § 2.3.1. 
 
 
2.3  Economic literature 
This paragraph discusses the economic literature regarding MTO. Studies listed here are 
based on economic theory, and in general consider variables affecting MTO outside the 
context of a PMS4. 
The general implications for MTO of economic theory are as follows. Economic 
theory relies universally on discounted utility and assumes positive time preference and 
diminishing marginal utility, and it does not consider individual differences in temporal 
orientation (Loewenstein and Prelec 1991). This seems to suggest that managers would 
prefer faster returns over longer-term investments, and thus be inclined towards a short 
term orientation. This may hold in general, but the assumption that everyone has the same 
preference for faster outcomes under all circumstances has been disproved by a large 
body of research. First, Loewenstein and Prelec (1991; 1992) show both theoretically and 
empirically that neither negative nor positive time preference always prevails, and that 
individuals sometimes actually have a tendency to defer a desirable outcome. In a short 
sequence, most individuals show some preference for a sequence that starts well, but 
most also exhibit a strong liking for improving sequences (Loewenstein and Prelec 1991). 
The latter suggests that long-term investments that yield benefits later on may be deemed 
acceptable more easily than would be expected based on positive time preference alone. 
Furthermore, individual differences in preferences remain (Loewenstein and Prelec 
1991). Although many other anomalies of standard economic theory exist (Frederick et 
al. 2002), there is one, myopic loss aversion, that is of particular importance to the 
research question. Paragraph 2.3.1 deals with a series of studies on this phenomena, that 
have identified effects of the evaluation period on MTO. Furthermore, based on standard 
economic reasoning (agency theory) which includes an assumption of self-interested 
behavior, a second stream of research has identified employment horizon as an individual 
situational factor influencing MTO. These studies are discussed in § 2.3.2. 
                                                 
4 Several studies using economic theory, that included PMS variables, have been discussed as part of the 
accounting literature in §2.2. 
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2.3.1  Myopic loss aversion 
A recent stream of literature in experimental economics has also analyzed the effect of 
the length of the evaluation period on MTO, though not as part of a PMS. The concept of 
myopic loss aversion indicates that a longer evaluation period makes managers, who are  
loss-averse (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Chang et al. 2002, p.17), more likely to 
consider a specific investment opportunity as part of a long-term set of similar 
opportunities. Consequently, they will consider the risk of a loss attached to a separate 
investment as lower, and are generally inclined to invest more. In case of a short 
evaluation period, however, individuals will tend to view the investment as a one-shot 
deal, even when it is part of a sequence. In most cases, this causes individuals to invest 
significantly less than should be expected based on the expected value of the investment, 
thus leading them to act myopically (Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Gneezy and Potters 1997; 
Thaler et al. 1997; Gneezy et al. 2003; Langer and Weber 2003, 2005; Bellemare et al. 
2005). Figure 2-4, which displays two gambles with their probability distribution and 
possible outcomes, can be used to illustrate the basic idea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assume that an individual is loss-averse and assigns three times more value to a loss than 
to a gain. Such an individual will not take gamble 1 (G1) in figure 2-4, even though it has 
a positive expected value, because to him it has a negative value of (½ * + € 25) + 3 * (½ 
* – € 10) = – € 2,5. If the same person were offered a sequence of two of the same 
gambles, his acceptance decision would depend on how the problem is framed. If he 
evaluates per period and views the problem myopically, he is likely to see each gamble as 
separate (two times G1) and reject them at the start of each period. If he considers the 
decision tree for an aggregated gamble (G2) at the beginning, however, he more easily 
realizes that the bet has an attractive value of (¼ * + € 50) + (½ * + € 15) + 3 * (¼ * –
€ 20) = + € 5. Longer sequences look even more attractive when aggregated, which is 
more likely in case of a longer evaluation period (see Langer and Weber 2005).  
Figure 2-4: Myopic loss aversion. If losses loom three times larger than gains, 
accepting two instances of gamble 1 looks unattractive while an aggregation of two 
times G1 is acceptable – see G2 (based on Langer and Weber 2005). 
¼ 
¼ 
G1 = 
½ – € 10
+ € 25½ 
G2 = 
– € 20 
+ € 15 
+ € 50 
½
  
 
 
 
23
CHAPTER 2   LITERATURE REVIEW
  
 
The following studies contain empirical evidence on the concept of myopic loss aversion. 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Thaler et al. (1997) conducted experimental investigations 
into the effect of evaluation period length by examining the amount of money individuals 
were willing to pay for gambles. Results lend support to the concept of myopic loss 
aversion. In other studies, the concept was successfully applied to asset pricing in market 
settings (Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Gneezy et al. 2003). The evaluation period was 
varied in most studies by simultaneously manipulating both feedback frequency and 
binding (fixed decision for multiple periods). Langer and Weber (2003) disentangle these 
effects and provide experimental evidence that feedback frequency and the binding of 
decisions affect myopic decision-making separately and interactively. Theoretically, 
binding should force individuals to consider the whole period at the start. Less frequent 
feedback should also induce an aggregation of periods. Consistently, both binding and 
more limited feedback frequency are found to decrease myopic decision-making. When 
decisions are bound, however, not limiting the frequency of feedback but increasing it 
limits myopia – an interactive effect (Langer and Weber 2003). This conflicts with the 
findings of Bellemare et al. (2005), who demonstrate that varying feedback frequency 
alone is enough to influence the degree of myopia in decision-making, irrespective of 
binding. Langer and Weber (2005) extend the concept of myopic loss aversion to myopic 
prospect theory. They show that the effect of evaluation period length is not 
unidirectional, but depends on the risk profile of the decision. Their results indicate that a 
shorter evaluation period can actually decrease myopia in case of a small probability of a 
relatively large loss.    
 
To sum up, there is relatively strong evidence that shortening the evaluation period 
increases myopia in decision-making, unless there is a small chance of a large loss. 
However, it is not clear whether this holds when decisions can be varied per period (no 
binding). Furthermore, empirical evidence is limited to gambles and asset pricings; no 
study in this literature stream has used investment decisions in (unbound) value-creating 
company projects as dependent variable. Further research is needed to investigate the 
generalizability of the findings to other settings and determine effects on MTO. 
 
2.3.2  Employment horizon 
A research stream in the economic literature that focuses on managerial career concerns 
has identified job mobility as a potential cause of myopia (Palley 1997; Chang et al. 
2002). Mannix and Loewenstein (1994) describe the economic reasons for the influence 
of job mobility on MTO as follows. A manager leaving the firm is unlikely to suffer the 
consequences from any decisions he has made that are detrimental in the long-run, given 
that the consequences of defection are spread out over a large number of people and 
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delayed in time. In the same way, the manager will not be able to benefit from the 
positive future pay-offs of previous decisions. Job mobility, and likewise quitting 
probability, is therefore expected to decrease MTO (Mannix and Loewenstein 1994). In a 
similar vein, contractual or employment horizon is expected to affect MTO. 
 
Empirical evidence that indirectly supports an effect of employment horizon on MTO is 
provided by several studies, of which the following provide an illustration.  
Lewellen et al. (1987) use age as a proxy for employment horizon. They argue 
that older executives have a short employment horizon because they are close to 
retirement, and will therefore be less likely to care about future results. They use this 
proxy as an independent variable in an effort to explain the proportion of stock-based 
incentives, which represent long-term incentives, relative to cash incentives, which 
represent short-term incentives. Results indicate that the more important the future firm 
growth opportunities and the older the manager, the smaller the relative weight on cash 
compensation and the greater the relative weight on stock-based compensation. These 
circumstances represent contingency factors in which a short-term orientation can be 
expected to be relatively more problematic (see figure 2-2). By showing that more long-
term incentives are used in case of a shorter employment horizon, the results provide 
support for the conclusion that MTO is shorter in case of a shorter employment horizon.  
Banker et al. (1996) conducted a field study in which they examine the impact of 
a performance contingent compensation plan. Consistent with economic theory, they 
suggest that temporary employees have only a short-term orientation, while a permanent 
employee is expected to invest more in the long term by acquiring more skills (also see 
Banker et al. 2001, p321). Their findings are consistent with these expectations; 
specifically, they find that the plan causes an increase in performance, which is found to 
be less for temporary than for permanent employees.  
 
Further empirical evidence on the effect of employment horizon is available in studies 
that demonstrate effects on investments. 
Like Lewellen et al. (1987), Dechow and Sloan (1991) use age to proxy for 
employment horizon. They theorize that when the CEO is about to retire or change 
employer, R&D expenditures will be diminished. Based on archival data, their 
expectation is verified empirically, indicating that short employment horizons cause a 
short-term managerial orientation. 
Cheng (2002) documents results contrary to Dechow and Sloan (1991). In this 
archival study, R&D expenditures are not affected by CEOs nearing retirement. Instead, 
R&D expenditures are more strongly positively associated with CEO-compensation, 
which indicates that Boards of Directors adjust incentive payments to provide incentives 
25
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2   LITERATURE REVIEW
  
to invest in the long-term to overcome inclinations towards short-term behavior resulting 
from the short employment horizon (Cheng 2002). 
Experimental evidence is available from two studies that were published in an 
organizational behavior journal. Mannix and Loewenstein (1993; 1994) conducted two 
similar experiments in which they manipulate employment horizon (job mobility). 
Findings indicate that subjects that are more likely to leave the firm are less likely to 
invest in the long-term (Mannix and Loewenstein 1993; 1994). Their experimental 
evidence clearly establishes the direction of causation from employment horizon to MTO. 
Their second paper is special in its acknowledgement that time orientation is influenced 
by both economic and psychological factors. In this study, Mannix and Loewenstein 
(1994) also manipulated whether groups or individuals were the decision makers. They 
found that groups exhibit a longer time orientation than individuals, possibly due to the 
development of a group identity, leading to social concerns or pressure for cooperative 
behavior (social identity theory, see, e.g., Worchel et al. 1998). Interestingly, the authors 
also acknowledge the existence of individual differences in time orientation (Mannix and 
Loewenstein 1994, p. 374) – a subject further explored in the next paragraph (§ 2.4). 
 
In accounting studies that address issues related to MTO, employment horizon has played 
an important role, albeit often implicitly. For example, Eccles (1991) blames managerial 
short-term behavior on short tenure. Leone and Rock (2002) demonstrate how budget 
ratcheting can promote long-term investments, but only under the assumption of at least a 
five year employment horizon. Analytical papers, most of which have already been 
described in paragraph 2.2.1, provide a clear illustration of the importance of 
employment horizon. Narayanan (1985) demonstrated that managers may be inclined to 
undertake short-term projects to increase earnings and subsequently enhance their 
reputation, but they have less incentive to do so when their contract length increases. 
Sliwka (2002) assumes that managerial career concerns lead to a short-term horizon when 
management can signal its value to potential employers by increasing current results 
before quitting. Dikolli (2001) shows that in case of a shorter employment horizon for the 
agent, the optimal weight on forward-looking performance measures increases. Dutta and 
Reichelstein show that the need for leading performance indicators depends on both the 
agent’s and the principal’s planning horizon and their ability to make long-term 
contractual commitments, as well as that short-term contracting results in inefficiently 
low levels of investments (Dutta and Reichelstein 2003). Finally, an analytical model by 
Dutta (2003) shows when there is a severe managerial retention problem, there is a high 
need for a long-term incentive contract (option based instead of accounting based) in 
order to ensure appropriate investment decisions.   
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In summary, studies in the organizational, the accounting and foremost the economic 
literature have used (contractual) employment horizon as an indicator or predictor of 
MTO. There are relatively strong indications that a longer employment horizon has a 
positive effect on MTO, although there is only a limited number of studies establishing 
causality (Mannix and Loewenstein 1993; 1994). Furthermore, many factors that 
determine the cause of job mobility, which may affect its influence on MTO, have not 
been considered in the economic literature. For example, a high probability of a lay-off 
due to economic difficulty may not result in a decrease of MTO if there are no alternative 
opportunities in the labor market, because the individual wishes to remain with the firm 
(Mannix and Loewenstein 1993). Moreover, the relative importance of employment 
horizon for MTO compared to other factors such as the PMS, as well as how it interacts 
with the PMS, remains largely unexplored.   
 
 
2.4  Psychological literature 
Time orientation has been studied as a personality characteristic by psychologists quite 
extensively. In this stream of literature, time orientation is distinguished as a specific part 
of the broader term time perspective (De Volder 1979; Nuttin and Lens 1985), which is 
explored first below. 
Time perspective refers to the extent to which different temporal periods are 
incorporated into the psychology of an individual. Some individuals are mainly past 
oriented, while others are present or future oriented (Lens and Moreas 1994, p.24). In 
their overview on time perspective, Lens and Moreas (1994) define future time 
perspective as the degree to which the future is integrated into the present life space, with 
individuals with a long future time perspective having relatively more goals in the more 
distant future. These individuals experience a given time interval into the future as 
relatively shorter compared to individuals with a shorter future time perspective. 
Additionally, individuals with a long future time perspective are better able to foresee the 
implications of their current actions for the future. Zaleski (1994) provides a 
comprehensive collection of articles related to time perspective, which shows that time 
perspective is a stable bias, which varies between individuals (also see Waller et al. 
2001). Time perspective has been used in many studies, both as a dependent and an 
independent variable. An example of a factor that has been shown to influence time 
perspective is age (De Volder 1979; Strathman et al. 1994a). Findings with regard to age 
were very ambiguous (De Volder 1979), which is of particular interest given the use of 
this variable as a proxy for time horizon in studies based on economic theory. As an 
independent variable, time perspective has been argued and found to influence motivation 
and goal setting (Nuttin 1964; Strathman et al. 1994a; Zimbardo and Boyd 1999). A 
longer time perspective will lead individuals to consider long-term goals as more 
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important and more proximal. Individuals with a longer time perspective will therefore be 
motivated to work harder in the present to attain a future goal (Lens and Moreas 1994; 
Zaleski 1994; Waller et al. 2001).   
Time orientation is considered part of time perspective. While time perspective is 
typically concerned with a more general preoccupation with the future (Zimbardo and 
Boyd 1999), time orientation is more specifically related to the extent to which possible 
future events influence decision-making in the present. Strathman et al. (1994b) have 
developed a construct called Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC), which is 
defined as the extent to which individuals take future consequences of their actions into 
consideration in current decisions (also see Petrocelli 2003). Like time perspective, time 
orientation (CFC) is considered a relatively stable dispositional characteristic (Zaleski 
1994; Strathman et al. 1994a, 1994b; Waller et al. 2001). It can therefore be concluded 
that the individual characteristic time orientation or CFC represents a different construct 
than MTO. While CFC is a stable personality trait, MTO is a context-specific construct 
related to investments in a work environment, which can be influenced by personality 
characteristics as well as circumstantial variables, such as the PMS.  
 
Individual time perspective and time orientation have been used very little in business 
research (Das 1987, p.204), although some use of this personality trait has been made in 
the organizational literature (see Waller et al. 2001). Bird (1992) published a theoretical 
paper in which individual time orientation is hypothesized to be related to strategy 
formulation and the opportunity vision of entrepreneurs, subsequently influencing 
organizational development. Specifically, a long future time perspective is expected to be 
particularly important for innovative products. However, no empirical studies on these 
relationships exist (Bird 1992, p. 15). The only related empirical evidence that could be 
found is the study by Das (1987), who used a questionnaire to study the effect of 
individual time orientation in managers on their strategic planning. The planning horizon 
is found to average 2.85 years. The paper poses that the planning horizon that is 
appropriate depends on the type of business and kind of decisions to be made. Findings 
further indicate that individuals with a present orientation tend to make plans with a 
shorter planning horizon compared to individuals with a future orientation, who have a 
longer planning horizon. As a conclusion, Das (1987) advises to assign managers to 
organizational operations which require a certain time orientation based on the managers’ 
individual time orientation. 
 
In sum, while individual time orientation as a personality characteristic has been shown 
to influence decision-making in general and strategic planning horizons in particular, and 
would therefore seem to be of interest to studies on MTO, its use in business research has 
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been very limited (Das 1987; Bird 1992). No empirical evidence on the effect of 
individual time orientation on MTO could be found. 
 
 
2.5  Research opportunities 
The previous paragraphs have provided an overview of available evidence regarding 
effects of performance measurement system properties and individual level variables on 
MTO from the accounting, economic and psychological literatures. This paragraph 
concludes this chapter by shortly summarizing these findings and identifying 
opportunities for further research.  
 
Table 2-2 displays a summary overview of empirical evidence to date. It corroborates 
Laverty’s conclusion that research in this field is underdeveloped (Laverty 1996, p.837), 
with the following gaps in the literature standing out. First, empirical evidence on the 
effects of non-financial performance measures on MTO is limited, in spite of theoretical 
models predicting these effects (Sliwka 2002; Dutta and Reichelstein 2003). A  
considerable amount of indirect evidence exists, demonstrating cognitive long-term 
effects of non-financial measures (Luft and Shields 2002) and (performance effects due 
to) increased relative use of non-financial measures in cases where contingency factors 
favor a long-term managerial orientation (e.g., Ittner et al. 1997; Said et al. 2003). But 
direct empirical evidence is limited (Moers 2001; Farrell et al. 2005). Furthermore, 
existing studies have used distinctions in broad categories, such as financial versus non-
financial performance measures. Such categories oversimplify the properties of 
performance measures (cf. Malina and Selto 2004, p.444) and within these categories 
there can be variation between measures (cf. Said et al. 2003). Moreover, different 
classifications overlap and terms such as financial and accounting, as well as non-
financial and leading, have sometimes been used interchangeably and inconsistently 
across studies, while their meaning does not exactly correspond (see § 2.2.1). This 
illustrates the lack of clear theoretical arguments in the accounting literature to date about 
which characteristics or dimensions of performance measures affect MTO (cf. Ittner and 
Larcker 1998; Ittner and Larcker 2002, p. s60).  
 
Second, the amount of evidence that provides indirect support for a relation between 
subjectivity and MTO is considerable, generally demonstrating more subjectivity in 
circumstances requiring a long-term orientation (e.g., Bushman et al. 1996; Murphy and 
Oyer 2003; Gibbs et al. 2004). Nevertheless, evidence regarding middle-management 
levels is limited (Murphy and Oyer 2003; Gibbs et al. 2004), and no evidence on the 
direct effect of subjectivity on MTO could be found. There is also an absence of clear 
theory on the relation between subjectivity and MTO.  
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Table 2-2: Overview of empirical evidence regarding effects on MTO 
Literature 
 
Topic Empirical 
evidence 
Measurement instrument for MTO 
 
 
Type of 
 
Financial  
 
Considerable 
• % of time spent generating short-
term accounting returns    
• R&D expenditures  
measure  
Non-financial  
 
Limited 
 
• % of time spent generating short-
term accounting returns    
 
Subjectivity 
 
 
None 
 
  n.a.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Accounting 
 
Evaluation period 
 
 
Limited 
 
• selection of project generating 
long- or short-term financial 
results 
 
Myopic loss aversion 
(evaluation period) 
 
Considerable 
 
• amount paid for gamble sequence   
• asset prices 
 
 
Economic 
 
Employment horizon 
 
 
Limited2 
 
• amount of long-term investments 
• R&D expenditures 
 
Psychology 
 
Individual time orientation 
 
 
None3 
   
  n.a. 
1 n.a. = not applicable: no direct evidence on MTO available. 
2 Most studies include proxies for employment horizon. Two studies provide direct experimental evidence 
(Mannix and Loewenstein 1993; 1994). 
3 Das (1987) provides empirical evidence on the effect on strategic planning horizon. 
 
 
Third, conclusive evidence regarding the direct effect of evaluation period length on 
MTO is limited to a single experimental study in the accounting literature (Bhojraj and 
Libby 2005), which only considers the evaluation period for external, not internal, 
reporting. Although other accounting studies provide evidence on the effects of using 
short-term accounting measures based on archival or survey data, these studies do not 
vary evaluation period length (e.g., Merchant 1990, earnings management studies). More 
experimental evidence is available from the economic literature on myopic loss aversion, 
but that evidence involves dependent variables that do not clearly resemble MTO (see 
table 2-2 and § 2.3.1 for details).  
 
Fourth, evidence on the effects of individual level variables is limited. Two experimental 
studies confirm the expected effect of employment horizon on MTO (Mannix and 
Loewenstein 1993; 1994), but the rest of the supporting evidence stems from studies that 
use proxies for employment horizon based on archival data (Lewellen et al. 1987; 
Dechow and Sloan 1991; Cheng 2002). Furthermore, the consequences of a short 
(expected) employment horizon may depend on the source of the employment risk, which 
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has not been considered in empirical studies thus far (Mannix and Loewenstein 1993). 
Empirical evidence on another individual level variable, the psychological characteristic 
individual time orientation, is limited to a single study showing effects on strategic 
planning horizon (Das 1987). No empirical evidence on the relative importance for MTO 
of these individual level variables is available in the literature. And with few exceptions 
(Dikolli 2001; Sliwka 2002; Dutta and Reichelstein 2003; Farrell et al. 2005), accounting 
studies have not explicitly investigated how these individual level variables interact with 
the PMS. 
 
Fifth and finally, different measurement instruments have been used for MTO, with the 
choice of instrument largely method-dependent. Survey studies in the accounting 
literature have used the percentage of time allocated to activities aiming at generating 
short-term accounting returns (e.g., Merchant 1990; Van der Stede 2000; Moers 2001). 
Other studies, using experimental and archival data, use invested amounts (or R&D 
expenditures) for measuring MTO (e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Mannix and 
Loewenstein 1993; 1994). Although the use of multiple instruments can in principle 
enhance the reliability of the findings related to MTO, consideration should be given to 
the relation between these different instruments. The time allocated to activities aimed at 
generating short-term returns may lead to effects on investments or R&D expenditures, 
although the latter is constrained by the investment opportunity set. Future research 
should attempt to use both measurement instruments and address whether these 
instruments yield similar results.  
 
Taken together, the gaps in the literature that were identified above clearly illustrate the 
lack of cross-fertilization between different streams of literature. More specifically, the 
accounting literature to date has made too limited use of insights from experimental 
economics and the psychological literature in particular. This is particularly apparent with 
respect to the evidence available for the effects of evaluation period length. For that 
variable, studies in the accounting literature have made little or no use of the insights 
from studies in experimental economics. As a result, two separate research streams co-
exist that could benefit greatly from each other (see table 2-2). A lack of cross-
fertilization also applies to the evidence pertaining to the individual characteristic CFC. 
The economic literature has ignored this variable, and has instead used age as a proxy for 
time horizon. The accounting literature has also made no use of this variable, although it 
has attached great importance to MTO. Including individual level variables such as CFC 
could therefore significantly enhance the understanding of the determinants of MTO. 
 
In sum, further development of theoretical arguments on the effects of PMS properties on 
MTO and additional empirical evidence are certainly called for; this dissertation aims at 
31
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2   LITERATURE REVIEW
  
filling part of the gaps in the literature as displayed in table 2-2. It does so by adopting a 
neutral approach to MTO, not focusing on myopic behavior and its prevention only. It 
enhances the reliability and generalizability of results by using multiple methods of 
measuring MTO. Moreover, it identifies theoretical arguments about the effects of 
performance measurement system properties that underlie previously used dichotomies, 
and it provides empirical evidence on the effects of these properties on MTO. In doing 
so, it answers calls to identify essential properties of performance measures (cf. Pavlik et 
al. 1993; Ittner and Larcker 1998), to re-examine the assumed short-term effect of 
accounting measures (Pavlik et al. 1993), and for empirical (experimental) research 
involving dependent variables other than performance (Sprinkle 2003). By integrating the 
aforementioned streams of literature, it also answers the plea of Merchant et al. (2003) for 
interdisciplinary research to further advance our knowledge about complex practical 
problems.
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter develops hypotheses regarding the effects of PMS properties and individual 
level variables on MTO. The expectations that are derived in this chapter concern the 
research topics as outlined in table 2-2.  
The next paragraph (§ 3.2) investigates the effects of PMS properties. The 
accounting literature has considered type of performance measure (financial vs. non-
financial) as an important determinant of MTO. Subparagraph 3.2.1 demonstrates that the 
appropriate performance measure categories for predicting effects on MTO are actually 
leading and accounting measures. It also argues that the effects of these types of 
performance measures are dependent on the length of the evaluation period, which has 
been identified as an important factor for MTO in both the accounting and economic 
literatures. Next, subparagraphs 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 derive predictions with regard to 
subjectivity and (possibilities for) manipulation of accounting performance measures. 
The third paragraph relates two individual level variables to MTO. Employment 
horizon was identified in the economic literature as an important factor. Psychological 
studies have stressed the importance of the personality characteristic consideration of 
future consequences. The last two hypotheses are devoted to these two variables. 
 
 
3.2  Properties of the performance measurement system 
This paragraph describes effects of the use different types of performance measures for 
evaluation purposes, and the way in which they are used, on MTO. The terminology used 
for performance measure type is consistent with paragraph 2.2.1 (see table 2-1 and figure 
2-1). In the next three subparagraphs, predictions with regard to the following variables 
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related to the PMS will be derived respectively: leading performance measures, 
accounting evaluation period length, subjectivity, and manipulability of accounting 
performance measures. 
 
3.2.1  Effects of leading and accounting performance measures 
This section analyzes the effects of the use of leading indicators, of accounting measures, 
and of the combination of those two types of measures on MTO.  
 
Leading measures 
Leading performance measures are performance measures that are causally linked to 
eventual end-results in terms of accounting performance (Kaplan and Norton 1996). 
Figure 3-1 reproduces figure 2-1 and provides an illustration of the concept of leading 
performance measures. A change in a leading indicator affects accounting results with a 
time lag. The length of this time lag determines the degree to which the performance 
measure is leading (degree of lead). As an illustration, in figure 3-1 customer satisfaction 
is a performance measure with a higher degree of lead than customer retention, because 
the time lag until accounting performance (lagging measure) is affected is longer. Figure 
3-1 shows only non-financial leading performance measures, but leading indicators can 
be stated either in non-financial or financial terms (for example, quality costs). Although 
arguably most leading performance measures are non-financial, theoretical arguments 
center around the degree to which performance measures are leading, and not around 
their non-monetary nature. In the practitioner literature, claims have been voiced 
regarding a possible lengthening effect on MTO of leading performance measures (e.g., 
Eccles and Mavrinac 1995; Kaplan and Norton 1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  High degree of lead 
Figure 3-1: Business process causal chain, with performance measures that exhibit different 
degrees of lead. 
Time 
Action Increase in 
customer 
satisfaction 
Increase in 
profits 
Increase in 
customer 
retention 
     Low degree of lead 
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Evaluations based on leading indicators can be expected to result in the following two 
effects on managerial behavior. First, managers tend to optimize measured dimensions of 
performance (e.g., Kerr 1975; Jenkins et al. 1998; Courty and Marschke 2004). 
Optimization of a leading performance measure in order to obtain a favorable 
performance evaluation can be achieved by investing more in long-term projects 
(Merchant 1989; Sliwka 2002). For example, increasing customer satisfaction may 
require an investment in employee training, with long term effects on profits. Enhancing 
leading performance measures for this reason does not necessarily extend managerial 
horizons, however, and therefore does not imply an effect on MTO. Managers can simply 
be engaged in optimizing the leading indicator, thus influencing their evaluation 
positively. 
 
Second, the use of leading performance measures has a cognitive effect on MTO. 
Individuals tend to look for causes in the near past, but the use of leading indicators can 
reduce this myopic focus by providing a temporal bridge (Luft and Shields 2002). By 
making causal effects more salient, leading measures make managers consider lagged 
causal effects to a greater extent. If managers think about past causal factors of current 
financial performance and then look into the future, their planning horizon is increased 
(Das 1987, p.207). Leading measures thus cause managers to focus more on the future 
and lead managers to pay more attention to relations with future financial performance 
(AAA Financial Accounting Standards Committee 2002; Luft and Shields 2002). By 
identifying causal effects, they also facilitate the identification of the optimal long-term 
strategy (Farrell et al. 2005). These arguments point at a positive effect on MTO. This 
effect on MTO is expected to be stronger in case of a higher degree of lead, for the 
following reasons. First, individuals are more likely to look for causes which are 
relatively close in time to the present (Luft and Shields 2002). The effects of changes in a 
measure with a low degree of lead will appear relatively soon in accounting performance, 
making oversight by managers less probable. Second, a higher degree of lead will make 
managers consider lagged causal effects from further in the past. Consequently, their 
planning horizons can be expected to increase further into the future (Bluedorn and 
Denhardt 1988). This implies that MTO is increased to a greater extent when a leading 
indicator has a higher degree of lead. In other words, if a leading performance measure is 
selected that is located earlier in the causal chain of the business process (see figure 3-1), 
the positive effect on MTO will be stronger.  
 
Based on the predicted cognitive effect of leading measures, the following is 
hypothesized: 
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H1: A higher degree of lead of performance measures used for evaluation purposes 
positively affects MTO 
 
An empirical test of this hypothesis will contribute to the limited amount of evidence 
regarding the effect of leading indicators on MTO. The existing literature studied effects 
of the use of leading indicators in general, but not of specific attributes of these measures 
such as degree of lead (Moers 2001; Farrell et al. 2005). 
 
Accounting measures 
Previous research has found that accounting measures lead to myopia (Merchant 1989; 
1990). The cause for this effect lies in the aggregated and summarized nature of these 
measures, which provide little indication of actions taken (Fisher 1992; Singleton-Green 
1993). Accounting measures lack a clear link between actions taken in the short-run and 
long-run strategy, and they tend to focus management attention on the current impacts of 
decisions (Malina and Selto 2001, p.51). Accounting measures reflect historical results 
and do not consider variables that are important for long-term results, such as strategic 
position and market share (Merchant 1989; Jacobs 1991). Therefore, managers can take 
myopic actions to enhance current accounting performance, which are not easily detected 
(Nagy et al. 1999; Libby et al. 2002). Moreover, accounting measures are governed by 
cautious, conservative rules, which do not recognize uncertain gains. For instance, in the 
U.S. it is required to fully expense R&D investments immediately. By lowering current 
performance, this conservatism can discourage long-term investments and cause myopia 
(see Merchant 1989; Bushee 1998, p. 306). Consequently, accounting measures are less 
useful for evaluating performance when the consequences of current actions occur 
(further) in the future (Lambert and Larcker 1987).   
 
Nevertheless, accounting performance approaches economic performance in the long-run, 
because results stemming from long-term investments are then realized and recognized in 
accounting performance (Merchant and Bruns 1986). Similarly, a failure to invest in 
long-term value-enhancing projects backfires in the long-run, because future accounting 
performance will be negatively affected. The effect on MTO of accounting measures is 
therefore dependent on the length of the period that is taken into consideration in 
managerial performance evaluation based on accounting measures (labeled hereafter: 
evaluation period). Evaluations based on periodic accounting measures provide 
incentives to manipulate reported performance and adjust investment behavior (Healy 
1985; Holthausen et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 1999). The stock market’s emphasis on short-
term results has been found to lead to short-term thinking and little incentives to invest in 
R&D at top-management level, because of an over-emphasis on periodic results (Eccles 
1991; Eccles and Mavrinac 1995; Demirag and Tylecote 1996; Demirag 1998b). Even 
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when the market is not primarily interested in short-term returns, the mere perception by 
management that periodic external reports influence their performance rating in any way 
is enough to invoke short-term behavior (Demirag 1996; Demirag 1998a). Bhojraj and 
Libby (2005) provide experimental evidence confirming that external reporting frequency 
affects investment behavior.  
The concept of myopic loss aversion also implies effects of the evaluation period 
length on MTO (see § 2.3.1). A longer evaluation period makes loss-averse managers 
more likely to consider a specific investment opportunity as part of a long-term set of 
similar opportunities (see figure 2-4). Consequently, they will consider the risk of a loss 
attached to the investment as lower, and are thus inclined to invest more. In case of a 
short evaluation period, however, individuals will tend to view the investment as a one-
shot deal, even when it is part of a sequence. A short evaluation period causes individuals 
to invest significantly less than should be expected based on the expected value, thus 
leading them to act myopically (Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Gneezy and Potters 1997; 
Thaler et al. 1997; Gneezy et al. 2003; Langer and Weber 2003, 2005; Bellemare et al. 
2005).  
In sum, in general it can be expected that a shorter evaluation period decreases 
MTO (cf. Bluedorn and Denhardt 1988), and vice versa. Despite the relatively large 
amount of empirical evidence, there is no conclusive empirical evidence on the effect of 
internal evaluation period length on MTO. Existing empirical research does not clearly 
distinguish the effect of the evaluation period length from effects of the type of measure 
(e.g., Merchant 1990).  
 
Under the condition that accounting measures are being used for managerial evaluations, 
the following is predicted: 
 
H2:  A longer evaluation period for accounting measures positively affects MTO 
 
 
Interactive effect 
Furthermore, the evaluation period length for accounting measures is expected to 
moderate the effect of the degree of lead performance measures. The expected interaction 
indicates that the shorter the evaluation period for accounting performance, the weaker 
the effect of the degree of lead of leading performance measures, and vice versa. 
A short evaluation period for accounting performance measures forces attention to 
these measures, which provides a powerful motivation to optimize current accounting 
performance (cf. Healy 1985; Merchant 1990; Holthausen et al. 1995). Evaluating 
accounting performance based on results from shorter periods will reinforce managers’ 
tendency to focus on near-term results. Moreover, it will make these measures more 
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salient, which will limit the cognitive effect of degree of lead by reducing the (relative) 
saliency of lagged effects (cf. Luft and Shields 2002). Figure 3-2 illustrates the effect on 
managerial horizons graphically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the reasoning above and conform figure 3-2, the strength of the positive effect 
of degree of lead on MTO is expected to be lower in case of a shorter evaluation period 
for accounting measures, and vice versa. The corresponding interactive effect is 
displayed graphically in figure 3-3, and results in the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The positive effect of degree of lead on MTO is stronger in case of a long 
evaluation period than in case of a short evaluation period for accounting 
measures 
Figure 3-2, panel B: Combined effects of degree of lead and a short evaluation period. The 
expected managerial horizon is indicated by the arrow below the time-line. 
Time 
Action Increase in 
customer 
satisfaction 
Increase in 
profit 
 Degree of lead 
Short evaluation period accounting measures
Figure 3-2, panel A: Combined effects of degree of lead and a long evaluation period. The 
expected managerial horizon is indicated by the arrow below the time-line. 
Time 
Action Increase in 
customer 
satisfaction 
Increase in 
profit 
  Degree of lead 
Long evaluation period accounting measures 
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3.2.2  Effect of subjectivity 
The next hypothesis concerns the degree of subjectivity involved in managerial 
evaluations. Subjectivity refers to a judgment by the supervisor of the subordinate’s 
performance, including a judgment of the actions taken to achieve that performance. 
Subjective evaluations can take different forms, such as [1] flexible weighting of 
objective performance measures ex-post (at the end of the evaluation period); [2] the use 
of subjective (qualitative) measures; [3] discretion in using additional performance 
criteria (Ittner et al. 2003; Sprinkle 2003; Moers 2005). In contrast, in completely 
objective evaluations the weights attached to quantitative performance measures are 
specified precisely ex-ante.  
Subjectivity allows the supervisor to respond flexibly to the performance achieved 
by the subordinate. It allows the supervisor to back out dysfunctional behavior, which 
may be induced by a PMS that does not include all elements of performance perfectly 
(Ittner and Larcker 1998; Baker 2002). Therefore, subjective evaluations can be expected 
to prevent gaming and dysfunctional short-term managerial orientation (Merchant 1989, 
p.135), because this behavior is likely to result in a more negative performance 
evaluation. Consequently, when a short-term focus is more problematic, such as in case 
of high growth opportunities or long product cycles, more subjective evaluations are to be 
expected (Gibbs et al. 2004). Indeed, the use of subjectivity in evaluations has been found 
to increase with firm growth opportunities and product life cycle length (Bushman et al. 
1996), consistent with the notion that subjective evaluations are required and used in 
situations in which a short-term orientation is particularly harmful. By preventing a 
Figure 3-3: Interactive effect on MTO of degree of lead of leading indicators and 
evaluation period length for accounting measures  
 short 
MTO 
high low 
 long 
Short evaluation period 
Long evaluation period 
Degree of lead 
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possible dysfunctional short-term orientation, subjectivity in evaluations can be expected 
to generally lengthen MTO5. Moreover, subjectivity can provide incentives to extend 
managerial horizons, by causing evaluations to be affected by long-term investments 
which are not adequately valued by completely objective performance measures (Hayes 
and Schaefer 2000).  
No study to date provides empirical evidence on the direct effect of subjectivity on MTO. 
The following hypothesis will be empirically tested:  
 
H4: A higher degree of subjectivity in evaluations positively affects MTO 
 
 
3.2.3  Effects of ease-of-manipulation 
The ease with which performance measures can be manipulated influences whether or not 
they can be classified as causing a short-term orientation (Coates et al. 1995). This ease-
of-manipulation, or distortion possibility, is a property of performance measures that has 
not been well explored in the literature (see Baker 2002). Ease-of-manipulation of 
accounting measures is argued below to affect MTO indirectly.  
According to Libby et al. (2002), “the inherent subjectivity of much accounting 
measurement allows managers flexibility to opportunistically report or manage 
earnings”. Basically, a higher ease-of-manipulation of accounting measures allows 
managers to report better results. Earnings management studies provide empirical 
evidence of the manipulation of accounting data (Healy 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995; 
Guidry et al. 1999). Accounting performance can be managed by methods of strategic 
manipulation of information reporting such as smoothing, filtering and falsification 
(Hopwood 1972; Merchant 1990; Jaworski and Young 1992; Kohn 1993; Holthausen et 
al. 1995; Chow et al. 1996), but also by adjusting operating and investment decisions 
(Holthausen et al. 1995; Leone and Rock 2002). These two methods can be expected to 
have distinctly different consequences for future results. While strategic manipulation of 
information reporting can possibly be sustained in future periods, lowering investment in 
long-term projects to boost current accounting measures such as earnings would backfire 
on a manager in the long-run when earnings dry up due to a low level of activities (cf. 
Leone and Rock 2002). To the extent possible, the first method of managing earnings 
would thus be preferable because it maximizes both current and future reported earnings. 
Higher ease-of-manipulation of accounting measures is therefore predicted to lead to the 
                                                 
5 This assumes that supervisors generally have a longer time orientation than subordinates, which is 
consistent with the increased importance of strategic objectives at higher organizational levels. Moreover, 
there is also an implicit assumption in the literature that there will be less occurrence of a dysfunctional 
long-term MTO for which supervisors correct. This is likely to hold in general, since there are relatively 
few circumstances that require a short MTO (such as financial distress or a divest strategy). 
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actual manipulation of accounting measures (labeled hereafter: accounting data 
manipulation). Because this alleviates short-term performance pressure, investment 
decisions are likely to be less short-term oriented, thus securing future accounting results. 
Accordingly, the corresponding hypotheses are posited, assuming accounting measures 
are used for evaluation purposes: 
 
H5a: Higher ease-of-manipulation of accounting measures increases accounting data 
manipulation 
H5b: Accounting data manipulation positively affects MTO 
 
Ease-of-manipulation is also expected to have an indirect effect on MTO through 
subjectivity in evaluations. In case of higher ease-of-manipulation of performance 
measures, firms and supervisors are likely to try to prevent accounting data manipulation 
by using subjective evaluations. Accordingly, when performance measures are more 
susceptible to manipulation, evaluations will be more subjective, as found by Gibbs et al. 
(2004). Ease-of-manipulation therefore affects MTO indirectly by affecting subjectivity 
(see H4). The reasoning above implies the following hypothesis: 
 
H5c: Higher ease-of-manipulation of accounting measures increases subjectivity  
 
However, actual accounting data manipulation is expected to be lower in case of more 
subjectivity consistent with the increased possibilities to correct for dysfunctional 
behavior (Ittner and Larcker 1998; Baker 2002; Gibbs et al. 2004). This argument leads 
to the following prediction: 
 
H5d: A higher degree of subjectivity in evaluations decreases accounting data 
manipulation. 
 
 
Figure 3-4 displays the relationships predicted by H4 and H5a-d combined. Note that 
there is no predicted direct effect of the accounting performance measure property ease-
of-manipulation on MTO. In sum, the figure shows that ease-of-manipulation lengthens 
MTO by enabling accounting data manipulation, but only insofar as this is not corrected 
for in the PMS by adjustments in the level of subjectivity. 
41
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3   HYPOTHESES
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3  Individual level variables 
The second group of hypotheses derived in this chapter relate to the effects of individual 
level variables. Many researchers have acknowledged the influence of individual level 
variables on MTO (Loewenstein and Prelec 1991; Karniol and Ross 1996; Laverty 1996, 
p.840). Two such variables will be considered here, based on their salience in the 
literature: employment horizon (from the economic literature) and individual temporal 
orientation (a psychological construct).  
 
Employment horizon 
The individual level variable employment horizon influences MTO for the following 
reason. Assuming that managers are acting in their own self-interest, a shorter 
employment horizon makes it unlikely they will benefit from long-term investments 
(Mannix and Loewenstein 1994; Palley 1997). A shorter employment horizon can 
therefore result in a lack of long-term investments or investments in projects with low net 
present values, but high returns in the near future (Dutta and Reichelstein 2003). Thus, a 
shorter employment horizon can be expected to lead to a shorter MTO (Eccles 1991). 
Palley (1997) provides analytical evidence of this effect, which has been confirmed by 
two experimental studies (Mannix and Loewenstein 1993; 1994).  
Many researchers have acknowledged the importance of employment horizon as a 
determining factor of MTO and have assumed a positive effect (Dechow and Sloan 1991; 
Banker et al. 1996; Dikolli 2001). Several researchers have used age as a proxy for 
employment horizon, assuming that older managers have a shorter horizon because they 
are closer to retirement (e.g., Lewellen et al. 1987; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Cheng 
2002). Others explicitly incorporate employment horizon into their analysis (e.g., Dutta 
and Reichelstein 2003; Farrell et al. 2005), for instance by assuming that employees with 
a fixed contract focus more on the long-term than temporary employees (Banker et al. 
Figure 3-4: Indirect effects of ease-of-manipulation on MTO 
H5b: + H5a: + 
H5c: + H4: + 
H5d: -
MTO 
Data 
manipulation 
Subjectivity 
Ease-of-
manipulation 
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1996, p.206). Although contract length and age are proxies for employment horizon, it is 
the expected length of the employment relationship that affects MTO. This is also 
affected by the probability of quitting and lay-offs (Palley 1997), and the intentions of 
both employer and employee. Temporary contracts can be renewed and temporary 
employees may anticipate this, and permanent employees can decide to quit despite their 
contracts. Moreover, probability to quit is influenced by social forces with respect to 
corporate loyalty (Palley 1997, p.555). What can be expected to affect MTO are therefore 
personal intentions regarding the employment horizon, because this determines how 
much of the benefits of long-term investments can be expected to accrue to the decision 
maker. Psychological studies have previously developed a construct called propensity to 
leave which reflects the psychological inclination to quit (Martin and Hunt 1980; Rahim 
and Afza 1993). Consistent with a positive effect of the (expected) length of the 
employment horizon, the following effect of propensity to leave is hypothesized:  
 
H6: A higher propensity to leave negatively affects MTO 
 
Individual time orientation 
Individuals exhibit a personal bias in temporal orientation that affects their decision-
making (Schotter and Weigelt 1992). Psychological studies provide an explanation for 
this, since they have found that individuals differ in their general orientation towards the 
future (Lens and Moreas 1994; Zaleski 1994). Those who are more future oriented attach 
greater importance to events that are relatively further into the future and perceive these 
as relatively closer to the present (Lens and Moreas 1994). Individuals differ in the extent 
to which they consider the future consequences of their current decisions (Strathman et 
al. 1994b). This construct called Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) relates to 
both private and professional life, and is considered to be a relatively stable personality 
characteristic (Strathman et al. 1994a). CFC can be expected to persist in a work-related 
decision-making environment and to affect MTO. Managers that consider future 
consequences to a higher degree are likely to attach more importance or higher values to 
future returns from long-term investments (cf. Lens and Moreas 1994), consequently 
making them more willing to invest in the long-term. CFC is thus expected to influence 
MTO positively, as stated in the following hypothesis:  
 
H7: A higher Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) positively affects MTO 
 
 
Figure 3-5 displays the full model including all hypothesized effects. The next two 
chapters describe the results of a survey and an experiment, respectively, which were 
designed to test the hypotheses derived in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4  
SURVEY STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In order to test the hypotheses derived in the previous chapter, a survey study was 
conducted as a first generalizable empirical test of the theoretical model. Data was 
gathered using a questionnaire that was distributed among Dutch financial managers. 
This chapter subsequently describes the rationale and procedure behind the selection of 
respondents (§ 4.2), the preparation, pre-testing and design of the questionnaire (§ 4.3), 
and the procedure that was followed for distributing the questionnaire and maximizing 
response rate (§ 4.4). The next section, § 4.5, describes the response rate, after which the 
sample descriptives are discussed in paragraph 4.6. Next, the measurement instruments 
are outlined (§ 4.7), followed by descriptive statistics on the variables from the 
theoretical model in § 4.8. An analysis of non-response is presented in the next paragraph 
(§ 4.9), while § 4.10 shows the results of the data analysis relating to the hypotheses. The 
chapter ends with conclusions and a discussion (§ 4.11). 
 
 
4.2  Sample selection 
The survey for this study was presented as part of a joint research project between the 
practitioners’ Controllers Institute (CI), the University of Amsterdam and Nyenrode 
University entitled "Performance Management in the Netherlands". The CI agreed to 
support this study due to its relevance for practicing financial managers and made its 
member list available for research purposes. The joint research project consisted of three 
separate related studies, one of which concerned this dissertation. For each of the three 
studies, a different questionnaire was sent out. A significant part of the three 
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questionnaires was identical and consisted of control questions and measures considered 
important for all three studies. 
 
The rationale for selecting financial managers as respondents is as follows. Financial 
managers are often members of the management team and are involved in management 
decisions and investment decisions (confirmed by this survey). They are often personally 
evaluated and rewarded based on business unit financial or operational results. Moreover, 
previous research has found that managers who engaged in earnings management for the 
purpose of presenting better short-term results more often engaged in operational 
earnings management (e.g., expediting sales or shipments, lowering service levels or 
quality) than in financial earnings management (e.g., shifting funds between accounts, 
early recognitions of profits). The reason for this was that generally speaking they were 
unable to engage in these budget games because they lacked the authority to do so 
(Merchant 1989). Several hypotheses developed in chapter three relate to data 
manipulation – the sample of managers for the survey should therefore be able to affect 
this variable. As financial managers generally have the authority, opportunity and 
potentially the incentive to engage in this type of behavior, and because they are often 
involved in decision-making, they are considered appropriate subjects for this study.   
 
Financial managers form a relatively diverse group of managers, with a broad possible 
range of tasks, and care should therefore be taken in the selection process. This study 
requires respondents that are involved in decision-making processes. Accordingly, the 
subsample of financial managers from the CI’s member list was selected in the following 
way. A relatively homogenous group of respondents was obtained by selecting only those 
members of the CI who had the word "controller", "control", "management accountant", 
"management accounting" and "management reporting" in their job title. Members who 
were employed as "internal controllers" (Dutch: interne controle) were deleted, as the 
field of internal control in the Netherlands is traditionally much more focused on internal 
procedures and regulations than on performance measurement and management control 
in the broader sense of this dissertation. This selection process based on key terms also 
meant that members with job titles such as "financial reporting" (expected to be more 
oriented towards external reporting or bookkeeping only), "consultant" or "financial 
analyst" were not considered as respondents. 
Furthermore, the intended sample addressed managers at middle-management 
levels. Financial managers who appeared to be working at the highest organizational 
levels, such as those with the job title Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and those who 
worked for a holding, were omitted. Subsequently, the Amadeus database was used to 
select only those financial managers working in companies that employed 250 employees 
or more. Not-for-profit companies were excluded as were financial managers residing or 
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working abroad. The procedure outlined above resulted in a group consisting of 1063 
managers. A sample of 310 respondents was subsequently selected from this group of 
managers meeting the selection criteria. The final sample of 310 was randomly selected 
as much as possible, given the constraints of the project6.   
 
Summarizing, this study uses a sample of 310 members of the CI who are working as 
financial managers, who work for a company with 250 employees or more, and who 
work and live in the Netherlands. 
 
 
4.3  Preparation, pre-testing, and design 
The questions in the survey were worded in Dutch. This corresponded with the study 
being framed as part of an overall project on management control in The Netherlands, 
which was one of the selling arguments for enhancing the response rate. Several 
researchers that were experienced in reading and writing in English, including three 
professors, gave their opinion on the design of the questionnaire and the translation of 
items from existing constructs. They provided some valuable comments on the translation 
of certain items, but generally indicated that the design was acceptable.  
 
The questionnaire was pre-tested in a group of second-year students in the Registered 
Controller program at the University of Amsterdam, who were also working as (assistant) 
financial manager. For their participation, they received an incentive (a cinema coupon of 
€ 7,50 for one hour) and they were promised a summary of results if they were interested. 
The participants were asked to fill out the questionnaire in the presence of the researcher 
and to indicate if anything was unclear, ambiguous or if they were unable to answer a 
specific question. Afterwards, the layout, wording and content of the questions was 
discussed. This pretest lead to minor changes in the wording of some questions and also 
pointed out that the questionnaire was quite long. 
 
The final design of the questionnaire was in accordance with Dillman's (2000) Tailored 
Design Method. It was a 16-page A4-booklet which was printed on high quality 
environmentally friendly (A3-size) paper with a cover of slightly heavier paper. The front 
                                                 
6 One of the three studies in the overall project addressed a smaller sample of specific manufacturing firms 
only, which were selected through a different procedure. As a result, after random selection of respondents 
for the survey study described in this chapter, some subjects were selected to participate in two studies, 
which was deemed undesirable. These duplicates were allocated to one of the two studies. Respondents that 
were lost for the survey study described in this dissertation because they were assigned to the other study, 
were replaced by subjects from the same sector as much as possible. Also, where possible, a respondent 
from the same company was selected. This procedure, although not totally random, can be expected to have 
prevented any obvious bias in the sample. 
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cover stated the name of the overall project "Performance Management in the 
Netherlands" and the subtitle of this specific study, "Performance Measurement and 
Evaluation" (Dutch: "Prestatiemeting- en beoordeling"). To emphasize the importance of 
the project and the support it received, it also showed the logos of the three institutions 
supporting the project. The first two pages of the questionnaire provided instructions for 
filling out the questionnaire. It was also stated that it would take an estimated 30 minutes 
to complete the questionnaire, that respondents could indicate their interest in receiving a 
summary of the research findings at the end of the questionnaire, and it provided details 
on how to contact the researcher at his working address in case there were any questions. 
In addition, the first pages promised confidentiality of the data provided and stated 
explicitly that the data would only be available to the academic researchers, and not to 
anyone within their own organization nor to the CI. On the last page a space was 
provided to the respondent for making comments on the questions or providing 
clarifications about answers provided. The back cover page contained the questionnaire's 
number, which was used to identify the type of company the respondent was working for 
and to facilitate the follow-up procedures outlined below. A comment was added that 
indicated that the coding would not violate the confidentiality and anonymous treatment 
of responses, but was only used for administrative reasons. 
 
 
4.4  Procedure 
The survey procedure was also mostly in accordance with Dillman's (2000) Tailored 
Design Method.  
The first step of the research project was the publication of an article authored by 
the research group which announced the overall project and explained its relevance for 
practice, while taking care not to divulge the exact purpose of any of the separate studies 
(Bouwens et al. 2003).  This article was published in the professional magazine covering 
control topics that all members of the CI receive monthly. This made it likely that 
respondents who received a questionnaire remembered the study and its relevance and it 
could lead them to be more inclined to respond. The article replaced a pre-notice letter. 
The questionnaire was sent the month after the publication of the article as part of 
a complete package. Apart from the questionnaire itself, this package consisted of a pre-
stamped return envelope with the logo of the University of Amsterdam which was 
labeled with the working address of the researcher. It contained a high-quality Parker pen 
(value: € 2,50). A cover letter printed on stationary of the CI was included that was hand-
signed by the researcher. The cover letter explained the relevance and purpose of the 
study, emphasized anonymity in the same way as described before and indicated the 
support by the professional organization for the study. To prevent damage to or loss of 
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the pen, the complete package was sent in a tough cardboard envelope with the Institute's 
logo on the front.   
Approximately two weeks later, a postcard was sent to every subject, which 
thanked them in case they had already completed and returned the questionnaire and 
otherwise requested them to do so. Approximately two and a half weeks after that, a 
replacement questionnaire was sent only to those subjects who had not responded yet. 
The replacement questionnaire was part of a package which contained a cover letter 
similar to the first in all essential aspects and which was sent in an envelope of the CI. A 
copy of the article explaining the relevance of the project was attached to remind subjects 
of its importance.  
Starting approximately three weeks later, attempts were made to contact the 
subjects that still had not responded by telephone at their working address, in order to 
inquire about the reasons of their non-response and to try to persuade them to participate. 
A few respondents indicated that the questionnaire was not applicable in their specific 
situation, for instance in case they were financial manager for a specific project. It was 
also found out that some respondents had changed job or were no longer working for the 
same company. Otherwise, respondents did not indicate, even when explicitly asked, any 
problems with the layout, structure or content of the questionnaire. The most commonly 
heard reason for non-response was “no time” or “other priorities”. Finally, an e-mail was 
sent to those respondents who still had not responded and could not be contacted by 
phone, asking them one last time if they would be willing to participate.  
 
 
4.5  Response rate  
A total of 310 questionnaires were sent out. During the final phase of the survey, the CI 
was asked to provide an update on the data of the respondents in order to contact them by 
telephone at their current working address. In the time between sending out the 
questionnaire and the final follow-up, the Institute had conducted its annual survey to 
update its member database.  
It was found that 32 respondents appeared to have changed company. Of these 32, 
three respondents had changed their company name to that of a different unit within the 
same conglomerate, so effectively their company was unchanged – leaving 29 (or 9.4% 
of the 310 surveys sent out) with a real change of employer. These changes in company 
were viewed as randomly occurring across suitable companies and industries and 
therefore these respondents were considered suitable. However, four subjects no longer 
met the selection criteria. One subject changed to a job in the non-profit sector and one 
was now working and residing abroad. Two subjects were now working for a company 
that employed less than 250 employees. These four subjects reduced the effective sample 
size to 306. Furthermore, telephone calls to the office numbers of non-respondents 
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revealed that an additional eight subjects were no longer working in the same company. 
Their new working address could not be traced because they had not sent an update to the 
CI. These subjects were treated as inactive members of the CI and therefore considered 
inappropriate subjects, reducing effective sample size further to 298.  
In addition, some subjects had changed job (sometimes also to another company) 
and were no longer employed as financial managers. One was now an interim manager, 
one a consultant, one a private businessman, one an investment manager, one a director 
of company management, one an interim manager and advisor, and one a work stream 
manager managerial reporting. Because these subjects were not in the target population 
of financial managers, they reduced effective sample size by a further seven subjects to 
291. 
The number of questionnaires that was returned is 162 (full sample size). Gross 
response rate, based on the original number of questionnaires sent out, is therefore 52% 
(162/310). However, eleven of the questionnaires that were received needed to be 
excluded for hypotheses testing because the respondents no longer met the selection 
criteria, leading to a reduced sample size of 151. If this number is divided by the 
corrected effective number of possible respondents, the effective response rate also 
amounts to 52% (151/291). The sample of 151 is used for hypothesis testing. 
 
 
4.6  Sample descriptives 
Descriptive statistics regarding the respondents to the survey are summarized in table 
A1-1 in appendix A1. On average, respondents were 38.3 years old and had been 
working for their current company for 6.3 years. They had been working for 3.5 years for 
the same organizational unit, and for 3.0 years in a similar type of function on average. 
Male respondents comprised 88% of the sample. Respondents reported some influence on 
the design of the incentive system, but more influence on the design of the performance 
measurement system (means of 2.01 and 2.99 on a five-point scale, respectively). 
Importantly, for effects of PMS properties are likely to be stronger in case of stronger 
incentives, a significant part of the respondents’ reward is variable (17.4% on average). It 
is also noteworthy that respondents received negligible proportions of their reward in 
stock-based form – which demonstrates that effects of stock-based rewards on MTO, if 
any, are not likely to taint results. In fact, 72% of respondents received no such rewards 
whatsoever. Respondents further reported that they were working for an organizational 
unit that employed 2577 employees, within a company that employed 37960 people on 
average. The companies were active in the sectors of production (32%), trade (16%), 
financial services (20%) or other services (32%). Refer to table A1-2 (in appendix A) for 
the company descriptives. 
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 Of specific interest given the purposes of this study is the task package of the 
respondents, which should be relevant in relation to the dependent variable, MTO. Table 
A1-3 in appendix A1 contains a summary overview of data on the respondents’ tasks. It 
shows that 99% of respondents had at least some type of managerial tasks. The average 
share of the management-supporting task of the responding financial managers in their 
total task package was 39%, which was more than any of the other tasks. Furthermore, 
66% was a member of the management team, while 70% of respondents were explicitly 
involved in decision-making regarding investment projects. This clearly demonstrates 
that the responses that were obtained are relevant to the issue at hand and can be used to 
test the model as developed in chapter 3. 
 
 
4.7  Measurement instruments 
The measurement instruments were taken from prior literature as much as possible. For 
multi-item instruments, this section also reports the results of a reliability and factor 
analysis7. For newly developed scales, the decision to retain or discard items is largely 
based on the results of these analyses. For existing constructs, the analyses are reported as 
a first exploration of the data, but all items are retained. This decision is based on the 
desire to maximize the comparability of the results of this study to those of previous 
studies. Additionally, the data-analysis technique employed to test the hypothesized 
theoretical model (PLS, see paragraph 4.10.2) takes the exact factor loadings of every 
item into account when estimating the path values. This makes discarding items based on 
separate factor analyses beforehand unnecessary. 
 Although the questionnaire contained more questions, only those that are relevant  
for this study are described below. 
 
4.7.1  Managerial time orientation 
The dependent variable MTO was measured by an instrument based on that developed by 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). This instrument asks the respondent to “indicate the 
percentage of time spent on activities that will show up in the profit and loss statement 
after (a) one month or less, (b) between one month and one quarter, (c) between one 
quarter and one year, and (d) between one and five years”. Percentages should sum up to 
a total of 100%.  
Merchant (1990), Van der Stede (2000) and Moers (2001) have subsequently  
used the same instrument. In their empirical analyses, these researchers have used the 
items that refer to a period of less than one year (items a-c) to represent a managerial 
short-term orientation.  
                                                 
7 Based on the full sample of all returned questionnaires (162). 
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This study uses the same question with one adaptation: an item (e) longer than 
five years was added. The addition of this item is based on the argument that there is no 
a-priori reason to expect that no manager will be engaged in any activity with a horizon 
beyond five years. Excluding this category would force the respondents to allocate 100% 
among the remaining categories, which could distort measurement if some of their 
activities actually have a longer horizon. In that case, respondents could decide to 
exclude those activities and proportionally increase the percentages allocated to all other 
periods. The construction of the MTO variable as in previous studies would then inflate 
the short-term orientation. Percentages allocated to items d and e were summed to 
provide a measure of the length of the MTO for this study. A higher score thus indicated 
a longer MTO. 
 
4.7.2  Data manipulation  
Accounting data manipulation was measured by a set of items based on the scale 
previously used by Merchant (1990). Respondents were asked how often they engaged in 
four budget-related potentially dysfunctional behaviors. A sample item is “shifting funds 
between accounts to avoid budget overruns”. Answers were given on a fully anchored 5-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1=(almost) never to 5= very often. Table A2-1 in 
appendix A2 shows all four items and demonstrates that only one component was 
extracted using principal component analysis. Cronbach alpha for this four-item scale 
was 0.56 – this reliability coefficient has a generally accepted minimum acceptable level 
of 0.7, which may be lowered to 0.6 in exploratory stages of research (Hair et al. 1998, 
p.118). Although the alpha was somewhat too low, also in view of the one-factor 
structure that was obtained, it was decided to retain all items.  
 
4.7.3  Propensity to leave 
The measurement scale for propensity to leave was partly taken from previous 
psychological studies (Martin and Hunt 1980; Rahim and Afza 1993). Item (a) read “If 
circumstances permitted, I would jump at the chance to accept another job in another 
organization” and item (b) was ”If I were completely free to choose, I would continue 
working in this organization”. Two additional specifically designed items were added to 
this scale, for the following reasons. First, it can be expected that promotion opportunities 
within the company would significantly influence intent to leave while the existing 
instrument failed to capture this. Secondly, the existing items focused only on changes in 
company, while a change in function within the same company could be expected to have 
similar effects. The two items that were added are (c) “My promotion opportunities 
within this company are excellent” and (d) “I expect to keep working in my current 
function for a long time”. Subjects were required to indicate their agreement with the 
statements on a fully anchored 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 
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5=completely agree. Items b-d were reverse coded. Only one component was extracted 
using principal component analysis; see table A2-2 in appendix A2. Cronbach alpha for 
this scale was acceptable at 0.72.  
 
4.7.4  Individual time orientation (CFC) 
The measurement scale for the construct Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) as 
developed by Strathman et al. (1994b) was selected as a measure of individual time 
orientation (see § 3.3). The CFC construct “refers to the extent to which individuals 
consider the potential distant outcomes of their current behaviors and the extent to which 
they are influenced by these potential outcomes. It involves the intrapersonal struggle 
between present behavior with one set of outcomes and one set of future outcomes.” 
(Strathman et al. 1994b, p.743). The instrument focuses on behavioral consequences and 
is one of the most commonly used with respect to time orientation (Petrocelli 2003).  
Although previously validated in a limited sample by Strathman et al. (1994b), 
Petrocelli (2003) recently conducted a large-scale study designed to further validate this 
twelve-item measurement scale. He found a two-factor structure. The first of these factors 
consists of the reversed items plus item b, and deals with the focus on short-term 
outcomes. The remaining (non-reversed) items load on the second factor which 
represents concern with future consequences. The first factor, consisting of 8 items, was 
found to exhibit the best properties. The existence of a two factor structure indicated that 
the two factors are not exactly each others reverse, in other words a lack of focus on 
short-term results does not automatically imply high concern with future consequences 
(Petrocelli 2003).  
Table A2-3 in appendix A2 contains details on the items and loadings in the initial 
factor analysis, which revealed five factors. No clearly distinguishable pattern emerges, 
except that some of the reversed items load together. However, when a two-factor 
structure was imposed, results were similar to those of Petrocelli (2003), except that item 
f did not load on any of the two factors and item b did not load on the same factor as the 
reversed items (see table A2-4 in appendix A2). In sum, all non-reversed items except 
item f loaded on one factor and all reversed items loaded on the second factor when two 
factors were imposed. Cronbach alpha for the complete scale including all items had a 
value of 0.63. Despite some unclarity in the factor structure, given the acceptable alpha 
value and the previous use and validation of the scale, all items were retained for further 
analyses.  
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4.7.5  Performance measure properties 
Ease-of-manipulation and degree of lead are two performance measure properties on 
which hypotheses were drafted. 
Ease-of-manipulation was measured by three items, which were part of a set of 
statements placed in the same table with items that measured other properties of the PMS. 
The table referred to the most important accounting performance measure on which the 
subject was being evaluated, as indicated in an open question by the subject. The items 
for ease-of-manipulation (a-c) related to the objectivity and verifiability of the measure 
and were based on the property of accuracy as developed by Merchant (1989). The same 
table also contained three items measuring sensitivity (d-f), three items measuring 
controllability (g-i), and three items (j-l) regarding the emphasis placed on the measure 
for evaluation purposes. Although not all properties were used in this study for 
hypothesis testing, all items are shown here to be able to investigate whether respondents 
were able to distinguish between these characteristics. Results were almost entirely as 
expected, showing a four-factor structure; the only unexpected result was that item i did 
not load on the same factor as the other items measuring controllability. Regarding the 
ease-of-manipulation property which is used in the theoretical model for this study, the 
three items designed to measure it loaded on the same separate factor. This scale had an 
acceptable Cronbach alpha of 0.69. For an overview of the items and factor scores, see 
table A2-5 in appendix A2.  
Degree of lead was measured with an open question, asking for the average 
number of months it would take for a change in the level of the most important 
operational measure to affect profit levels. Usable responses were carefully determined 
based on the most important non-financial measure that respondents had provided in a 
previous open question. Only those respondents that were evaluated based on measures 
related to the business process (such as product quality) were considered viable 
responses, while others that were primarily rewarded based on personal or administrative 
objectives (such as the quality of internal reporting), which are not theoretically linked to 
MTO, were omitted from further analyses. 
 
4.7.6  Other PMS properties 
Three further characteristics of the PMS were measured.  
Subjectivity was measured by an instrument which was developed based on the 
elements of subjective evaluation described by Gibbs et al. (2004). Each of the causes of 
subjectivity was translated into an item for the measurement scale. The three items were 
the following: (a) “The criteria used in my evaluation are subjectively determined with 
hindsight by my supervisor”; (b) “My evaluation and compensation are dependent on 
subjective judgments about my performance”; (c) “My own performance as well as other 
factors are taken into account in my evaluation”. Respondents were asked to indicate 
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their level of agreement with these statements on a 5-point Likert scale. Principal 
component analysis revealed that items a en b loaded on the same factor, while item c did 
not (see table A2-6 in appendix A2). It would seem that although the use of subjective 
evaluations creates the possibility for the supervisor to take factors outside the manager’s 
influence into account, this is not often the case. Item c was therefore omitted from 
further analyses. Cronbach alpha for the reduced scale consisting of items a en b was 
0.71.  
Second, the evaluation period length was determined by asking respondents an 
open question to indicate how often a report was made regarding the most important 
accounting measure they were evaluated on (“..once per  _____”).  
Finally, slack was used in the analyses as a control variable, because previous 
research indicates it that affects MTO (Van der Stede 2000). Because it may also affect 
data manipulation, a link with that variable was also included in the model. Slack was 
measured with the five items previously used by Van der Stede (2000), all on a five-point 
Likert scale. Refer to table A2-7 in appendix A2 for details on items and factor loadings. 
In spite of the fact that factor analysis reveals two factors, it was decided to retain all the 
original items. Cronbach alpha for the entire scale was acceptable with a value of 0.60.  
 
 
4.8  Descriptive statistics 
Table 4-1 below presents descriptive statistics for the measurement instruments described 
above. Values for variables that were measured by a multi-item Likert-scale were 
constructed by calculating the mean score for all items. This way of constructing a 
variable as opposed to the use of factor scores is often the most suitable, especially when 
generalizability or transferability are desired (Hair et al. 1998, p.120). 
 
Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics for survey measurement instruments 
Variable n Unit of 
measurement 
Theoreti- 
cal range 
Actual range Mean  Median Standard 
deviation 
MTO  136 % 0-100 0.00-100.00 26.88 20.00 24.67 
Degree of lead 69 months ≥1 1.00-36.00 8.24 6.00 6.54 
Evaluation 
period 
103 days ≥1 14.00-365.00 86.96 30.42 120.93 
Subjectivity 150 Likert-scale 1-5 1.00-5.00 3.06 3.00 0.88 
Data 
manipulation 
148 Likert-scale 1-5 1.00-2.67 1.24 1.17 0.27 
Ease-of-  
manipulation 
88 Likert-scale 1-5 1.33-5.00 2.42 2.33 0.73 
Propensity to     
leave 
148 Likert-scale 1-5 1.50-5.00 2.80 2.75 0.69 
CFC 148 Likert-scale 1-5 3.00-4.75 3.72 3.67 0.33 
Slack  147 Likert-scale 1-5 1.2-4.0 2.34 2.40 0.51 
Based on 151 questionnaires.  
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The following general observations are apparent from the data. The median respondent 
devoted 20% of time spent to long-term (>1 year) issues (MTO-variable). If a leading 
indicator was used in the managers evaluation system, the median time lag until it 
affected financial performance was 6 months (degree of lead variable). Median and most 
common evaluation interval for accounting measures was 1 month (30 days). 
Respondents did not report a high level of data manipulation on average, possibly due to 
reasons of social desirability or to high levels of professional ethics. However, the range 
of responses on this variable was not too limited (1-2.67). 
 It should be noted that the number of observations was (much) more limited for 
some variables than for others. Not all respondents were evaluated based on a leading and 
an accounting measure. As a result, the number of observations is lower regarding 
evaluation period, ease-of-manipulation, and especially degree-of-lead. The non-use of 
certain PMS elements is be expected given the degrees of freedom that companies enjoy 
when designing a PMS. The conclusion of this chapter and of this dissertation (chapter 6) 
provide more details on the resulting limitations. 
 
 
4.9  Non-response analysis 
To test whether the sample exhibits a non-response bias, early respondents were 
compared to late respondents with respect to differences in the variables of the theoretical 
model. Late respondents are assumed to be more likely to represent non-respondents, 
which means that significant differences between early and late respondents imply a 
biased sample.  
 The sample was split at the median response date (17-06-2003)8. Table A3-1 in 
appendix A3 shows the results of an independent t-test that tests for significant 
differences in the means of the variables between the two groups. Results indicate the 
absence of  any significant difference between early and late respondents. The use of the 
non-parametric test Mann-Whitney U-test (see table A3-2 in appendix A3), which tests 
whether two independent groups are likely to originate from the same sample, provides 
similar results. 
 In sum, there is no apparent evidence of any non-response bias in the sample. 
 
                                                 
8 The three responses received on that date were omitted from the non-response analysis. 
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4.10  Results 
 
4.10.1  Correlations 
Table 4-2 below presents bivariate correlations among the dependent and independent 
variables that are included in the theoretical model. These correlations provide a first 
opportunity to explore the hypotheses.  
 
Table 4-2: Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. MTO   0.26 
0.040 
64 
0.02 
0.868 
97 
0.09 
0.284 
136 
0.04 
0.673 
135 
-0.10 
0.357 
86 
-0.10 
0.274 
135 
0.21 
0.013 
135 
0.13 
0.150 
135 
2. Degree of lead 0.45 
0.000 
64 
 0.05 
0.707 
56 
-0.08 
0.505 
69 
-0.01 
0.960 
68 
-0.16 
0.294 
45 
-0.02 
0.900 
68 
-0.10 
0.434 
68 
0.03 
0.799 
68 
3. Evaluation period 0.11 
0.308 
97 
0.16 
0.235 
56 
 -0.16 
0.098 
103 
-0.04 
0.718 
101 
0.11 
0.308 
86 
0.10 
0.317 
101 
-0.15 
0.128 
101 
0.09 
0.362 
101 
4. Subjectivity  0.13 
0.126 
136 
-0.02 
0.845 
69 
-0.10 
0.314 
103 
 0.08 
0.342 
148 
0.16 
0.130 
88 
0.28 
0.001 
148 
-0.20 
0.015 
148 
0.25 
0.003 
147 
5. Data manipulation -0.01 
0.889 
135 
-0.08 
0.532 
68 
0.01 
0.953 
101 
-0.00 
0.991 
148 
 0.33 
0.002 
86 
0.24 
0.003 
148 
-0.09 
0.274 
148 
0.07 
0.387 
147 
6. Ease-of-manipulation -0.07 
0.530 
86 
-0.21 
0.169 
45 
0.14 
0.197 
86 
0.10 
0.346 
88 
0.31 
0.004 
86 
 0.33 
0.002 
86 
-0.05 
0.623 
86 
0.26 
0.018 
86 
7. Propensity to leave -0.07 
0.400 
135 
-0.07 
0.554 
68 
0.07 
0.498 
101 
0.29 
0.000 
148 
0.23 
0.004 
148 
0.28 
0.009 
86 
 -0.11 
0.170 
148 
0.11 
0.172 
147 
8. CFC 0.19 
0.029 
135 
-0.09 
0.474 
68 
-0.13 
0.185 
101 
-0.19 
0.023 
148 
-0.17 
0.040 
148 
-0.08 
0.456 
86 
-0.11 
0.187 
148 
 -0.04 
0.600 
147 
9. Slack  0.16 
0.065 
135 
0.03 
0.817 
68 
0.04 
0.710 
101 
0.28 
0.001 
147 
0.01 
0.864 
147 
0.18 
0.098 
86 
0.13 
0.116 
147 
0.01 
0.874 
147 
 
Reported are correlation coefficients, below that the corresponding p-value (two-tailed) and n. Correlations 
that are significant at the 10% level are indicated in boldface. Figures below the diagonal are Pearson 
correlation coefficients, above the diagonal Spearman correlation coefficients (nonparametric).  
 
 
First, the hypotheses about the variables that directly affect MTO are evaluated. Based on 
the Pearson correlations in the first column, degree of lead and CFC are positively and 
significantly related to MTO. This provides preliminary evidence in support of 
hypotheses 1 and 7. Hypothesis 4 regarding subjectivity can also be considered 
supported, albeit weakly, with a marginal significance level of just above 10% (two-
tailed; one-tailed p-value for hypothesis testing is 0.063). Hypotheses 2, 5b and 6, 
however, which predicted direct effects of the evaluation period, data manipulation and 
propensity to leave, do not appear to hold based on the insignificant values of their 
correlations with MTO. Hypothesis 3 refers to an interaction and cannot be tested by the 
data in the table.  
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The remaining hypotheses referred to effects among independent variables. The 
significant correlation between ease-of-manipulation and data manipulation supports 
H5a. Hypothesis 5c, however, which predicted an effect of ease-of-manipulation on the 
level of subjectivity, does not appear to hold based on the insignificant correlation 
between these variables. This is inconsistent with the findings of Gibbs et al. (2004). 
Hypothesis 5d also does not appear to hold based on the insignificance of the correlation 
between subjectivity and data manipulation. Regarding the effect of the control variable 
slack, the positive correlation with MTO is in line with findings from previous research 
(Van der Stede 2000). 
Any conclusion based on bivariate correlations only should be made very 
cautiously. Preferably, all relations between variables should be considered 
simultaneously. Furthermore, the preliminary conclusions drawn based on these 
correlations sometimes differ when Spearman instead of Pearson correlations are 
analyzed – this is especially true with regard to the subjectivity variable. 
Finally, there is no apparent problem of multicollinearity given the low values of 
the correlations among independent variables. 
 
 
4.10.2  Partial Least Squares analysis of the model 
The model was analyzed using the Partial Least Squares (PLS) technique, which is a 
specific form of structural equation modeling (SEM). PLS is a combination of factor 
analysis, representing the relation between constructs and measures, and path analysis of 
the structural relations between constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). It provides 
estimates of standardized regression path coefficients and calculates factor loadings and 
weights of indicators of constructs, as well as an R2 for dependent variables (Chin 1998; 
Sosik and Godshalk 2000). In fact, the primary objective of PLS is the maximization of 
variance explained for all endogenous constructs (Hulland 1999). Several reasons arise to 
select the PLS-method for this study. No assumptions regarding data distribution, 
observation independence and variable metrics underlie this method. This makes PLS a 
well-suited method for statistical testing of theoretical models in early stages of 
development and small sample sizes, as is the case in this study. Traditional SEM-
techniques (like LISREL) are less applicable since they assume a specific multivariate 
data distribution and require a larger sample size (Chin 1998; Chin and Newsted 1999).  
 
The model was tested using the PLS-graph 3.0 software developed by Chin (2001). The 
original measurement scales as used in previous research and described above were first 
entered unaltered. The results that were obtained are displayed in figure 4-1. 
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The model includes all independent variables, as well as the control variable slack. The 
interaction between degree of lead and evaluation period is not included due to data 
limitations. The number of observations on this interaction term is much lower than for 
the other variables, which results in difficulties when interpreting results9. As a 
consequence, the interaction predicted in H3 is tested separately (see next subparagraph).  
                                                 
9 To test for the interaction, the data was standardized, which yields results comparable to those in figure 
4-1. When the interaction is included, however, almost all significant paths become insignificant. Given the 
correlations (see table 4-2) and the fact that the significance of the paths in figure 4-1 is insensitive to 
Figure 4-1: PLS results 
 a p<0.01; b p<0.05 (two-tailed). 
+0.216b 
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The results appear to confirm H1, which predicted a positive effect of degree of lead on 
MTO. This main effect should be interpreted carefully, however, because the strength of 
this effect was hypothesized to depend on evaluation period length, and the interaction 
was not included. The data also show a positive and significant effect of both subjectivity 
and CFC on MTO, thus confirming H4 and H7. The other hypothesized effects on MTO 
were not confirmed by the results. Finally, significant results regarding budget data 
manipulation demonstrate that it is influenced negatively by budget slack and positively 
by ease-of-manipulation, as expected in H5a. The model explains 40.8% of the variance 
in the dependent variable MTO. 
 
With the PLS method, path coefficients and item loadings are simultaneously estimated.  
The obtained PLS output therefore provides another opportunity and imperative to 
investigate measurement issues, and to improve measurement instruments. 
 With respect to reliability, the factor loadings of individual items should be 
assessed (see table A4-1 in appendix A4). Not entirely surprising given the results 
obtained in § 4.7, which indicated multidimensionality of some scales, many item 
loadings fall short of the desired minimum loading of 0.5 (Chin 1998; Hair et al. 1998). 
This applies especially to the CFC and slack constructs. Internal composite reliability of 
the measurement scales, a measure similar to the Cronbach alpha except that it does not 
assume equal weights for all indicators, is at acceptable levels (>0.5) for all constructs. 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE), which is the average proportion of variance that a 
construct shares with its measures, however, falls short of the minimum acceptable level 
of 0.5 (Hair et al. 1998) for four of the constructs (data manipulation, propensity to leave, 
CFC, and slack).  
A second measurement validity issue relates to discriminant validity. 
Discriminant validity is achieved when items measure only the specific construct they are 
designed to measure, and do not exhibit a high degree of overlap with other constructs 
(Chin 1998; Smith et al. 2001). Table A4-2 in appendix A4 provides cross-loadings of all 
measurement items on the latent PLS-variables. From the rows of the table, it is apparent 
that there are a few items that load higher on a construct they were not designed to 
measure than on their own construct. This is the case for item f of the CFC construct, and 
for items b, c and d of the slack construct. Additionally, an analysis of the table columns 
reveals that item d of the propensity to leave construct loads lower on its own construct 
than several other items that belong to other constructs (see column for variable 4). Table 
A4-3 also provides evidence on discriminant validity. This table displays correlations 
                                                                                                                                                 
adding or omitting any other path, the results in figure 4-1 can be interpreted with confidence. The most 
likely cause for the dramatic drop in significance due to the inclusion of the interaction term are data 
limitations.  
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between latent PLS-variables and square roots of the AVE for each variable. When the 
square root of AVE is larger than any of the correlations, more variance is shared by the 
items intended to measure the construct than with any other construct (Chin 1998). The 
data in table A4-3 do not indicate any problems regarding discriminant validity. 
 
In order to address the measurement validity issues that arose above, several constructs 
were improved by omitting items. Table A4-4 in appendix A4 shows the new factor 
loadings (above >0.7 as selection criterion), internal composite reliability and average 
variance extracted values after item trimming. The values for these measures are now all 
at at least acceptable levels. Discriminant validity is also excellent (tables A4-5 and A4-6 
in appendix A4). Figure A4-1 displays results for the new measurement model. The 
model now accounts for 33.8% of the variance in the dependent variable MTO. 
Importantly, results regarding the hypotheses are essentially unchanged, except for a drop 
in significance levels for the degree of lead and subjectivity constructs. 
 
Sensitivity analyses further show that results also remain essentially unchanged when the 
control variables organizational size, strategy or industry are introduced10 (not reported).  
 
To sum up, PLS results confirm H4, H5a and H7. Subjectivity and CFC positively affect 
MTO, and ease-of-manipulation increases data manipulation. However, the predicted 
effects of ease-of-manipulation on subjectivity (H5b), subjectivity on data manipulation 
(H5c) and of data manipulation on MTO (H5d) were not confirmed. Further, propensity 
to leave did not significantly affect MTO, which fails to support H6.  
 
Finally, results seem to confirm H1 which stated that degree of lead positively affects 
MTO. There is no main effect of evaluation period length (no support for H2). 
Conclusions should be drawn cautiously with regard to these two independent variables, 
however, because the strength of the effect of degree of lead was predicted to depend on 
evaluation period length. This interactive effect is investigated in the next subparagraph. 
 
Further discussion of the results is deferred to the conclusion of this chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Paths between these control variables and MTO were introduced in the model. See appendix A5 for 
measurement of these variables. 
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4.10.3  Tests for interaction H3 
The interaction between degree of lead and evaluation period length, as predicted in H3, 
is investigated below. First, a regression analysis was performed – see table 4-3.  
 
 Table 4-3: Regression analysis; dependent variable = MTO.  
Variable Expected 
sign 
Standardized 
β-coefficient 
p-value 
Constant   0.000 
Degree of lead (L) + +0.04 0.823 
Evaluation period (P) + +0.05 0.805 
Interaction (L x P) + +0.48 0.044 
 n = 52. F-value =  6.473 ( p=0.001). Adj. R2 = 0.24. 
 The analysis is based on standardized variables.  
 
It can be concluded from the significant (p<0.05) interaction term that the effects of 
degree-of-lead and evaluation period on MTO are interdependent. The positive sign of 
the interaction coefficient is consistent with the prediction that a higher degree-of-lead 
lengthens MTO more in case of a long evaluation period than in case of a short 
evaluation period, as displayed in figure 3-3.  
The regression was re-run including organizational size, strategy, and industry as 
control variables – see table A5-1 in appendix A5. Results were essentially unchanged. 
 
A further exploration of the nature of the interaction was conducted. To enable further 
testing, the two independent variables were dichotomized. Degree-of-lead was split at the 
median (6.00). The evaluation period was divided into a group shorter and a group longer 
than semi-annually11. Table 4-4 shows that, consistent with the expectation in H3, 
correlation coefficients are much higher in case of a long evaluation period than in case 
of a short evaluation period (table shows two-tailed sign. levels).  
 
     Table 4-4: Correlations between degree of lead and MTO 
  Correlation between 
 degree of lead and MTO 
  Pearson Spearman 
 
SHORT 
0.080 
p = 0.601 
n = 45 
0.115 
p = 0.454 
n = 45 
 
 
Evaluation 
period  
LONG 
0.753 
p = 0.051 
n = 7 
0.734 
p = 0.060 
n = 7 
                                                 
11 1,0% of respondents reported a two-weekly evaluation interval, 75,7% a monthly  interval, 7,8% a 
quarterly interval, and 15,5% of respondents were anually evaluated. No respondents indicated an 
evaluation period length in the relatively long range between quarterly and annually, such a semi-annually. 
Consequently, this was the natural point at which to split the sample. 
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The form of the interaction is further confirmed by ANOVA-analyses. A full-factorial 
ANOVA confirmed the interactive effect - see table A6-2 in appendix A6. A significant 
one-way ANOVA (F=6.803, p=0.001) also indicated that there are differences in the 
mean value for MTO between the four subgroups that were formed based on the two 
dichotomized variables. The value for MTO was highest for the group with a long 
evaluation period and a high degree of lead (see table 4-5). This mean is significantly 
different from the other means at the 0.05 confidence level12.  
 
   Table 4-5: Mean analysis. Dependent variable = MTO 
  Degree of lead 
  HIGH LOW 
SHORT Mean: 27.98 
n = 23 
Mean: 22.05 
n = 22 
 
Evaluation 
period LONG Mean: 63.00 
n = 5 
Mean: 12.50 
n = 2 
   
 
These results all support H3 and indicate that the positive effect of degree of lead on 
MTO is stronger in case of a longer evaluation period. There are a few caveats, however. 
First, the sample is relatively limited, with only a few observations in some subgroups. 
Second, the data does not meet the assumption of both regression and ANOVA analyses 
of a normal distribution (see figure A6-1 and table A6-1 in appendix A6). Nevertheless, 
the nonparametric Spearman correlations that do not assume normality also corroborate 
the interactive effect (table 4-4).  
 
 
4.11  Conclusion and discussion 
The results of the survey are summarized in table 4-6. The results can be classified into 
three groups, which are discussed below. 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 relate to the combined effects of degree of lead and 
evaluation period. The predicted interactive effect is supported by the data, as shown in 
§ 4.10.3. Degree of lead lengthens MTO (also supported by correlation table and PLS-
results), and this effect is stronger in case of a longer evaluation period. Several 
limitations of these results must be acknowledged, however. First, as discussed above, 
limitations in the data necessitated a separate analysis of this interactive effect. This 
detracts to some extent from the possibility to generalize the findings to the entire 
population of financial managers. Moreover, the effects of degree of lead and evaluation 
period are likely correlated to the type of industry. Although these effects were controlled 
                                                 
12 Both in post-hoc LSD and Bonferroni analyses. 
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for, the relatively crude proxies for industry may not have been entirely adequate for this 
purpose. Finally, the survey data does not shed light on the reason for the effect of degree 
of lead on MTO. The hypothesis regarding this variable was based on predicted cognitive 
effects of degree of lead, which are confounded in survey data by incentive effects. In 
other words, attention to long-term matters or long-term investments may have increased 
just because the manager maximized the leading performance measure, while the 
manager’s horizon (MTO) was unaffected.  
Given [1] that the survey results provide a first confirmation of the interactive 
effect; [2] limitations in the survey data; [3] a desire to confirm the cognitive effects of 
degree of lead; [4] a desire to control for industry effects, and [5] a desire to definitely 
establish causation, it was decided to conduct an additional empirical test of H1-3. The 
experiment that provides additional evidence on this interactive effect is outlined in the 
next chapter. This experiment also answers recent calls for experimental research 
investigating dependent variables other than performance (Sprinkle 2003).  
 
 Table 4-6: Results of hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis Independent 
variable 
Dependent 
variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Results 
1 Degree of lead (L) MTO + See H3 
2 Evaluation period (P) MTO + See H3 
3 Interaction (L x P) MTO + Supported 
4 Subjectivity MTO + Supported 
5a Ease-of-manipulation Data manipulation + Supported 
5b Data manipulation MTO + Not supported 
5c Ease-of-manipulation Subjectivity + Not supported 
5d Subjectivity Data manipulation - Not supported 
6 Propensity to leave MTO - Not supported 
7 CFC MTO + Supported 
 
 
Hypotheses 4 and 5a-d provided a set of predictions regarding subjectivity and data 
manipulation. Hypothesis 4 was supported, thus providing evidence that subjectivity 
positively affects MTO. The predicted positive effect of data manipulation on MTO, as 
posited by hypothesis 5b, was not confirmed. Ease-of-manipulation affected data 
manipulation positively, confirming H5a, but did not significantly influence subjectivity. 
The main conclusion from this set of hypotheses is that (possibilities for) data 
manipulation do not affect MTO, but subjectivity in evaluations does. 
 
The last two hypotheses concern individual level variables. Propensity to leave had no 
significant effect on MTO, thus not corroborating H6. The personality characteristic 
Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC), on the other hand, affected MTO 
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positively. This implies that the selection of managers that exhibit a certain level of CFC 
is crucial. Thus, personnel controls (Merchant and Van der Stede 2003) may be as 
important in achieving a desired MTO as result controls. 
 
The implications and limitations of the survey are discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
In that concluding chapter, the experimental evidence obtained on the first three 
hypotheses (see next chapter) is also integrated into the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
As described in the previous chapter, three hypotheses (H1-3) were subjected to an 
additional empirical test by means of an experiment. These hypotheses on the effects of 
degree of lead and evaluation period length were derived in chapter 3 and are re-iterated 
below: 
 
H1: A higher degree of lead of performance measures used for evaluation purposes 
positively affects MTO 
H2: A longer evaluation period for accounting measures positively affects MTO 
H3: The positive effect of degree of lead on MTO is stronger in case of a long 
evaluation period than in case of a short evaluation period for accounting measures 
 
The additional experimental test was motivated by the empirical findings from the survey 
(see chapter 4). Moreover, it provides the opportunity to explore the hypothesized effects 
without any possible confounding influence of industry. With regard to the degree of lead 
variable, the experiment provides the opportunity to isolate the cognitive effects of the 
use of leading indicators from incentive effects (increasing long-term investments for 
self-interested reasons). These effects are difficult to disentangle in real-world survey 
data. Furthermore, an added benefit of the experimental method in general is that it 
allows establishing causation rather than cross-sectional correlation only, as in the 
survey. Given the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of the different methods, 
researchers have called for the use of multiple methods in order to triangulate results 
(McGrath et al. 1982; Birnberg et al. 1990). This chapter follows that recommendation. 
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The remainder of this chapter outlines the experimental design (paragraph 5.2) 
and presents and discusses the results (paragraphs 5.3 and 5.4). 
 
 
5.2  Experimental design 
 
5.2.1  General outline 
A 2x2 between-subjects computerized experiment was designed in which the two 
independent variables, degree of lead and evaluation period length, were manipulated. It 
consisted of 16 periods in which subjects were required to make an investment decision, 
from which their MTO was deduced.  
 
The experiment was conducted with student subjects from a third-year accounting course 
on a voluntary basis. Students were offered a course-credit as well as a financial reward 
for their participation. Students with knowledge of accounting and finance were 
considered appropriate subjects for the following reasons. The use of student subjects in 
experimental research regarding investment decisions has been shown to yield effects 
similar in direction compared to the use of practitioners (cf. Ashton and Kramer 1980; 
Liyanarachchi and Milne 2005). Furthermore, student subjects are often preferable when 
general human decision-making processes are involved, to avert any noisy influence from 
biases induced by individual practical experiences (cf. Libby et al. 2002). 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Physically separated individual 
working places in the experimental room. 
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The experimental procedure was as follows. Subjects were first guided to a room 
opposite the experimental computer laboratory. They were shown a short introductory 
video, in which a female presenter outlined general procedural issues during the 
experiment (length of the session, seating procedure, use of the computers, reward pay-
out procedure, etc). Afterwards, the experimenter shuffled and then handed out envelopes 
containing seat numbers for the laboratory, ensuring random seating and distribution 
across conditions. The subjects then entered the computer room and were asked to follow 
the task instructions on screen. By using only video-taped and computerized instructions, 
no experimenter effect is likely to be present. The working places in the computer room 
were physically separated from each other, preventing interaction between subjects – see 
figure 5-1.  
       
After every subject had completed the computer program, the rewards that were earned 
were paid out to the subjects. The earned amounts as well as subjects’ progress during the 
experiment were monitored by the session leader from a central working place (displayed 
in figure 5-2 at the bottom left). The duration of the entire experimental session was 
approximately one hour.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Schematic overhead view of the 
lay-out of the experimental room. 
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5.2.2  Operationalization of variables 
The dependent variable (DV), MTO, was operationalized by the amounts invested in an 
investment project. For determining the subject’s bonus, the invested amounts were 
subtracted from the current-period profit. Subjects could invest low amounts, increasing 
their current bonus and lowering their future bonus, or high amounts that lowered their 
current bonus but increased future bonuses. Any amount invested yielded a positive 
return in the future, and increased both the subject’s total bonus as well as value for the 
company. Higher invested amounts thus signaled a longer managerial time orientation 
(cf. Mannix and Loewenstein 1993; 1994).  
 
The manipulation of the independent variables was achieved through different incentive 
schemes. The evaluation period length for accounting measures was manipulated by 
providing subjects with a report on their profit-based bonus either every period (short 
evaluation period) or only twice during the experiment, after 8 and after 16 periods (long 
evaluation period). In the latter case, subjects were rewarded based on the cumulative 
profits over the previous 8 periods (cf. Gneezy and Potters 1997). The reward paid was 
€ 0.06 per 1000 profit. Actual profit-based rewards paid to subjects varied from € 6.74 to 
€ 10.20 (theoretical range: 6.03-10.20), with a mean of € 8.99. 
 
Degree of lead was manipulated by rewarding subjects every period based on a non-
financial leading indicator that increased almost immediately (the next period) after an 
investment (high degree of lead), or based on an indicator with a more lagged-effect, 
which increased only one period before a profit increase was noticeable (low degree of 
lead). The measure with a high degree of lead was customer satisfaction, while the 
measure with a low degree of lead was customer retention. Including the leading 
indicator in the incentive scheme along with the financial measure was deemed necessary 
to make the leading measure salient.  
The hypothesized effect of degree of lead was based on cognitive effects of 
leading performance measures. Complete evidence regarding this effect therefore 
requires evidence on the process through which these measures affect MTO. The 
experimental materials included a table which contained the lagged causal effects of an 
investment in the project on all performance measures. To facilitate the detection of the 
cognitive effect, the use of that table was recorded as a variable (see next subparagraph 
and instruction screen 3 in appendix B1). 
 
Care was taken to ensure that subjects in every condition faced exactly the same project, 
because only when investment opportunities are equal can conclusions be drawn with 
regard to the same DV. This meant that subjects in all conditions saw the same table with 
lagged causal effects regarding the investment project - see instruction page 3 of the 
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experimental materials (appendix B1). It also meant that subjects could not be rewarded 
based on exactly the same leading performance measure. Rewarding subjects based on 
the same measure (for instance, customer satisfaction) with a different degree of lead 
would vary the nature of the project. Differences in invested amounts could then be 
attributed to preferences for different types of projects13. It was thus deemed necessary to 
hold the degree of lead of specific measures constant and use two different measures. 
Nevertheless, both measures that were used were related to the same (customer) 
perspective from the Balanced Scorecard, preventing any obvious bias. 
 
Care was also taken that there would not exist a material difference in the sacrifice made 
for future returns between subjects in the high versus the low degree of lead conditions. If 
subjects in the high degree of lead condition had received a considerable bonus based on 
increased non-financial performance early on, they would have made less of a sacrifice 
than subjects in the low degree of lead conditions. This would render these conditions 
less comparable with respect to the DV, and hinder the detection of cognitive effects of 
degree of lead. Sensitivity of the bonus based on the leading indicator was therefore set at 
a (very) low level. This was achieved by rewarding the subjects based on the cumulative 
score on their leading indicators for the 16 plants they were responsible for (see 
experimental materials and screen examples in appendices B1 and B3). Actual rewards 
based on non-financial performance paid to subjects varied from € 4.14 to € 4.38 
(theoretical range: 4.10-4.38), with a mean of € 4.28.  
Investing in the project always cost the subject much more in current reward, due 
to the profit decrease, than the gain in reward based on the increased non-financial 
performance. The expected value of the total reward, as well as of the rewards based on 
profit and non-financial performance, was identical across conditions14. 
 
Manipulation checks were performed at the start of the experiment, where subjects could 
only proceed to the investment periods by answering questions on the (non)financial 
performance measure that formed the basis of their reward and evaluation period length 
correctly. If they answered incorrectly, they were automatically taken back to the 
instruction page of interest before given an opportunity to answer again (for the 
questions, see appendix B2). 
 
                                                 
13 To be more precise, an earlier increase in customer satisfaction could be argued to be generally 
preferable over a later increase. 
14 Total reward (rewards based on profit and non-financial performance) varied between € 11.04 and 
€ 14.57 (theoretical range: 10.13-14.58), with a mean of € 13.27. Rounding and timing differences led to 
negligible differences in pay between the low and high degree of lead conditions (approximately 3 cent or 
0.2% of the mean total reward). 
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Conditions were labeled according to table 5-1: 
 
 Table 5-1: Experimental conditions 
  Degree of lead 
 
 
 
  
HIGH 
 
LOW 
 
SHORT 
 
 
I 
 
III 
 
 
Evaluation 
period  
LONG 
 
 
II 
 
IV 
 
 
Figure 5-3 below displays the hypotheses graphically, including the condition numbers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.3  Detailed experimental design 
The experimental design was first extensively tested by a group of 10 fellow researchers 
and subsequently by a group of 28 students from a first year course in accounting, which 
lead to several small adaptations in the experimental design.  
 
Figure 5-3: Interactive effect on MTO of degree of lead of leading indicators and 
evaluation period length for accounting measures. The Roman numbers indicate the 
experimental conditions. 
 
III 
 
I 
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II 
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Experimental materials 
The final experimental materials (see appendix B1) outlined that the subject was 
employed as a BU-manager with considerable decision-making power. The BU consisted 
of 16 similar plants, in each of which an investment opportunity existed. The duration of 
the computerized experiment was 16 periods. At the beginning of each period, subjects 
were asked how much of their current profit (a fixed amount of 10000) they wanted to 
invest in the project in one of the plants that had not been invested in before. They could 
invest any amount in the range between 0 and 10000. Investing in the project affected the 
two non-financial leading indicators at different points in time as described before, and 
generated the first financial returns after 6 periods. Any investment yielded a 10% total 
return, which was equally spread between two future periods: half the initial investment 
was paid back plus return after 6 periods, and the same amount was accumulated after 7 
periods. Figure 5-4 displays a time-line for an investment of 10000 at the beginning of 
period 3. This figure was not included in the experimental materials. Instead, the lagged 
effects could be detected by subjects with some effort from a table which provided 
examples of the causal effects of similar investments on all three performance measures 
(see instruction screen 3 of the experimental materials in appendix B1).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk was included in the experimental design because it is normally part of investment 
decisions. Moreover, the concept of myopic loss aversion predicts effects of evaluation 
period length on MTO specifically in the presence of risks.  
Figure 5-4: Partial time-line for the experiment, showing the effect of a 10.000 investment at 
the beginning of period 3. Profit increases occur 6 and 7 periods after the investment, at the 
end of periods 8 and 9. Increases in leading indicators occur after 1 period and after 5 periods.
High degree of lead
   Low degree of lead
Increase 
in profits 
+ 5500 
Investment 
10.000  
Time
Increase in 
customer 
satisfaction 
Increase in 
customer 
retention 
Increase 
in profits 
+5500 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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The experimental materials outlined that there was a 5% independent chance that 
an investment made in a specific period would not yield any financial return or payback 
(non-financial performance measures were always affected)15. The 5% risk was in fact 
not actually present during the task; in other words, invested amounts always yielded a 
return. This was done to prevent any noisy effects of a bad investment on future 
investments at a subject-specific time in the task, which would then have to be co-varied 
out in the data-analysis. Thus, all subjects had the same amount of “luck” and should 
have perceived the same amount of risk16. 
 
Covariates 
To enable tests for possible effects of other factors, the following variables were 
measured as covariates. Risk aversion was included as a covariate because the investment 
project contained risk, which might have affected individuals differentially. Second, as 
some subjects might be more inclined to behave naturally in the interests of the company, 
ethical behavior was also included as a covariate. Based on hypothesis 7 (see chapter 3), 
Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) was included as a measure of individual 
temporal orientation. Previous experience in developing a performance measurement 
system and with the Balanced Scorecard were also used as covariates to correct for any 
practical experiences subjects may have had. Finally, the general characteristics sex and 
age were also measured. 
 
Structure of computer program 
The experiment was programmed in Authorware and was structured as follows.  
First, three questions measuring the covariate risk aversion were posed in random 
order. The five instruction pages describing the task appeared next – see appendix B1. 
The first provided a general introduction of the task. The second page outlined the 
determination of the reward based on the BU’s financial performance (profit) and non-
financial performance (customer satisfaction or customer retention). The third page 
provided a table which showed the time lagged effects of different amounts invested in 
similar projects on the performance indicators. As discussed, the use of this table was 
recorded as a variable to enable detection of cognitive effects of degree of lead. The third 
page also described the risk involved. The fourth page provided a summary and the fifth 
                                                 
15 As an illustration, investing the maximum amount of 10.000 at the beginning of period 3 would payback 
5.500 at the end of period 8, and also 5.500 at the end of period 9, with a probability of 95%. Because of a 
5% chance the investment would be lost, the expected value of this investment was 10.450. Given the 
expected positive pay-off of 4,5%, the optimal strategy would be to invest the maximum amount each 
period up to and including period 10, after which the returns would fall outside the length of the experiment 
and would no longer benefit the subject. 
16 The relatively high mean score on the debriefing item v (see appendix B7) provides evidence that 
subjects indeed experienced that their investment decisions were risky. 
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and last screen displayed a timeline for the experimental study, among other things 
indicating the timing of the bonus determination (evaluation period length).  
After the instructions were read, a series of basic questions about the task (i.e. 
duration, performance measures used for reward, risk percentage involved, length of 
evaluation period) followed that had to be answered correctly in order to proceed. This 
included the manipulation checks. In case of a false answer, subjects were taken back to 
the appropriate section of the instructions before they were give the opportunity to 
answer the question again – thus ensuring comprehension of the task to the greatest 
extent possible (for the questions, see appendix B2).  
Then, the actual task followed consisting of 16 periods in which subjects were 
asked how much they wanted to invest in the project. After a decision was made in each 
period, a bonus report followed based on the results so far. This report always showed 
non-financial performance, and dependent on the condition, either every period or every 
8th period also financial performance. Appendix B3 contains example screen shots from 
periods within each treatment condition. 
The final part of the experiment was a questionnaire which first posed debriefing 
questions related to the task in random order, then measured several covariates (both the 
order of the constructs and the items were randomized), and finally required information 
on general characteristics of the subject (i.e. age, sex).   
 
 
5.3  Results 
 
5.3.1  Sample 
One hundred eighty-eight (188) students from a third-year accounting course at the 
University of Nijmegen were recruited as participants in the experiment. There were 17 
experimental sessions, each with a maximum of 12 participants. Occasional no-shows 
resulted in varying actual numbers of participants in each session. There were five 
sessions with 12 participants, seven with 11, three with 10, and one session had 9 
participants. These small differences in participant numbers are unlikely to have affected 
experimental results. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the treatment 
conditions. Observations were equally distributed across experimental conditions, with 
47 observations per cell.  
Sample demographics were as follows. The participants varied between 20 and 35 
years of age (mean =  22.39, s.d. = 2.09). Female participants represented 27% of the 
sample. Most participants (174 or 93%) had no working experience in the area of 
accounting & finance. All demographic variables were investigated for differences 
among treatment conditions. Neither ANOVA nor nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests for 
the demographic variables measured on a continuous scale, nor Kruskal-Wallis and 
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Pearson Chi-square tests for the demographic variables measured on a nominal scale, 
revealed significant differences between treatment conditions (at a 0.05 confidence level; 
not reported).  
 
 
5.3.2  Assumption testing 
The main method of analysis of the experimental data is ANOVA, which is based on 
several assumptions. 
 The first assumption tested is normality of the data. As the next subparagraph 
explains, there are two possible DVs. Both are investigated here to check data normality. 
A summation of the amounts invested during all 16 investment periods yields a first 
possible DV. This DV is labeled “sum invested amounts – all periods”. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov normality test results in an insignificant value (K-S = 0.979, p = 0.294), 
indicating that the distribution is not significantly different from a normal distribution – 
see panel A in figure 5-5. The distribution of this variable is also normal within each of 
the four treatment conditions (see figure B4-1 and table B4-1 in appendix B4). The next 
DV, which consists of a summation of the invested amounts from periods 11-16, is not 
normally distributed (K-S = 1.934, p = 0.001). This DV is labeled “sum invested amounts 
– periods 11-16”. Panel B of figure 5-5 displays a histogram of the distribution of this 
variable. 
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Figure 5-5: Histogram of two alternative dependent variables  
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Although this variable is not normally distributed when aggregated across conditions, 
more detailed analysis shows that the distribution of this variable is only significantly 
different from the normal distribution in condition I. Moreover, the distribution of this 
variable is skewed in a similar way (positively) in all conditions (see figure B4-2 and 
table B4-2 in appendix B4). This suggests that the violation of the normality assumption 
is not problematic (Norusis 2002; Karpinski 2003; StatSoft 2003). 
  A second assumption for ANOVA requires homogeneity of variance in all 
treatment conditions. Levene’s test yields a non-significant value for the first DV, “sum 
invested amounts – all periods (F = 2.521 , p = 0.059). For this variable, the requirement 
of equal variance across conditions has been sufficiently met. For the second DV, “sum 
invested amounts – periods 11-16”, Levene’s test shows a significant value (F = 2.688, 
p = 0.048) There was only a limited spread in variance across conditions, however, with 
the smallest variance less than 4 times the largest variance (see table 5-4 and table B4-2). 
Combined with a relatively large sample size and an equal number of observations in 
each condition, this suggests that the between-subjects ANOVA is fairly robust despite 
the deviation from equal variances and normality (cf. Hair et al. 1998, p. 348-349; Field 
2000, p. 275; Norusis 2002p. 301-302). Furthermore, results in upcoming sections are not 
materially affected by the choice of DV. Because the first DV meets the assumptions, this 
demonstrates that violation of neither the first nor the second assumption is a major 
concern. 
 Another assumption concerns independence of observations. The experimental 
design ensured data independence as much as possible. First, a randomized between-
subjects design was employed. ANOVA and nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis and Pearson 
Chi-square tests (not reported) revealed no significant differences among treatment 
conditions for both demographic variables and covariates at the 0.05 confidence level. 
Furthermore, any interaction between subjects during the experiment was prevented. 
Regression analyses of the two independent variables and the interaction term on both 
dependent variables, with the observations in the correct temporal order, were conducted 
to investigate correlation between error terms. The resulting Durbin-Watson statistics are 
close to 2, signaling that the adjacent residuals are uncorrelated (DW = 2.166 and 
DW = 2.011). Therefore, data independence can be safely assumed. 
 Based on the analysis above, where present, violations of ANOVA assumptions 
are not considered problematic.  
 
 
5.3.3  Hypothesis testing 
The invested amounts provide the measurement instrument for MTO. Several alternatives 
for constructing the DV arise. As introduced in the previous section, the first possibility is 
to aggregate all the invested amounts throughout the entire experiment, in periods 1-16 
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(“sum all invested amounts – all periods”). An ANOVA test of this DV was conducted as 
a first exploration of results, which are displayed in table 5-2.  
 
Table 5-2: ANOVA; DV = sum invested amounts - all periods 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
square 
F p-value 
Corrected model 99211789071 3 3307059636 4.557 0.004 
Intercept 1.447E+12 1 1.447E+12 1994.240 0.000 
Degree of lead (L) 26182369 1 26182369 0.036 0.850 
Evaluation period (P) 8588431495 1 8588431495 11.834 0.001 
Interaction (L x P) 1306565044 1 1306565044 1.800 0.181 
Error 1.335E+11 184 725733777   
Total 1.591E+12 188    
Corrected total 1.435E+11 187    
1R2=0.069, Adj. R2=0.054. 
 
The significant p-value (0.001) for evaluation period length indicates a significant main 
effect for this variable, confirming H2. No main effect of degree of lead and interaction 
effect appear present in the data given the insignificant p-values for these variables. Thus, 
the data provide no support for H1 and H3. 
  
The following considerations favor another construction of the DV. Subjects in the low 
degree of lead conditions see the first change in non-financial performance at the end of 
period 5 (provided they decided to invest). Subjects in the conditions with a long 
evaluation period see their first on-screen profit bonus report at the end of period 8. The 
possibility for learning effects regarding these manipulations provide an argument to 
exclude the amounts invested early in the experiment. Only at the end of period 8 has 
every subject received at least one profit-based bonus report. Alternative constructions of 
the DV based on the amounts invested in the second half of the experiment are therefore 
investigated next.  
The amounts invested in periods 9 and 10 are likely unaffected by learning effects 
because every subject has experienced a profit-based reward after period eight. 
Moreover, in these periods no end-game effects are present yet. Later, at the beginning of 
period 11, it is no longer in the subject’s interest to invest because the resulting profit 
increase has a six-period time lag and therefore falls outside the duration of the 
experiment. 
Table B5-1 in appendix B5 shows the significance of separate ANOVA analyses 
on the amounts invested in individual periods. The analysis reveals that the bulk of the 
differences are located in periods 11-16. There are also some significant differences in 
periods 1-10, mostly indicating higher investments in conditions with a long evaluation 
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period (conditions II and IV – see table B5-2). However, only one one-way ANOVA (of 
period 7) and two full factorial ANOVAs (of periods 2 and 7) are significant in the first 
ten periods. Correspondingly, ANOVAs on the summed invested amounts in the first half 
of the experiment (periods 1-8), on the sum of the invested amounts in periods 9 and 10, 
and on the summed amounts invested in the first ten periods (1-10) are not significant 
(not reported). The concentration of significant effects in periods 11-16 suggests that 
there is an effect on MTO mostly when subjects are faced with a short (employment) 
horizon. Based on these results, the sum of the invested amounts in periods 11-16 is used 
as the DV in further analyses. It should be noted that results are not materially different 
when the sum of the invested amounts in all periods is used as the DV instead. Table 5-3 
reports the results of an ANOVA on the DV “sum invested amounts – periods 11-16”. 
Table 5-4 shows results per condition, and table 5-5 investigates the significance of the 
differences in means between conditions.  
 
           Table 5-3: ANOVA; DV = sum invested amounts – periods 11-16 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
square 
F p-value 
Corrected model 71525480181 3 2384182673 8.084 0.000 
Intercept 7.146E+10 1 7.146E+10 242.281 0.000 
Degree of lead (L) 119212162 1 119212162 0.404 0.526 
Evaluation period (P) 6776618742 1 6776618742 22.977 0.000 
Interaction (L x P) 256717114 1 256717114  0.870 0.352 
Error 5.427E+10 184 294930896   
Total 1.329E+11 188    
Corrected total 6.142E+10 187    
             1R2=0.116, Adj. R2=0.102. 
 
 
  Table 5-4: Results per experimental condition; 
   DV= sum invested amounts – periods 11-16 
 
 
  Degree of lead 
 
 
 
  
HIGH 
 
LOW 
 
SHORT 
Condition I 
N = 47 
Mean: 11527 
S.D.: 15260 
Var.: 232880510 
Condition III 
N = 47 
Mean: 15457 
S.D.: 15596 
Var.: 243245728 
 
 
 
Evaluation 
period  
LONG 
Condition II 
N = 47 
Mean: 25872 
S.D.: 19030 
Var.: 362148855 
Condition IV 
N = 47 
Mean: 25127 
S.D.: 18478 
Var.: 341448458 
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Table 5-5: Condition comparison of means 
from table 5-4 
condition minus 
condition 
mean 
difference 
p-value 
I II -14345 0.000 
 III -3930 0.269 
 IV -13600 0.000 
II III 10415 0.004 
 IV 744 0.834 
III IV -9671 0.007 
    Post-hoc (LSD) analysis. Differences that are 
significant in the table are also significant 
(p<0.05) with the more conservative Bonferroni-
test. 
 
 
 
Results are consistent with those from the previous ANOVA analysis based on the 
amounts invested during the entire experiment. The low p-value (<0.001) for evaluation 
period in table 5-3 indicates a significant main effect of evaluation period length, clearly 
supporting H2 for this DV based on the invested amounts in the last periods17. No main 
effect of degree of lead and interaction effect appear present in the data, as indicated by 
the high p-values for these variables in table 5-3. No support is therefore provided for H1 
and H3. Additionally, table 5-5 demonstrates that the differences between conditions I 
and III and between II and IV, are insignificant. Degree of lead therefore does not 
significantly affect the DV.  
This is illustrated further by a graph of the mean invested amounts, as displayed 
in figure 5-618. The difference in height of the two lines represents the main effect of 
evaluation period length. However, there is no effect of degree of lead nor an interactive 
effect, as can be seen by the relatively flat-sloped lines with only slightly differing slope 
values. 
                                                 
17 There are also significant (p<0.05) main effects of evaluation period in periods 2 and 7. 
18 The figure is not exactly scaled. 
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Additional evidence 
The next step in analyzing the results involves including the covariates. For descriptive 
statistics and measurement details on the covariates, see appendix B6. Table B6-4 shows 
an ANCOVA analysis that demonstrates that results are insensitive to the inclusion of the 
covariates19. Moreover, none of the covariates, including CFC and risk aversion, 
significantly influence the DV20. Therefore, covariates need not be considered further in 
analyzing the results. 
 
An in-depth analysis also requires attention to the processes that underlie the effects of 
the two independent variables on MTO. The debriefing questionnaire contained several 
questions posed to subjects in order to provide insight in these processes (for the items 
and descriptive statistics, see appendix B7).  
 
Additional evidence for the effect of evaluation period length is considered first. The 
following items show significant ANOVA results for evaluation period (detailed results 
in appendix B7): item f, which read “The total duration of the task (16 periods) was an 
important factor in determining the amounts I invested”, and item h, “I took the future 
consequences of my investment decisions for the company after the task was over into 
                                                 
19 A regression yields similar results. Covariates remain insignificant after stepwise deletion of insignificant 
variables. 
20 This is independent of the choice of DV. 
Figure 5-6: Graph of results 
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consideration”. Subjects in conditions with a long evaluation period (II and IV) scored 
significantly lower on item f and significantly higher on item h. This implies that a longer 
evaluation period indeed assisted or induced subjects to look beyond the duration of the 
task. It thus provides corroborating evidence, suggesting that a longer evaluation period 
lengthens MTO in case of ending employment contracts.  
Items n, o and w also show a significant effect of evaluation period length. Results 
for items n and o indicate that subjects were willing to invest more in the short evaluation 
period conditions (I and III) at the expense of their next reward, and that they were less 
focused on their next reward. These results are not necessarily contradictory to the 
previous finding that a longer evaluation period lengthens MTO, as the analysis of the 
invested amounts has shown. In case of a shorter evaluation period, subjects necessarily 
have to sacrifice more short-term rewards to maximize returns in the long-run. 
Finally, the result for item w indicates that a shorter evaluation period assisted 
subjects in identifying causal linkages. Thus, a higher frequency of profit reports clarified 
the interrelations between the non-financial and the financial measures. This effect was 
expected for the other independent variable, degree of lead. 
 
Regarding degree of lead, two debriefing items (i and j) show significant effects. 
Although evidence for both items seems to indicate that a higher degree of lead induced 
subjects to act more in the company’s interests, this did not affect their investment 
decisions, as previous results have shown.  
The experimental design also allowed for more direct measurement of the effects 
of degree of lead by registering the number of times instruction page 3 was consulted. 
This page contained the table containing the causal linkages between performance 
measures. Its use provides an indication of the predicted effects on cognitive searches by 
the subjects for lagged effects and causal relations among performance measures. Results 
from an ANOVA analysis are displayed in table 5-6.  
 
         Table 5-6: ANOVA; DV = #times instruction page 3 consulted during task 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
square 
F p-value 
Corrected model 93.7611 3 31.254 4.671 0.004 
Intercept 1190.048 1 1190.048 177.851 0.000 
Degree of lead (L) 29.920 1 29.920 4.472 0.036 
Evaluation period (P) 44.048 1 44.048 6.583 0.011 
Interaction (L x P) 19.793 1 19.793 2.958 0.087 
Error 1231.191 184 6.691   
Total 2515.000 188    
Corrected total 1324.952 187    
1R2=0.071, Adj. R2=0.056 
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Given the significant p-values (<0.05) for both variables, these results suggest both a 
main effect of evaluation period length and of degree of lead. Additional analysis, a 
condition comparison of means (see table 5-7), reveals that in condition IV, the number 
of times the table with the causal linkages was studied during the task was significantly 
higher than in the other three conditions. Results thus indicate that both a longer 
evaluation period and the use of a short-lead measure increase attention to lagged effects. 
This is contrary to the prediction. Increased attention to lagged causal effects was 
expected to depend only on the degree of lead of the performance measure – with a 
higher degree of lead increasing attention to lagged effects. Further discussion of this 
finding is deferred to the next section.  
 
Table 5-7: Condition comparison of means for 
the use of instruction page 3  
condition minus 
condition 
mean 
difference 
p-value 
I II -0.32 0.551 
 III -0.15 0.780 
 IV -1.77 0.001 
II III  0.17 0.750 
 IV -1.45 0.007 
III IV -1.62 0.003 
Post-hoc (LSD) analysis. Results are also 
significant (p<0.05) with the more conservative 
Bonferroni-test. 
 
 
 
5.4  Conclusions 
The main finding of this experiment is that a longer evaluation period for accounting 
performance measures positively affects MTO, mostly when the employment horizon is 
short. A longer evaluation period led subjects to invest more in the final periods of the 
experiment, when investing was no longer in their interest. These subjects were 
apparently helped by the decreased evaluation frequency to look beyond the duration of 
the task, thus overcoming myopia and extending their horizon into the future. Evidence 
from the debriefing questionnaire provides strong support for this conclusion21.  
                                                 
21 The experiment was carefully designed to exclude the possibility that subjects were unaware of the end 
of the task. The comprehension check at the start of the experiment involved a question asking subjects for 
the duration of the experiment (question 2 in appendix B2). Furthermore, at the end of every period 
subjects proceeded to the next by pressing a button labeled “go to period # (of 16)” – see appendix B3. 
Finally, statistical analysis of the investment patterns between subsequent periods revealed identical 
patterns across conditions (see appendix B8). These patterns clearly showed a decrease in invested amounts 
between periods 10 and 11, the point at which the horizon problem becomes relevant. This provides 
evidence that subjects in every condition were aware of end-game effects on their reward. 
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This finding is in line with the theory that formed the basis for H2. This 
hypothesis predicted a positive effect of evaluation period length on MTO. Results of the 
experiment suggest that this effect is present mostly in the final stages of the employment 
relationship. Given the ever-present possibility of terminating employment contracts in 
practice, this evidence stresses the importance of the PMS-design for achieving the 
desired MTO. 
 
Regarding the effects of degree of lead, the experiment showed no significant effects on 
MTO. Several alternative explanations for this lack of effect arise22.  
Based on the evidence from table 5-7, subjects in the low degree of lead 
conditions appear to have compensated the lack of clarity about causal effects by 
initiating a search for lagged effects. Although subjects in the high degree of lead 
conditions were expected to exhibit increased attention to lagged effects, the evidence 
from the use of the information on lagged causal effects indicates that a low degree of 
lead (combined with a long evaluation period) leads to a more intensive use of 
information on causal relationships. It thus appears that when the effect of investment 
decisions is not easily or quickly apparent in performance measures, more information on 
these effects is needed. This initiates a search for causal linkages, at least in a 
(necessarily) relatively simple experimental setting. 
Nevertheless, it could still hold that the use of a measure with a higher degree of 
lead focuses attention on lagged casual effects more than the use of a measure with a low 
degree of lead. That is, it could be that a high degree of lead immediately makes lagged 
causal effects more transparent or salient, thus limiting the need for an extensive 
investigation of lagged effects. However, this cannot be demonstrated with the 
experimental data that was obtained. 
It should also be noted that even if the degree of lead of a performance indicator 
may not influence MTO, the inclusion of a leading indicator itself may. Furthermore, this 
experiment set out to detect cognitive effects of degree of lead, not incentive effects due 
                                                 
22 Another possible explanation is that the manipulation of this variable was not extreme enough. The 
difference in degree of lead between the high (five period lead) and low (one period lead) degree of lead 
conditions was four periods. Based on constraints for the experimental design, however, this was deemed 
the maximum variation possible. The total length of the experiment was set at no more than 16 periods to 
prevent boredom and irritation by subjects with the amount of repetition. This implied a maximum length 
of the evaluation period of eight periods, to ensure that every subject had at least seen one profit based 
bonus report halfway through the task. This ensured that subjects understood their bonus determination 
method also in the long evaluation period conditions and it enabled analysis of the invested amounts during 
the second half of the experiment as the DV. In turn, the maximum length for the evaluation period of eight 
periods meant that the two profit increases had to be timed before that, the first in periods 6 and 7, which 
made the maximum degree of lead five periods. Given that the manipulation of degree of lead significantly 
affected other variables, namely subjects’ search strategies as well as debriefing items, conservatism in the 
manipulation does not seem a likely cause for the lack of effects of this variable on MTO. 
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to the increase in reward. Nevertheless, positive incentive effects of the inclusion of 
leading indicators on the level of long-term investments are likely to be present in reality. 
Many studies have shown that individuals respond to rewards based on performance 
measures by enhancing their performance, at least on the measured dimensions of 
performance (Kerr 1975; Jenkins et al. 1998; Courty and Marschke 2004). Such incentive 
effects of degree of lead would not be likely to extend managerial horizons and thus not 
impact MTO, although they would be likely to influence the amount of long-term 
investments positively (due to self-interest behavior). The survey evidence from chapter 4 
provides support for this. 
 
The next and final chapter, containing the conclusions of this dissertation, provides more 
discussion of the limitations and implications of the experiment. It also considers the 
relation between the findings from the survey and the experiment in more detail. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
This last chapter provides a summary of this dissertation. Paragraph 6.2 outlines the 
structure and content. Next, in paragraph 6.3, the findings of the two empirical studies are 
re-iterated, integrated and discussed. Paragraph 6.4 discusses the implications of the 
empirical results and reviews the contributions of this dissertation. Finally, paragraph 6.5 
concludes with a description of the limitations and suggestions for further research.  
 
 
6.2  Summary overview 
This study set out to investigate the effects of PMS properties and individual level 
variables on MTO.  
Chapter 1 provided an introduction, which indicated the relevance of and 
motivation for this study. Achieving a MTO appropriate for the circumstances is crucial 
for companies to be successful (National Academy of Engineering 1992). Both the PMS 
and individual level variables are important factors that influence MTO, but research in 
this field is not yet well developed (National Academy of Engineering 1992; Laverty 
1996). This study aimed at contributing to this area of research. 
The literature review in chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on MTO. 
It drew primarily from the accounting literature, but also from the underlying economic 
and psychological disciplines. From these different fields, it identified factors from 
within the PMS and individual level variables that have been shown or argued to affect 
MTO. The main conclusions of the review are that [1] the accounting literature is full of 
claims about the effect of PMS properties, but only a few empirical studies exist; [2] 
studies to date have analyzed broad performance measure categories, under emphasizing 
properties of performance measures that can cause effects on MTO; and [3] relatively 
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little cross-fertilization exists between the different streams of literature. This dissertation 
aimed at filling these gaps. 
The third chapter developed a model with hypothesized links between the factors 
identified in the literature review as potentially affecting MTO. The variables that were 
expected to influence MTO directly are degree of lead (+), evaluation period length (+), 
subjectivity (+), data manipulation (+), propensity to leave (-) and Consideration of 
Future Consequences (+). The model provides a first attempt to integrate both individual 
level and PMS variables in one model that predicts MTO, while also including linkages 
between independent variables. 
Chapter 4 described the survey study that was conducted with the participation of 
the CI. A representative sample of financial managers was selected from this institute’s 
member list. The purpose of the survey study was to conduct a first generalizable 
empirical test of the theoretical model. Results are re-iterated in the next paragraph. 
Chapter 5 outlines the experimental study that was designed as an additional in-
depth test of the hypothesized interactive effect of degree of lead and evaluation period. 
Moreover, its specific goals were [1] to establish evidence of causality in addition to the 
correlational evidence obtained by the survey, thus triangulating results (McGrath et al. 
1982; Birnberg et al. 1990); [2] to explore the hypothesized effects without any possible 
confounding influence of industry; [3] to isolate the cognitive effects of the use of leading 
indicators from incentive effects (increasing long-term investments for self-interested 
reasons), which are difficult to disentangle in real-world survey data. The results of the 
experiment are also re-iterated in the next paragraph. 
 
6.3  Discussion of findings 
Table 6-1 provides a summary overview of the findings from both the survey and the 
experiment. 
 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 relate to the combined effects of degree of lead and evaluation 
period. The predicted interactive effect is supported by the survey data. Degree of lead 
lengthens MTO and this effect is stronger in case of a longer evaluation period for 
accounting measures. These results are subject to several limitations, however. The 
sample was especially limited in size for these two variables, which detracts to some 
extent from the possibility of generalizing the findings to the entire population of 
financial managers. Moreover, the effects of degree of lead and evaluation period are 
likely correlated with the type of industry. Although these effects were controlled for in 
the empirical analyses, the relatively crude proxies for industry may not have been 
entirely adequate for this purpose. Finally, it is not possible based on the survey data to 
definitely determine whether cognitive effects are the cause for the effects of degree of 
lead on MTO. Alternatively, attention to long-term matters or long-term investments may 
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have increased just because the manager maximized the leading performance measure, 
while the manager’s horizon was unaffected.  
 
Table 6-1: Summary overview of findings 
Hypo-
thesis 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent 
variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Survey 
results 
Experimental 
results 
1 Degree of lead (L) MTO + See H3 Not supported 
2 Evaluation period (P) MTO + See H3 Supported 
3 Interaction (L x P) MTO + Supported Not supported 
4 Subjectivity MTO + Supported  n.a.1 
5a Ease-of-manipulation Data manipulation + Supported n.a. 
5b Data manipulation MTO + Not supported n.a. 
5c Ease-of-manipulation Subjectivity + Not supported n.a. 
5d Subjectivity Data manipulation - Not supported n.a. 
6 Propensity to leave MTO - Not supported (employment 
horizon effect) 
7 CFC MTO + Supported (n.s.2 as 
covariate) 
1 n.a. = not applicable; 2 n.s. = not significant 
 
In contrast, the experimental evidence did not provide support for the interactive 
effect. Additionally, degree of lead did not significantly affect MTO. The predicted 
cognitive effect of a higher degree of lead, in the form of increased attention to lagged 
effects, could not be demonstrated. Instead, subjects had increased attention to lagged 
causal effects in the condition with a low degree of lead and a long evaluation period. By 
doing this, they seem to have compensated for the lack of clear indications of lagged 
effects in their PMS. It could therefore hold that a high degree of lead immediately makes 
lagged causal effects more transparent or salient, which would limit the need for an 
extensive investigation of lagged effects. This cannot be demonstrated with the 
experimental data that was obtained, however. 
The experiment showed that the accounting evaluation period significantly affects 
MTO. A longer evaluation period led subjects to invest more mostly in the final periods 
of the experiment, when investing was no longer in their interest. These subjects were 
apparently helped by the decreased evaluation frequency to look beyond the duration of 
the task, thus extending their horizon into the future.  
Taken together, the results from the survey and the experiment suggest the 
following. A longer evaluation period increases MTO, especially when the (contractual) 
employment horizon is short. Degree of lead affects MTO for incentive, not cognitive  
reasons. In other words, leading indicators can increase attention to long-term matters for 
self-interested reasons when evaluations are based on these indicators, but no evidence 
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could be found that they increase MTO due to increased attention to lagged causal 
effects. In practice, these two variables, degree of lead and evaluation period length, 
interact as demonstrated by the survey evidence.  
 
Hypotheses 4 and 5a-d provided a set of predictions regarding subjectivity and data 
manipulation. These predictions were tested only by the survey study, and the findings 
are repeated below. Hypothesis 4 was supported, thus providing evidence that 
subjectivity positively affects MTO. Subjectivity had no effect on data manipulation (as 
predicted in H5d), however. Ease-of-manipulation affected data manipulation positively, 
confirming H5a, but did not significantly influence subjectivity (H5c). The predicted 
positive effect of data manipulation on MTO, as posited by hypothesis 5b, was not found. 
The main conclusion from this set of hypotheses was that (possibilities for) data 
manipulation do not affect MTO, but subjectivity in evaluations does. 
 
The last two hypotheses (6 & 7) concerned individual level variables. Propensity to leave 
did not significantly affect MTO in the survey study, thus not corroborating H6. On the 
other hand, the experimental study showed that the effects of evaluation period length are 
strongest at the end of the employment horizon. Because propensity to leave influences 
the expected employment horizon, this variable could also interact with evaluation period 
length. This could not be tested further due to limitations of the survey sample, however.  
The personality characteristic Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) had a 
significant positive influence on MTO in the survey. In the experimental study, this 
variable was included as a covariate and as such, it had no significant effect on MTO. 
The evidence thus suggests that in practice, managers are either selected or self-select 
themselves for a job that requires a MTO that fits their CFC.  
 
 
6.4  Implications and contributions 
The findings from the two empirical studies in this dissertation have important 
implications for the design of management control systems by organizations. The 
dissertation also provides significant contributions to the existing management 
accounting literature. 
The results have shown that the PMS design exerts a significant influence on 
MTO. More in particular, the length of the evaluation period for accounting measures has 
a positive effect on MTO. This suggest that companies should carefully tune the 
evaluation period for internal evaluation purposes to the desired MTO, and not 
automatically equate it with an external reporting period as required by law. The 
evaluation period was also found to moderate the effect of leading indicators. The degree 
of lead of these indicators affected MTO positively, and more strongly so for a longer 
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evaluation period. This suggests that when a BSC (Kaplan and Norton 1996) is 
implemented, not only the selection of measures is important for balancing short- and 
long-term objectives, but also the evaluation interval for the financial perspective. 
Additionally, companies should be careful when selecting a leading indicator and 
attaching a weight to it for evaluation purposes. The reason is that this study did not show 
any cognitive effects of degree of lead. Because no evidence was obtained that the use of 
a leading indicator extends managerial horizons, the danger exists that managers will just 
maximize the measured dimension.  
Second, subjectivity in evaluations affected MTO positively. Apparently, on 
average, companies and supervisors are more long-term oriented than subordinate 
managers. This corroborates an assumption that was made in previous studies (e.g., 
Bushman et al. 1996; Murphy and Oyer 2003), and provides the first empirical evidence 
directly supporting the positive relation between subjectivity and MTO. This dissertation 
also showed that (opportunities for) data manipulation, which could alleviate short-term 
pressure, do not significantly affect MTO.  
Third, individual level variables have been shown to significantly affect MTO. 
More specifically, employment horizon, and possibly propensity to leave, affects the 
strength of the effect of evaluation period length and perhaps also of other PMS 
properties. Additionally, the personality characteristic CFC influences MTO positively. 
Consequently, companies should attract managers with a high CFC when a long MTO is 
required. Thus, personnel controls (Merchant and Van der Stede 2003) may be as 
important in achieving a desired MTO as result controls.  
 
Overall, this dissertation provides a significant contribution to the existing accounting 
literature. It does so by isolating properties of the PMS that influence MTO, both 
theoretically and empirically. This contributes to the existing literature, that has primarily 
used broad performance measure categories (such as financial versus non-financial) and 
has underemphasized the process through which MTO is influenced (cf. Ittner and 
Larcker 1998; Ittner and Larcker 2002, p. s60). The theoretical model included all 
variables that were identified as potentially affecting MTO, and also included their 
interrelations. Moreover, this dissertation used an interdisciplinary approach, thus 
providing a more complete picture of a complex practical problem (cf. Merchant et al. 
2003). Regarding the first three hypotheses, it employed a multi-method empirical test to 
enable triangulation of  results (McGrath et al. 1982; Birnberg et al. 1990). Finally, it 
included individual level variables, which demonstrated the importance for MTO of 
personnel controls in addition to result controls. 
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6.5  Limitations and directions for further research 
As any empirical study, this study is subject to several limitations. These can be classified 
into limitations that are generally associated with the survey and experimental methods, 
and more specific limitations. 
 
First, in the survey study, the variables consisted of perceptual measures. This is not a 
problem for any of the independent variables, because it is exactly how managers 
experience the criteria for their evaluation that will influence their behavior. For the DV 
(MTO), however, an additional more ‘objective’ measure would have been desirable. An 
example of such a measure is data on invested amounts. To some extent, with respect to 
the first three hypotheses, the experimental study alleviates this limitation because it 
collected hard ‘objective’ data. Nevertheless, future research should attempt to replicate 
the survey findings and validate the results with a more objective measure for MTO.   
 Second, a general problem with survey studies is the “common-method” problem, 
which occurs when respondents are inclined to report socially desirable and consistent 
answers (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). This can bias the results in favor of confirming the 
hypotheses. This problem was limited by the design of the questionnaire, which also 
contained many questions that were not directly related to this study. This made 
hypothesis-guessing unlikely. More specifically related to this study, social desirability 
may have affected one variable in particular: data manipulation. A low tendency to report 
this manipulative behavior might have biased the results. Future research should aim at 
triangulating results by collecting objective data for this variable. 
Third, the survey study provided only cross-sectional correlational evidence 
(Young 1996). To establish causality on all the predicted relationships, more longitudinal 
or experimental research would be required. 
Fourth, the data gathered for the survey study originated from diverse industries. 
Although industry effects were controlled for to the extent possible in the statistical 
analyses, this may still have been a confounding factor. A future study using a sample 
based on a single industry can resolve this issue. The experimental study provided a test 
that controlled for industry effect regarding H1-3. 
Fifth, the survey used a sample of financial managers. This was an appropriate 
sample, because these respondents were in a position to affect some of the variables 
included in the theoretical model that are less under the influence of other managers (for 
example, data manipulation). Nevertheless, the number of observations was limited for 
some variables in the sample, because not all variables were part of every respondent’s 
PMS. More research can improve the generalizability of the findings to other types of 
managers for most of the hypotheses. 
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The experimental study is also not without its limitations.  
First, the experiment involved student subjects. Although this prevents biased 
results from practitioners with context-specific experiences (cf. Libby et al. 2002) and 
although decisions made by students have been shown to yield effects similar in direction 
as decisions by practitioners (cf. Ashton and Kramer 1980; Liyanarachchi and Milne 
2005), it could still limit the generalizability to other groups of subjects. Additionally, 
necessarily by design, the experiment involved a simple task that was compressed in 
time. This could limit the applicability of the findings to the more complex continuing 
circumstances in practice. 
More specifically related to this particular experimental design, the experiment 
involved a manipulation of degree of lead with two levels: low and high. An interesting 
question that can be answered by future research is whether the use versus non-use of a 
leading indicator results in cognitive effects and influences MTO. Obtaining evidence on 
this issue would require a similar experiment with extra treatment conditions that do not 
include a leading indicator in the PMS. 
 
Based on the findings of this dissertation, some interesting further general avenues for 
additional research present themselves. First, evidence from the experiment suggests that 
an individual level variable, employment horizon, is an important factor in determining 
the strength of the effect of evaluation period length on MTO. Second, the survey 
evidence shows a significant effect of the individual characteristic CFC on MTO. More 
studies examining the ways in which individual level variables interact with properties of 
the PMS to affect MTO are called for. Additionally, the relative importance of individual 
level variables and PMS properties needs to be investigated further. This could determine 
the relative importance of result versus personnel controls for achieving the desired 
MTO, with important implications for the design of the management control system.  
 
More general directions for future research can be derived by extending the topic of this 
dissertation. First, empirical evidence, especially experimental, on dependent variables 
other than performance is generally limited within the management accounting literature 
(Sprinkle 2003). The effects of PMS properties on DVs other than MTO that can also 
affect investment behavior, such as risk taking, are worth studying. As a second 
illustration, this dissertation did not focus on the effects of different types of incentives 
attached to the PMS on MTO. Therefore, the effects of stock-based incentives (Lewellen 
et al. 1987; Clinch 1991; Bizjak et al. 1993; Gaver and Gaver 1993; Bushman et al. 
1996), bonus banking (National Academy of Engineering 1992; Stern et al. 1995) and 
career concerns (Coates et al. 1995; Day et al. 2002) were not analyzed. Nevertheless, 
this would appear a potentially very fruitful area for future research. 
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APPENDIX A1 
 
Table A1-1: Respondents demographics 
Variable Descriptive 
Age 38.3 (mean) 
Sex 88% male 
Tenure with organization 6.3 years (mean) 
Tenure with organizational unit 3.5 years (mean) 
Tenure in same type of function 3.0 years (mean) 
Influence on design of performance measurement system1 2.99 (mean) 
Influence on design of incentive system1 2.01 (mean) 
Percentage of variable pay2 17.4 (mean) 
Percentage of stock-based reward (stock, options)3 2.0 (mean) 
1 Measured on a five-point Likert-scale. 
2 All respondents receive a partly variable reward, with a minimum of 3%. 
3 72% of respondents do not receive any part of their reward in stock-based form. 
 
 
 
Table A1-2: Sample characteristics 
Variable  Descriptive 
Organizational size  37960 (mean) 
Organizational unit size1  2577 (mean) 
Type of industry Agrarian/industrial production 32% 
 Trade 16% 
 Financial services 20% 
 Other services 32% 
1 Refers to unit at which the respondents’ activities are aimed, not to financial/ 
  accounting department. 
 
 
 
Table A1-3: Respondents’ tasks 
Variable % 
At least some management-supporting tasks 99 
Average share of management-supporting tasks in total task package 39 
Member of management team 66 
Management tasks are part of job 92 
Average share of management tasks in total task package 44 
Involved in investment decisions 70 
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APPENDIX A3 
 
 
Table A3-1: Non-response bias analysis, independent t-tests 
Mean (s.d) Variable 
Early respondents Late respondents 
t-value1 p-value 
(two-tailed) 
MTO (length) 27.92 (23.88) 26.10 (26.11) 0.42 0.676 
Degree of lead 8.09 (5.59) 8.46 (7.47) -0.23 0.819 
Evaluation period 96.78 (128.79)  76.35 (113.75) 0.85 0.399 
Subjectivity 2.97 (0.92) 3.17 (0.84) -1.42 0.157 
Data manipulation 1.26 (0.28) 1.20 (0.19) 1.50 0.137 
Ease-of-manipulation 2.34 (0.65) 2.50 (0.82) -0.96 0.339 
Propensity to leave 2.83 (0.69) 2.75 (0.70) 0.66 0.509 
CFC 3.69 (0.32) 3.76 (0.33) -1.41 0.162 
Slack  2.29 (0.47) 2.40 (0.55) -1.27 0.206 
1 Equal variances not assumed. 
 
 
 
Table A3-2: Non-response bias analysis, Mann-Whitney U-test 
Variable Mann-Whitney 
U-test 
Wilcoxon W Z-value Asymp. 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
MTO (length) 2011.5 3964.5 -0.860 0.390 
Degree of lead 558.0 1188.0 -0.242 0.809 
Evaluation period 1125.0 2206.0 -1.284 0.199 
Subjectivity 2350.5 5200.5 -1.373 0.170 
Data manipulation 2417.0 4902.0 -0.853 0.394 
Ease-of-manipulation 876.5 1911.5 -0.408 0.683 
Propensity to leave 2517.0 5002.0 -0.430 0.667 
CFC 2226.0 5076.0 -1.585 0.113 
Slack  2296.5 5146.5 -1.175 0.240 
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Table A4-1: Reliability analysis, original scales 
Variable Internal 
composite 
reliability 
Average 
 Variance 
Extracted 
Item Factor 
loading 
Subjectivity 0.875 0.779 a 0.854 
   b 0.910 
Data manipulation 0.724 0.419 a 0.820 
   b 0.806 
   c 0.434 
   d 0.410 
Ease-of-manipulation 0.834 0.626 a 0.773 
   b 0.765 
   c 0.833 
Propensity to leave 0.754 0.468 a 0.862 
   b 0.742 
   c 0.728 
   d 0.220 
CFC 0.647 0.158 a 0.653 
   b 0.725 
   c 0.230 
   d 0.499 
   e 0.322 
   f 0.185 
   g 0.211 
   h 0.317 
   i 0.194 
   j 0.284 
   k 0.301 
   l 0.384 
Slack  0.593 0.306 a 0.826 
   b -0.061 
   c 0.255 
   d 0.262 
   e 0.842 
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Table A4-2: Cross-loadings, original scales 
Variable Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Subjectivity  a  0.873 a -0.018  0.044  0.345 a   0.039  0.117 
 b  0.893 a -0.127  0.080  0.395 a  -0.035  0.000 
2. Data manipulation a -0.052  0.866 a  0.148  0.101 -0.070 -0.247 a 
 b -0.068  0.830 a  0.287 a  0.020 -0.109 -0.145 c 
 c -0.084  0.362 a  0.056 -0.037  0.000 -0.055 
 d -0.023  0.408 a  0.145  0.178 b -0.099 -0.066 
3. Ease-of-manipulation a  0.084  0.241 b  0.798 a  0.157 -0.076  0.001 
 b  0.074  0.096  0.751 a  0.333 a -0.154 -0.027 
 c  0.017  0.214 b  0.806 a  0.256 b -0.107 -0.125 
4. Propensity to leave a  0.378 a  0.033  0.308a  0.875 a -0.152 c  0.055 
 b  0.227 a  0.137 c  0.346a  0.749 a -0.018  0.099 
 c  0.328 a  0.056  0.061  0.725 a -0.081  0.080 
 d -0.053  0.046  0.128 0.253 a -0.010 -0.083 
5. CFC a -0.076  0.004 -0.136 -0.176 b  0.520 a  0.021 
 b  0.132  0.030 -0.124 -0.008  0.749 a  0.020 
 c -0.217 a -0.066 -0.273 a -0.092  0.230 a  0.120 
 d -0.048 -0.167 b -0.184 c -0.149 c  0.500 a  0.038 
 e  0.024 -0.077 -0.003 -0.053  0.368 a  0.092 
 f -0.194 b -0.039  0.292 a -0.076  0.172 b  0.058 
 g -0.012 -0.027 -0.056 -0.093  0.233 a -0.129 
 h  0.045 -0.245 a -0.070  0.035  0.268 a -0.070 
 i -0.232 a -0.178 b -0.046 -0.139 c  0.200 b  0.002 
 j -0.148 c -0.086  0.147 -0.093  0.305 a -0.145 c 
 k -0.151 c -0.041 -0.149 -0.194 b  0.337 a  0.053 
 l -0.126 -0.030 -0.047 -0.147 c  0.435 a -0.109 
6. Slack  a -0.005 -0.113 -0.031  0.141 c  0.050  0.850 a 
 b  0.272 a  0.160 b  0.201 c  0.160 b  0.075 -0.140 c 
 c  0.203 b -0.066  0.014 -0.056  0.067  0.159 b 
 d  0.252 a  0.036  0.195 c  0.089 -0.011  0.241 a 
 e  0.151 b -0.168 b -0.018  0.081 -0.017  0.821 a 
a p<0.01; b p<0.05; c p<0.10 (two-tailed). For discriminant validity, items should load higher on their 
own construct (in bold) than on other constructs and no other item should load higher on a construct 
that it was not supposed to measure. (Factor loadings may differ from table A4-1 due to rounding 
errors.) 
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Table A4-3: Correlations between PLS-variables, original scales 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Subjectivity   0.883      
2. Data manipulation -0.078  0.647     
3. Ease-of-manipulation  0.098  0.292 b  0.791    
4. Propensity to leave  0.440 a  0.144  0.293 a  0.684   
5. CFC  0.009 -0.101 -0.135 -0.146  0.397  
6. Slack   0.084 -0.260 a -0.063  0.104  0.045  0.553 
a p<0.01; b p<0.05 (two-tailed). Diagonal elements represent the square root of the average 
variance extracted (bold). Off-diagonal elements are Pearson-correlations. If diagonal 
elements are larger than off-diagonal elements, discriminant validity is achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4-4: Reliability analysis after item trimming 
Variable Internal 
composite 
reliability 
Average 
 variance 
extracted 
Item Factor 
loading 
Subjectivity 0.874 0.776 a 0.836 
   b 0.923 
Data manipulation 0.858 0.752 a 0.856 
   b 0.879 
Ease-of-manipulation 0.837 0.631 a 0.773 
   b 0.765 
   c 0.833 
Propensity to leave 0.836 0.632 a 0.878 
   b 0.790 
   c 0.708 
CFC 0.813 0.686 a 0.788 
   b 0.866 
Slack  0.857 0.750 a 0.860 
   e 0.871 
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Table A4-5: Cross-loadings after item trimming 
Variable Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Subjectivity  a  0.858 a  0.024  0.069  0.335 a  0.108  0.161 c 
 b  0.909 a -0.125  0.108  0.390 a  0.054  0.027 
2. Data manipulation a -0.042  0.881 a  0.148  0.145 c  0.020 -0.239 a 
 b -0.067  0.854 a  0.316 a  0.041 -0.018 -0.161 c 
3. Ease-of-manipulation a  0.097  0.226 a  0.804 a  0.161 -0.088 -0.011 
 b  0.115  0.160  0.783 a  0.320 a -0.182 c  0.062 
 c  0.038  0.232 b  0.791 a  0.254 b -0.159 -0.079 
4. Propensity to leave a  0.412 a  0.062  0.305 a  0.886 a -0.095  0.090 
 b  0.242 a  0.156 c  0.343 a  0.789 a  0.027  0.136 
 c  0.332 a  0.066  0.056  0.698 a -0.088  0.145 c 
5. CFC a -0.048  0.054 -0.146 -0.157c  0.695 a  0.033 
 b  0.152c -0.026 -0.141 -0.016  0.927 a  0.073 
6. Slack  a  0.007 -0.187b -0.029  0.151 c  0.104  0.875 a 
 e  0.169 b -0.217 a -0.002  0.107  0.014  0.857 a 
a p<0.01; b p<0.05; c p<0.10 (two-tailed). For discriminant validity, items should load higher on their 
own construct (in bold) than on other constructs and no other item should load higher on a construct 
that it was not supposed to measure. (Factor loadings may differ from table A4-4 due to rounding 
errors.) 
 
 
 
Table A4-6: Correlations between PLS-variables after item trimming 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Subjectivity   0.881      
2. Data manipulation -0.074  0.867     
3. Ease-of-manipulation  0.103  0.273 b  0.794    
4. Propensity to leave  0.408 a  0.106  0.302 a  0.795   
5. CFC  0.063  0.012 -0.184 -0.095  0.828  
6. Slack   0.097 -0.229 a -0.018  0.150 c  0.064  0.866 
a p<0.01; b p<0.05; c p<0.10 (two-tailed). Diagonal elements represent the square root of the 
average variance extracted (bold). Off-diagonal elements are Pearson-correlations. If diagonal 
elements are larger than off-diagonal elements, discriminant validity is achieved. 
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Figure A4-1: PLS results after item trimming 
a p<0.01; b p<0.05; c p<0.10 (two-tailed). 
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APPENDIX A5 
Table A5-1: Regression analysis; dependent variable = MTO 
Variable Expected 
sign 
Standardized 
β-coefficient 
p-value 
Constant   0.301 
Degree of lead (L) + -0.01 0.980 
Evaluation period (P) + -0.03 0.869 
Interaction (L x P) + +0.59 0.029 
Industry1  +0.26 0.067 
Strategy2 + +0.04 0.750 
Organizational size3  -0.23 0.091 
n = 52. F-value =  3.907 ( p=0.004). Adjusted R2 = 0.28. 
The analysis is based on standardized variables. 
1 Industry was measured by a dummy (1 if production, 0 otherwise). 
Including other dummies also (for trade and financial services) does 
not materially affect results, with the interaction term still having a 
significant p-value. 
2 Strategy was measured with the instrument developed by 
Govindarajan and Gupta (1985); higher values for strategy 
correspond to a more build oriented, and presumably longer term 
strategy.  
3 Organizational size was measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees.  
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Table A6-1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis K-S value1 p-value2 
Degree of lead 8.24 6.54 1.921 4.654 1.655 0.008 
Evaluation period 86.96 120.93 1.862 1.599 4.536 0.000 
1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality; 2 Significance (two-tailed) of K-S value 
 
 
 
Table A6-2: ANOVA; DV = MTO 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
square 
F p-value 
Corrected model 70771 3 2359 6.291 0.001 
Intercept 20307 1 20307 54.159 0.000 
Degree of lead (L) 3660 1 3660 9.762 0.003 
Evaluation period (P) 800 1 800 2.134 0.150 
Interaction (L x P) 2888 1 2888 7.702 0.008 
Error 19497 52 375   
Total 71066 56    
Corrected total 26574 55    
1R2=0.266, Adj. R2=0.224.        
35,0 30,0 25,0 20,0 15,0 10,0 5,0 0,0 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Std. Dev = 6,54  
Mean = 8,2
N = 69,00
Figure A6-1: Histograms  
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APPENDIX B1 
Experimental materials: instruction screens 
Reproduced and translated (original screens in Dutch) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instruction: general information (page 1/5) 
 
General information 
This study investigates investment decisions. 
The study consists of a task in which you are asked how much you would like to invest in a 
specific project. 
 
Introduction of the task 
Assume you are working as a manager in a large company. Your job as a manager is to take 
decisions that are in the interest of the company. The company you work for is a for-profit 
organization with the objective to maximize long term value. The company has enough cash 
to repay all its debts.   
 
As a manager, you are in charge of a business unit which produces 16 products, each in a 
separate plant. The plants are essentially identical en produce similar products, but for 
different target markets.  
 
At this time, you have the possibility to invest in 1 of the plants. This investment will increase 
customer satisfaction and customer retention of the customers of this plant and it will also 
increase the profit of the plant. This investment opportunity will also apply to the other plants 
in later periods. However, you can only invest in one plant at a time, to a maximum amount of 
10.000 per period. 
 
In total you will be working for 16 periods as a manager for this company. At the start of each 
of these periods, you can invest any amount in the range of 0-10.000 in 1 of the plants in 
your business unit. 
 
The next instruction page describes how your reward is determined. 
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1 Condition specific: in conditions with a long evaluation period, this paragraph read as follows: You will be 
rewarded based on the profit level of your business unit at the end of periods 8 and 16. Your reward will be 
based on the cumulative profits from the previous eight periods, for all plants in your business unit together. 
2 Condition specific: in conditions with a low degree of lead the performance indicator was customer 
retention instead of customer satisfaction. 
 
Instruction: your reward scheme (page 2/5) 
 
Your reward is based on a financial and a non-financial indicator. 
 
Every period, you will be rewarded based on the profit of your business unit that period. 
Your reward based on profit, for all plants together, will be determined at the end of each 
period1. 
 
For every 1.000 profit, you will receive a reward of 0,06 euro. 
 
Your current profit level is 10.000 per period – this amount of profit stems from current 
activities and will remain unchanged in the absence of any further action (such as 
investments). 
 
To determine your reward, the amount invested that period will be subtracted from your 
profit level, while any returns from investment in previous periods will be added to the profit 
level.  
 
Every period, you will also be rewarded based on the score for customer satisfaction for the 
products of all plants in your business unit together. Every period you score 1 point for the 
determination of your reward for every 1% customer satisfaction2. The 16 products of your 
business unit now all have 80% customer satisfaction2 each – therefore, you score 16 x 80 = 
1280 points for customer satisfaction2 for the determination of your reward. Customer 
satisfaction2 will also remain unchanged in the absence of any further action (such as 
investments). 
 
Per 100 points of customer satisfaction2, you will receive a reward of 0,02 euro. 
 
Payment: 
The reward you earn during the task will be periodically reported to you during the task, and 
will actually be paid to you at the end of the study!!! 
 
The next instruction page provides an overview of investment projects similar to the 
one you can invest in, that have been carried out in similar plants by managers in 
different business units.  
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1 Condition specific: in conditions with a long evaluation period, this paragraph read as follows: Your reward 
based on profit will be determined after every eight periods over cumulative profits; your reward based on 
customer satisfaction2 will be determined at the end of each period. 
2 Condition specific: in conditions with a low degree of lead the performance indicator was customer 
retention instead of customer satisfaction. 
Instruction: summary (page 4/5) 
 
* Your task is to take an investment decision. 
  
* Investing has an effect on customer satisfaction, customer retention, and (possibly) profit – 
see table 
 
* At the start of each of the 16 periods you will be asked to make an investment decision 
 
* Each period you can invest in another plant; the decisions are therefore independent 
 
* You may invest any amount in the range 0-10000 in each period 
 
* Your reward will be based on both profit and customer satisfaction2, based on the figures 
for your whole business unit (all plants/product together) 
 
* Your reward based on profit and your reward based on customer satisfaction2 will be 
determined at the end of each period1 
 
* At the start of each period, your profit is 10000 (from other current activities; this will 
change only when you decide to invest (>0)) 
 
* To determine your reward, the invested amount is subtracted from your profit level and 
returns from investments in previous periods are added to your profit level 
 
* There is a 5% probability that your competitors will follow your decision immediately and 
that an investment (>0) does not lead to higher profit levels in future periods and will 
generate no financial returns at all. The non-financial indicators are always affected if you 
invest (>0). 
 
 
Assume there are no interest- and tax considerations, in other words that both the tax rate 
and the interest percentage are 0%. 
 
 The next and final instruction page provides a summarizing timeline for this study. 
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APPENDIX B2 
Manipulation and comprehension check questions 
Reproduced and translated (original screens in Dutch) 
 
 
Questions 1-8: in case of an incorrect answer, subjects were automatically taken back to the appropriate 
instruction screen until a correct answer was provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[answer: customer satisfaction and profit for conditions I and II, customer retention and profit for conditions 
III and IV] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[answer: “16”] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[answer: “1” for conditions I and III, “8” for conditions II and IV]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[answer: “1”] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[answer: “5”] 
1. Which of the following performance measures form(s) the basis for the determination of your 
reward? 
 
Multiple answers possible 
 
 customer satisfaction   
 customer retention 
 profit 
 
2. Of how many periods, in which you will be asked to make an investment decision, does this study 
consist?  
 
 ____ periods 
 
3. What is the frequency of the determination of your reward based on profit?  
 
 Once per ____ period(s) 
4. What is the frequency of the determination of your reward based on a non-financial measure?  
 
 Once per ____ period(s) 
5. Suppose that you decide to invest (investment>0), what is the probabiltiy that this investment will 
not affect profits in future periods?  
 
 Probability =  ____ % 
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[answer: “0”] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[answer: “6”] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[answer: “7”] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[answer: “2200”. After the subject had provided an answer, the following example calculation was shown: 
“An investment of 4000 yields a 10% return, so 4400 in total. This return is booked in two periods, 6 and 7 
periods after the investment. Thus, 4400 / 2 = 2200 per period. Note: during the investment task there is 
also a 5% chance that the competitors will follow immediately and you will get no payback at all from your 
investment.”] 
 
 
6. Suppose that you decide to invest (investment>0), what is the probabiltiy that this investment will 
not affect non-financial indicators in future periods?  
 
 Probability =  ____ % 
 
7. Suppose that you decide to invest at the beginning of period 1 (t=0), at the end of which period will 
this investment affect profits for the first time? 
 
Assume that the competitors did not follow your decision to invest (in other words, an effect is certain) 
 
 First effect on profits at the end of period  ____  
 
8. Suppose that you decide to invest at the beginning of period 1 (t=0), at the end of which period will 
this investment affect profits for the last time? 
 
Assume that the competitors did not follow your decision to invest (in other words, an effect is certain) 
 
 Last effect on profits at the end of period  ____  
 
9. How much will profits increase in period 6 due to an investment of 4000 at the beginning of period 1 
(t=0)? 
 
Assume that the competitors did not follow your decision to invest (in other words, an effect is certain) 
 
 Profits will increase with  ____  
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APPENDIX B3 
Screenshots of performance reports from first eight periods 
Reproduced and translated (original screens in Dutch) 
Invested amounts in example: 5000, 7500, 9000, 10000, 2500, 6000, 1000, 500. 
 
 
Screenshot condition I, period 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 1 – Bonus determination at end of period 
Profit this period (fixed base amount):    10.000 
 
Invested this period:     5.000 - 
 
 
Profit this period:      5.000 
 
Profit from investments in earlier periods:  0 + 
 
 
Total profit     5.000 
 
 
Your reward this period based on profit: 5.000 x E 0.06 per 1000 = E ,3 
 
 
 
Customer satisfaction this period: 
 
15 factories, 80% each Æ points:       1.200 
 
Invested in factory 1 this period: 5.000. Customer satisfaction: 85% Æ points:   85 + 
 
 
Customer satisfaction total this period:       1.285 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer satisfaction: 1.285 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,26 
 
 
 
 
Your total reward this period: E ,3 + E ,26 = E ,56 
 
 
 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 2 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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Screenshot condition I, period 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screenshot condition 2, period 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 8 – Bonus determination at end of period 
Profit this period (fixed base amount):    10.000 
 
Invested this period:     500 - 
 
 
Profit this period:      9.500 
 
Profit from investment of 7.500 in period 2:   4.125 + 
Profit from investment of 9.000 in period 3:  4.950 + 
 
Total profit     18.575 
 
 
Your reward this period based on profit: 18.575 x E 0.06 per 1000 = E 1,11 
 
 
 
Customer satisfaction this period: 
 
8 factories, 80% each Æ points:       640 
 
Invested in 1 of the factories this period: 500. Customer satisfaction: 80,5% Æ points:  80,5 + 
From investments in earlier periods (earliest first): 85; 87,5; 89; 90; 82,5; 86; 81 Æ   601 + 
 
Customer satisfaction total this period:       1.321,5 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer satisfaction: 1.321,5 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,26 
 
 
 
Your total reward this period: E 1,11 + E ,26 = E 1,38 
 
Total reward including all previous periods:  
Based on profits: ,3 + ,15 + ,06 + 0 + ,45 + ,41 + ,95 + 1,11 = 3,43; 
Based on customer satisfaction: ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 = 2,09; 
Total: 3,43 + 2,09 = 5,53 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 9 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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Screenshot condition II, period 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screenshot condition 3, period 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 1 – Bonus determination at end of period 
 
 
 
 
 
Your reward based on profits is not determined this period. 
 
 
At the end of periods 8 and 16, your reward based on profits will be determined on the basis of the cumulative profits 
from the preceding eight periods. The cumulative profits will be determined by subtracting the invested amounts from 
the periodic fixed amounts of profits and adding returns from previous investments to the periodic fixed amounts of 
profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Customer satisfaction this period: 
 
15 factories, 80% each Æ points:       1.200 
 
Invested in factory 1 this period: 5.000. Customer satisfaction: 85% Æ points:   85 + 
 
 
Customer satisfaction total this period:       1.285 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer satisfaction: 1.285 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,26 
 
 
 
Your total reward this period: E ,26 
 
 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 2 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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Screenshot condition II, period 8 
 
 
 
 Period 8 – Bonus determination at end of period 
Profit each period (fixed base amount): 10.000 x 8 periods: 80.000 
 
Invested in periods 1-8 (earliest first): 
5.000+7.500+9.000+10.000+2.500+6.000+1.000+500= 41.500 - 
 
Profit this rewardperiod:     38.500 
 
Profit from investments, booked in period 6:   2.750  +   (2.750 from inv. in period 1) 
Profit from investments, booked in period 7:  6.875  +   (2.750 from inv. in period 1 and 4.125 from period 2) 
Profit from investments, booked in period 8:  9.075  +   (4.125 from inv. in period 2 and 4.950 from period 3) 
 
Total profit     57.200 
 
Your reward this period based on profit: 57.200 x E 0.06 per 1000 = E 3,43 
 
 
 
Customer satisfaction this period: 
 
8 factories, 80% each Æ points:       640 
 
Invested in 1 of the factories this period: 500. Customer satisfaction: 80,5% Æ points:  80,5 + 
From investments in earlier periods (earliest first): 85; 87,5; 89; 90; 82,5; 86; 81 Æ   600 + 
 
Customer satisfaction total this period:       1.321,5 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer satisfaction: 1.321,5 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,26 
 
 
 
Your total reward this period: E 3,43 + E ,26 = E 1,38 
 
Total reward including all previous periods:  
Based on profits: 3,43 
Based on customer satisfaction: ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 = 2,09; 
Total: 3,43 + 2,09 = 5,53 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 9 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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Screenshot condition III, period 1 
 
 
 
Period 1 – Bonus determination at end of period 
Profit this period (fixed base amount):    10.000 
 
Invested this period:     5.000 - 
 
 
Profit this period:      5.000 
 
Profit from investments in earlier periods:  0 + 
 
 
Total profit     5.000 
 
 
Your reward this period based on profit: 5.000 x E 0.06 per 1000 = E ,3 
 
 
 
Customer retention this period: 
 
16 factories, 80% each (unchanged) Æ points:      1.280 
 
    
 
 
Customer retention total this period:       1.280 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer retention: 1.280 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,26 
 
 
 
 
Your total reward this period: E ,3 + E ,26 = E ,56 
 
 
 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 2 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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Screenshot condition III, period 5 
This is the first period showing an effect on the customer retention measure 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 5 – Bonus determination at end of period 
Profit this period (fixed base amount):    10.000 
 
Invested this period:     2.500 - 
 
 
Profit this period:      7.500 
 
Profit from investments in earlier periods:  0 + 
 
 
Total profit     7.500 
 
 
Your reward this period based on profit: 7.500 x E 0.06 per 1000 = E ,45 
 
 
 
Customer retention this period: 
 
15 factories, 80% each Æ points       1.200 
 
Invested in a factory in period 1: 5.000. Customer retention this period: 89,13% Æ points:  89,13 + 
 
 
Customer retention total this period:       1.289,13 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer retention: 1.289,13 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,26 
 
 
 
Your total reward this period: E ,45 + E ,26 = E ,71 
 
Total reward including all previous periods:  
Based on profits: ,3 + ,15 + ,06 + 0 + ,45 = ,96; 
Based on customer retention: ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 = 1,28; 
Total: ,96 + 1,28 = 2,24 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 6 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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Screenshot condition III, period 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 8 – Bonus determination at end of period 
Profit this period (fixed base amount):    10.000 
 
Invested this period:     500 - 
 
 
Profit this period:      9.500 
 
Profit from investment of 7.500 in period 2:   4.125 + 
Profit from investment of 9.000 in period 3:  4.950 + 
 
Total profit     18.575 
 
 
Your reward this period based on profit: 18.575 x E 0.06 per 1000 = E 1,11 
 
 
 
Customer retention this period: 
 
12 factories, 80% each Æ points:       960 
 
Invested in a factory in period 4: 10.000. Customer retention this period: 98,25% Æ points:  98,25 + 
From investments in earlier periods (earliest first): 89,13; 93,96; 96,42 Æ    279,24 + 
 
Customer retention total this period:       1.337,49 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer retention: 1.337,49 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,27 
 
 
 
Your total reward this period: E 1,11 + E ,27 = E 1,38 
 
Total reward including all previous periods:  
Based on profits: ,3 + ,15 + ,06 + 0 + ,45 + ,41 + ,95 + 1,11 = 3,43; 
Based on customer retention: ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,27 = 2,07; 
Total: 3,43 + 2,07 = 5,51 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 9 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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Screenshot condition IV, period 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 1 – Bonus determination at end of period 
 
 
 
 
 
Your reward based on profits is not determined this period. 
 
 
At the end of periods 8 and 16, your reward based on profits will be determined on the basis of the cumulative profits 
from the preceding eight periods. The cumulative profits will be determined by subtracting the invested amounts from 
the periodic fixed amounts of profits and adding returns from previous investments to the periodic fixed amounts of 
profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Customer retention this period: 
 
16 factories, 80% each (unchanged) Æ points:      1.280 
 
  
 
Customer retention total this period:       1.280 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer retention: 1.280 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,26 
 
 
 
 
Your total reward this period: E ,26 
 
 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 2 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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Screenshot condition IV, period 5 
This is the first period showing an effect on the customer retention measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 5 – Bonus determination at end of period 
 
 
 
 
 
Your reward based on profits are not determined this period. 
 
 
At the end of periods 8 and 16, your reward based on profits will be determined on the basis of the cumulative profits 
from the preceding eight periods. The cumulative profits will be determined by subtracting the invested amounts from 
the periodic fixed amounts of profits and adding returns from previous investments to the periodic fixed amounts of 
profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Customer retention this period: 
 
15 factories, 80% each Æ points:       1.200 
 
Invested in a factory in period 1: 5.000. Customer retention this period: 89,13% Æ points:  89,13 + 
 
 
Customer retention total this period:       1.289,13 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer retention: 1.289,13 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,26 
 
Your total reward this period: E ,26 
 
Total reward including all previous periods:  
Based on profits: 0; 
Based on customer retention: ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 = 1,28; 
Total: 0 + 1,28 = 1,28 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 6 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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Screenshot condition IV, period 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 8 – Bonus determination at end of period 
Profit each period (fixed base amount): 10.000 x 8 periods: 80.000 
 
Invested in periods 1-8 (earliest first): 
5.000+7.500+9.000+10.000+2.500+6.000+1.000+500= 41.500 - 
 
Profit this rewardperiod:     38.500 
 
Profit from investments, booked in period 6:   2.750  +   (2.750 from inv. in period 1) 
Profit from investments, booked in period 7:  6.875  +   (2.750 from inv. in period 1 and 4.125 from period 2) 
Profit from investments, booked in period 8:  9.075  +   (4.125 from inv. in period 2 and 4.950 from period 3) 
 
Total profit     57.200 
 
Your reward this period based on profit: 57.200 x E 0.06 per 1000 = E 3,43 
 
 
 
Customer retention this period: 
 
12 factories, 80% each Æ points:       960 
 
Invested in a factory in period 4: 10.000. Customer retention this period: 98,25% Æ points:  98,25 + 
From investments in earlier periods (earliest first): 89,13; 93,96; 96,42 Æ    279,24 + 
 
Customer retention total this period:       1.337,49 
 
 
Your reward this period based on customer retention: 1.337,49 x E 0,02 per 100 = E ,27 
 
 
 
Your total reward this period: E 3,43 + E ,27 = E 3,7 
 
Total reward including all previous periods:  
Based on profits: 3,43 
Based on customer retention: ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,26 + ,27 = 2,07; 
Total: 3,43 + 2,07 = 5,51 
Introduction Reward scheme Investment table Summary Timeline To period 9 (of 16) 
While studying these results you may return to the instructions, and afterwards you can continue to the next period: 
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 Condition IV 
Condition N  Mean Variance Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis K-S 
value1 
p-value2 
I 47 77972 716911763 26775 0.469  0.485 0.589 0.878 
II 47 96762 771172511 27770 0.304 -0.282 0.878 0.423 
III 47 83991 444791348 21090 0.354  0.220 0.647 0.796 
IV 47 92236 970059487 31146 0.090 -0.662 0.473 0.979 
1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality; 2 Significance (two-tailed) of K-S value. 
Figure B4-1: Histograms for each condition of DV “sum invested amounts – all periods” 
Table B4-1: Descriptives per treatment condition  
DV = sum invested amounts – all periods 
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 Condition IV 
 
 
Condition N  Mean Variance Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis K-S 
value1 
p-value2 
I 47 11527 232880510 15260 1.790  3.104 1.543 0.017 
II 47 25872 362148855 19030 0.204 -1.094 0.656 0.782 
III 47 15457 243245728 15596 0.863 -0.058 1.163 0.134 
IV 47 25127 341448458 18478 0.246 -1.014 0.626 0.827 
1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality; 2 Significance (two-tailed) of K-S value. 
Figure B4-2: Histograms for each condition of DV “sum invested amounts – periods 11-16” 
Table B4-2: Descriptives per treatment condition  
DV = sum invested amounts - periods 11-16 
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Table B5-1: One-way ANOVA-analyses on 
invested amounts per period 
Variable F-value p-value 
Amount1 0.512 0.674 
Amount2* 2.557 0.057 
Amount3 0.741 0.529 
Amount4 1.541 0.205 
Amount5 1.186 0.316 
Amount6 1.878 0.135 
Amount7* 2.910 0.036 
Amount8 2.446 0.065 
Amount9 0.227 0.877 
Amount10 1.692 0.170 
Amount11 6.006 0.001 
Amount12 3.820 0.011 
Amount13 4.425 0.005 
Amount14 7.473 0.000 
Amount15 4.760 0.003 
Amount16 7.954 0.000 
* In addition to the last 6 periods, full factorial 
ANOVAs reveal a significant main effect of 
evaluation period for amount2 and amount7 
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Table B5-2: Post-hoc (LSD) condition comparisons; 
significant differences (p<0.05) 
variable condition minus 
condition 
mean 
difference 
p-value 
Amount2* I II -1351 0.046 
  IV -1532 0.024 
Amount4 I II -1491 0.039 
Amount6 II IV -1666 0.025 
Amount7* I IV 1960 0.007 
 III IV 1654 0.022 
Amount8 I IV 2000 0.008 
Amount10 I IV -1674 0.026 
Amount11 I II -2283 0.005 
  IV -3251 0.000 
 III IV -1834 0.022 
Amount12 I II -1855 0.019 
  IV -2487 0.002 
Amount13 I II -2420 0.002 
  IV -2126 0.005 
 II III 1527 0.044 
Amount14 I II -2659 0.000 
  IV -2500 0.001 
 II III 2359 0.001 
 III IV -2200 0.003 
Amount15 I II -2178 0.002 
  IV -1512 0.031 
 II III 2084 0.003 
 III IV -1418 0.043 
Amount16 I II -2950 0.000 
  IV -1724 0.013 
 II III 2662 0.000 
 III IV -1437 0.037 
Variables with a significant one-way ANOVA are printed bold. 
Insignificant differences (p>0.05) are not reported. 
* In addition to the last 6 periods, full factorial ANOVAs reveal 
a significant main effect of evaluation period for amount2 and 
amount7 
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Table B6-1: Descriptive statistics covariates 
Variable Items Cronbach 
α 
Theoretical 
range 
Actual 
range 
Mean  Median Standard 
deviation 
CFC See survey 
section1 
0.76 1-5 1.83-4.83 3.57 3.63 0.47 
Risk 
aversion 
See table B6-2 0.84 0-1 0.15-1.00 0.60 0.57 0.15 
Ethical 
behavior 
See table B6-3 0.37 1-5 1.50-5.00 3.68 4.00 0.70 
Experience 
PMS 
Dummy variable2 
(1=yes) 
- 0-1 0-1 0.15 0 0.36 
Knowledge 
BSC 
Dummy variable3 
(1=yes) 
- 0-1 0-1 0.96 1 0.19 
Gender Dummy variable 
(1=female) 
- 0-1 0-1 0.27 0 0.44 
Age - - 18+ 20-35 22.39 22.00 2.09 
1 Factor analysis revealed a 4-factor structure. Consistent with Petrocelli (2004) (except for item b) and with 
the results of the survey, forcing a 2-factor structure revealed that all reversed items loaded together as did 
all non-reversed items. To enable comparison with the survey results and with previous research, all items 
were retained and the average was used as a variable. See the survey chapter for further explanation and 
motivation. 
2 The question asked was whether the subject had any experience with designing a PMS.  
3 The question asked was whether the subject was familiar with the BSC concept.  
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Table B6-4:  ANCOVA; DV = sum invested amounts – periods 11-16 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
square 
F p-value 
Corrected model 99623662651 10 996236627 3.427 0.000 
Intercept 511980909 1 511980909 1.761 0.186 
Degree of lead (L) 111939695 1 111939695 0.385 0.536 
Evaluation period (P) 7086319838 1 7086319838 24.375 0.000 
Interaction (L x P) 162015476 1 162015476 0.557 0.456 
CFC 72116440 1 72116440 0.248 0.619 
Risk aversion 111074722 1 111074722 0.382 0.537 
Ethical behavior 520570699 1 520570699 1.791 0.183 
Experience PMS 678876229 1 678876229 2.335 0.128 
Knowledge BSC 523497755 1 523497755 1.801 0.181 
Gender 872972229 1 872972229 3.003 0.085 
Age 84232389 1 84232389 0.290 0.591 
Error 5.146E+10 177 290720150   
Total 1.329E+10 188    
Corrected total 6.142E+10 187    
1R2=0.162, Adj. R2=0.115. 
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APPENDIX B8 
 
Table B8-1: Paired samples t-tests of mean differences: 
condition I 
difference mean 
difference 
p-value 
amount1-amount2 1032 0.052 
amount2-amount3 -249 0.634 
amount3-amount4 430 0.535 
amount4-amount5 -511 0.354 
amount5-amount6 36 0.940 
amount6-amount7 -1164 0.017 
amount7-amount8 -74 0.877 
amount8-amount9 -79 0.890 
amount9-amount10 1702 0.004 
amount10-amount11 3074 0.000 
amount11-amount12 460 0.344 
amount12-amount13 469 0.228 
amount13-amount14 299 0.323 
amount14-amount15 44 0.857 
amount15-amount16 447 0.078 
 
 
Table B8-2: Paired samples t-tests of mean differences: 
condition II 
difference mean 
difference 
p-value 
amount1-amount2 -787 0.078 
amount2-amount3 212 0.669 
amount3-amount4 -172 0.761 
amount4-amount5 50 0.921 
amount5-amount6 -330 0.561 
amount6-amount7 1033 0.060 
amount7-amount8 -270 0.589 
amount8-amount9 -459 0.482 
amount9-amount10 500 0.231 
amount10-amount11 1670 0.010 
amount11-amount12 887 0.138 
amount12-amount13 -96 0.828 
amount13-amount14 60 0.878 
amount14-amount15 525 0.178 
amount15-amount16 326 0.380 
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Table B8-3: Paired samples t-tests of mean differences: 
condition III 
difference mean 
difference 
p-value 
amount1-amount2 764 0.117 
amount2-amount3 -285 0.625 
amount3-amount4 -330 0.598 
amount4-amount5 362 0.598 
amount5-amount6 -162 0.795 
amount6-amount7 -437 0.316 
amount7-amount8 379 0.390 
amount8-amount9 -703 0.173 
amount9-amount10 689 0.234 
amount10-amount11 2536 0.001 
amount11-amount12 938 0.087 
amount12-amount13 514 0.341 
amount13-amount14 893 0.007 
amount14-amount15 250 0.344 
amount15-amount16 253 0.435 
 
 
Table B8-4: Paired samples t-tests of mean differences: 
condition IV 
difference mean 
difference 
p-value 
amount1-amount2 -181 0.754 
amount2-amount3 468 0.237 
amount3-amount4 404 0.455 
amount4-amount5 734 0.155 
amount5-amount6 0 1.000 
amount6-amount7 428 0.423 
amount7-amount8 -34 0.954 
amount8-amount9 -2294 0.000 
amount9-amount10 243 0.597 
amount10-amount11 1498 0.015 
amount11-amount12 1224 0.025 
amount12-amount13 829 0.050 
amount13-amount14 74 0.771 
amount14-amount15 1032 0.029 
amount15-amount16 234 0.450 
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Figure B8-1: Graphs of invested amounts per condition 
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dit proefschrift beschrijft een studie naar de effecten van het prestatiemeetsysteem, en 
variabelen op individueel niveau, op de tijdsoriëntatie van managers. 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een inleiding ten aanzien van het onderwerp en geeft de relevantie van 
de studie aan. De tijdsoriëntatie van managers (Managerial Time Orientation, MTO) is in 
dit proefschrift gedefinieerd als de tijdsspanne waarbinnen managers de opbrengsten van 
hun investeringen optimaliseren. Het bestuderen van factoren die MTO beïnvloeden heeft 
zowel theoretische als praktische relevantie. Het beschikken over een MTO die passend 
is voor de omstandigheden waarin de onderneming verkeert, is essentieel voor de 
concurrentiepositie en het overleven van ondernemingen op lange termijn.  
Kenmerken van het prestatiemeetsysteem (PMS) en variabelen op individueel 
niveau kunnen beide van invloed zijn op MTO, maar hier is nog relatief weinig 
onderzoek naar gedaan. In de accounting literatuur zijn tot nu toe vooral de effecten van 
financiële (accounting) prestatiemaatstaven op MTO bestudeerd. Er is echter nog weinig 
bewijs aangaande de effecten van andere kenmerken van het PMS op MTO. Bovendien 
worden in de literatuur conclusies getrokken ten aanzien van algemene, brede categorieën 
prestatiemaatstaven, zoals financieel t.o.v. niet-financieel, terwijl veelal niet specifiek 
wordt ingegaan op de processen die leiden tot effecten op MTO. Verder is in de 
accounting literatuur (te) weinig rekening gehouden met variabelen op individueel 
niveau, zoals [1] individuele tijdsoriëntatie, een persoonlijkheidskarakteristiek 
geïdentificeerd in de psychologische literatuur; en [2] werkhorizon (lengte 
arbeidsovereenkomst), een variabele uit de economische literatuur. Dit proefschrift is 
gericht op het dichten van genoemde gaten in de bestaande literatuur door onderstaande 
centrale vraag te beantwoorden:  
Wat zijn de effecten van kenmerken van het prestatiemeetsysteem en variabelen op 
individueel niveau op de tijdsoriëntatie van managers?  
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In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een overzicht gegeven van de literatuur met betrekking tot 
tijdsoriëntatie (van managers). Het hoofdstuk beschrijft voornamelijk studies in de 
accounting literatuur, maar identificeert ook studies aangaande dit onderwerp uit de 
onderliggende economische en psychologische disciplines. Uit deze verschillende 
literatuurstromingen worden kenmerken van het PMS en individuele factoren 
geïdentificeerd die in verband gebracht zijn met MTO.  
 
Het derde hoofdstuk ontwikkelt een theoretisch model, waarin wordt aangegeven hoe de 
verschillende variabelen die in hoofdstuk 2 zijn geïdentificeerd met elkaar en met MTO 
samenhangen. Hieronder worden de hypotheses ten aanzien van directe effecten op MTO 
besproken. 
De eerste hypothese betreft het effect van het gebruik van leading indicators 
(prestatiemaatstaven met een voorspellende waarde voor toekomstige accounting 
resultaten) op MTO. Verwacht wordt dat de degree of lead (lengte van de tijdsspanne 
tussen de leading indicator en een effect op accounting resultaat) van de gebruikte 
prestatiemaatstaf een positief effect heeft op MTO. De reden is dat de manager door de 
leading indicator in geval van een grotere degree of lead geholpen wordt om verder in de 
toekomst te kijken. 
De tweede hypothese voorspelt dat ook een langere evaluatieperiode voor 
accountingresultaten een positief effect heeft op MTO, omdat dit de manager helpt een 
langere beslissingshorizon aan te nemen.  
Hypothese 3 beschrijft het modererende effect van de evaluatieperiode op het 
effect van degree of lead. In geval van een korte evaluatieperiode, zal het effect van 
degree of lead op MTO naar verwachting minder sterk zijn. De manager moet dan 
namelijk meer focussen op korte termijn accountingresultaten, en zal minder geneigd zijn 
acht te slaan op de leading indicator en dientengevolge verder in de toekomst te kijken. 
Ten vierde, subjectiviteit in evaluaties heeft naar verwachting een positief effect 
op MTO, aangezien leidinggevenden meer mogelijkheden hebben de evaluatie te 
corrigeren voor evt. dysfunctioneel korte-termijn gedrag van de ondergeschikte manager. 
Dit in tegenstelling tot het gebruik van objectieve, vooraf vastgestelde beloningsformules. 
Voorts werd voorspeld dat manipulatie van accounting data een positief effect zal 
hebben op MTO. De reden hiervoor is dat flexibiliteit bij het rapporteren over het 
behaalde resultaat druk tot het verminderen van lange-termijn investeringen kan 
wegnemen, omdat het eenvoudiger wordt goede korte-termijn resultaten te rapporteren. 
Tenslotte zijn twee variabelen op individueel niveau in verband gebracht met 
MTO. Van de geneigdheid om de organisatie te verlaten (“propensity to leave”) werd een 
negatief effect op MTO verwacht. Managers die verwachten niet lang meer in functie te 
blijven, zullen immers waarschijnlijk de opbrengsten van lange-termijn investeringen 
mislopen. Van de persoonlijkheidskarakteristiek Consideration of Future Consequences 
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(CFC), die aangeeft in hoeverre men geneigd is rekening te houden met toekomstige 
gevolgen bij het nemen van beslissingen, werd een positieve invloed op MTO voorspeld. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft het vragenlijst-onderzoek dat uitgevoerd is onder financieel 
managers. Het doel van dit empirische onderzoek was het theoretische model aan een 
eerste, generaliseerbare, empirische test te onderwerpen. De resultaten bevestigen de 
hypothesen t.a.v. de interactie van degree of lead en de lengte van de evaluatieperiode, 
subjectiviteit en CFC. Voor de overige voorspelde directe effecten op MTO wordt geen 
ondersteuning gevonden. Niettemin geven de resultaten duidelijk aan dat zowel het 
ontwerp van het PMS (result control) als het aannemen van managers met een CFC die 
bij de gewenste MTO past (personnel control) van belang zijn voor het bereiken van de 
gewenste MTO. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 bevat een beschrijving van het experiment dat ontworpen is om nader 
onderzoek te doen naar het in de eerste drie hypothesen voorspelde interactie-effect. Dit 
experiment heeft als voordelen dat het [1] additioneel bewijs oplevert t.a.v. causale 
effecten; [2] een toets vrij van complicerende factoren, zoals industrie-effecten, mogelijk 
maakt; [3] de mogelijkheid biedt te testen of degree of lead werkelijk de plannings-
horizon van de manager verlengt, in plaats van alleen de lange-termijn investeringen 
vergroot omdat dat de evaluatie gunstig beïnvloedt. Dit laatste kan niet definitief 
vastgesteld worden op basis van de analyse van de verkregen gegevens uit het 
vragenlijst-onderzoek. 
Het experiment is uitgevoerd met studenten uit een accounting-cursus als 
subjecten. De resultaten van het experiment laten zien dat de lengte van de evaluatie-
periode een positief effect heeft op MTO, vooral in geval van een eindige werkhorizon 
(afloop contract). Een langere evaluatie-periode lijkt subjecten te helpen om ook 
toekomstige opbrengsten in ogenschouw te nemen bij hun investeringsbeslissingen. De 
variabele degree of lead had niet het voorspelde effect op de planningshorizon, en had 
geen significant effect op de genomen investeringsbeslissingen. 
 
Het zesde en laatste hoofdstuk bevat een samenvatting en de conclusies van dit 
proefschrift. Hierin worden de resultaten van de twee empirische studies integraal 
besproken. Tevens wordt er aandacht besteed aan de implicaties en contributies, de 
beperkingen van de studies en worden er aanbevelingen voor verder onderzoek gedaan.  
 Degree of lead vertoont in de door middel van het vragenlijst-onderzoek 
verkregen data een interactie-effect met evaluatieperiode. In het experiment had degree of 
lead echter geen significant effect op MTO. Samen suggereren deze resultaten dat degree 
of lead niet de horizon van managers verlengt, maar mogelijk wel de lange-termijn 
investeringen verhoogt. Dit omdat door te investeren in de lange termijn ook de prestatie 
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uitgedrukt in de leading indicator toeneemt, hetgeen in het belang van de manager is 
gezien het gunstige effect op de evaluatie. De implicaties van deze resultaten zijn dat [1] 
bij het ontwerp van een Balanced Scorecard niet alleen de keuze van leading indicators 
van belang is, maar ook het vaststellen van een geschikte evaluatieperiode voor het 
financiële perspectief; [2] dat voorzichtigheid in acht moet worden genomen bij het 
bepalen van het gewicht op een leading indicator, aangezien niet kon worden vastgesteld 
dat deze effect sorteert op de planningshorizon, en het gevaar bestaat dat slechts de 
gemeten prestatiedimensie wordt gemaximaliseerd. 
Verdere implicaties van deze studie zijn ten eerste dat MTO middels subjectiviteit 
beïnvloed kan worden. Vooraf vastgestelde objectieve evaluatie-criteria lijken eerder een 
korte-termijn oriëntatie in managers teweeg te brengen, terwijl subjectievere evaluaties 
MTO juist kunnen verlengen. Ook is gevonden dat (mogelijkheden tot) manipulatie van 
accounting data geen effect hebben op MTO. Tenslotte spelen variabelen op individueel 
niveau, zoals contractshorizon (experiment) en CFC (vragenlijst) een rol van betekenis 
voor de totstandkoming van de tijdsoriëntatie van managers, hetgeen het belang van 
personnel controls benadrukt. 
 
Dit proefschrift draagt op de volgende manieren bij aan de bestaande accounting 
literatuur. In tegenstelling tot de meeste voorgaande studies, beschouwt het specifieke 
kenmerken van het PMS in plaats van brede, algemene categorieën prestatiemaatstaven. 
Het ontwikkelt een theoretisch model, waarin rekening wordt gehouden met de effecten 
op MTO van veel variabelen tegelijkertijd, alsmede met de interrelaties tussen deze 
variabelen. Verder werden ook variabelen op individueel niveau in de analyse betrokken. 
Tenslotte benadert dit proefschrift de centrale vraag interdisciplinair, hetgeen een 
completer beeld oplevert van een complex praktisch vraagstuk.  
 
Zoals elk empirisch onderzoek zijn de twee beschreven studies onderhevig aan 
beperkingen. Het vragenlijst-onderzoek geeft bewijs over correlaties tussen variabelen, 
maar is niet in staat causaliteit aan te tonen. Meer longitudinaal of experimenteel 
onderzoek naar causale effecten tussen alle variabelen is daarvoor vereist. Verder waren 
de verkregen data afkomstig uit verschillende sectoren. Hoewel hiermee in de analyses 
rekening werd gehouden middels een industrie-variabele, is toekomstig onderzoek 
gebaseerd op gegevens uit slechts één sector aanbevelenswaardig om industrie-effecten 
geheel uit te sluiten. Verder is de generaliseerbaarheid van de resultaten beperkt tot de 
populatie van financieel managers. 
In het experiment waren studenten degenen die de investeringsbeslissingen 
namen, hetgeen mogelijk de generaliseerbaarheid van de resultaten naar andere groepen 
vermindert. Ook kan het feit dat de experimentele taak (noodzakelijkerwijs) eenvoudig 
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van opzet was, en in een relatief kort tijdsbestek uitgevoerd werd, mogelijk de 
toepasbaarheid beperken voor de in de praktijk heersende complexere omstandigheden. 
 
Het proefschrift eindigt met enkele verdere aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek, 
waarvan hier de voornaamste nog eens genoemd worden. Aanvullende studies naar het 
relatieve belang van variabelen op individueel niveau, alsmede de wijze waarop deze 
interacties vertonen met variabelen uit het PMS, zijn gewenst. Verder was de focus van 
dit proefschrift niet gericht op de effecten van verschillende beloningsvormen en prikkels 
op MTO, zoals bijvoorbeeld beloningen in de vorm van opties of aandelen en carrière-
overwegingen. Ook hier liggen tal van verdere mogelijkheden voor toekomstig 
onderzoek. 
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Performance Measurement and 
Managerial Time Orientation
Scandals involving managers that have quickly cashed in, leaving
their company in distress, regularly come to light. These managers
have undertaken actions oriented towards short-term gains, such as
lowering service or quality and decreasing long-term investments.
These actions are taken to boost current financial performance,
which commonly forms the basis for managers’ evaluation and rewards.
Although such actions are often dysfunctional, a short-term orien-
tation is not always bad. For example, in case of liquidity problems, a
fast increase in current financial results is required. Clearly, the
adoption of a managerial time orientation that is appropriate for the
circumstances is essential to a company’s success.
This dissertation demonstrates how the design of the performance
measurement system affects the time orientation of managers. It also
shows that managerial time orientation depends on individual
characteristics. The results can be used as guidelines for the use of
performance measures in companies, as well as for the selection of
managers, dependent on the desired managerial time orientation.
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its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
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variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
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creating new business knowledge.
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